> On 26 Jul 2019, at 19:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/26/2019 12:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> You're shifting the argument. One may very well say "yes" to the doctor >>> believing that one's essential character and memories will be preserved, >>> while also believing that many details will be different. >> >> If some details are different (others than seeing different cities after >> opening the reconstitution box, of course), it means that the functional >> digital substitution has not been made at the right level. > > So the thought experiment relies on the reconstitution being exact in every > detail?
At the right substitution level. Iff it is incorrect below that level, that would not influence the first person experience, by the very definition of the substitution level. > >> >> >> >>> So which is it? Is it essential to your argument that the duplication be >>> exact?...exact at what level? >> >> At the substitution level, or below. > > But the question is whether such a "substitution level" exists, I am not really interested in that question. The existence of such a level is my working hypothesis. Then we extracts physics and can see if it is plausible with the observation. To discuss at the start of the level exists can only lead to infinite vague sharing of personal opinions. Better to study the observable consequence, and judge from facts. > and whether it exists depends on how exact the substitute must be. Quantum > mechanics But it is better to not use any hypothesis in physics, when doing metaphysics. I do not assume quantum mechanics. > places a limit on this and does not permit an exact substitute. So it comes > down to a question of how much difference is tolerable. That will depend on > other external factors. No difference in the subjective experience is tolerated. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15f1a3e0-f720-410e-2967-5c842137318e%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/213BB6D4-9163-4CF4-A316-D23888A57F51%40ulb.ac.be.
