> On 27 Jul 2019, at 21:51, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/27/2019 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 26 Jul 2019, at 19:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/26/2019 12:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> You're shifting the argument. One may very well say "yes" to the doctor >>>>> believing that one's essential character and memories will be preserved, >>>>> while also believing that many details will be different. >>>> If some details are different (others than seeing different cities after >>>> opening the reconstitution box, of course), it means that the functional >>>> digital substitution has not been made at the right level. >>> So the thought experiment relies on the reconstitution being exact in every >>> detail? >> At the right substitution level. >> >> Iff it is incorrect below that level, that would not influence the first >> person experience, by the very definition of the substitution level. > But as everyone who is not a logician knows you cannot define something into > existence.
Logicians knows that too. Indeed, that is the whole idea of assuming existence, like agreeing that x + 0 = x. That implies the existence of 0, but only in the frame of that assumption. Except for the personal consciousness here and now, all form of existence are assumed in some implicit or explicit theory. Even the existence of the moon or earth. > The problem is that you rely on the intuition of materialism that functional > substitutions will leave consciousness sufficiently similar that one might > say yes to the doctor. It relies on the intuition about machine and doctor, and some local apparent matter, but not on primitive matter, nor on physicalism. > But then you seem to rely on it not simply being adequate, but being exact so > that the subject could not notice. The choice of the substitution level (or below) must be exact, but this relies on us assuming to supportable by *digital* machine, physical perhaps, but not necessarily primitively physical (which is shown explicitly to not work). Bruno > > Brent > > >> >> >> >>>> >>>> >>>>> So which is it? Is it essential to your argument that the duplication be >>>>> exact?...exact at what level? >>>> At the substitution level, or below. >>> But the question is whether such a "substitution level" exists, >> I am not really interested in that question. The existence of such a level >> is my working hypothesis. Then we extracts physics and can see if it is >> plausible with the observation. To discuss at the start of the level exists >> can only lead to infinite vague sharing of personal opinions. Better to >> study the observable consequence, and judge from facts. > > But it is a fact that there is a well proven empirical bound to duplication. > So your working hypothesis might be wrong even though saying "yes" to the > doctor would be a good idea. > >> >> >> >>> and whether it exists depends on how exact the substitute must be. Quantum >>> mechanics >> But it is better to not use any hypothesis in physics, when doing >> metaphysics. I do not assume quantum mechanics. > > You don't assume it until you make some inference that agrees with it, and > then you claim it supports your theory. By the same token it can undermine > your theory. > >> >> >> >> >>> places a limit on this and does not permit an exact substitute. So it >>> comes down to a question of how much difference is tolerable. That will >>> depend on other external factors. >> No difference in the subjective experience is tolerated. > > Yet no one asked to say "yes" to the doctor is likely to demand that level of > accuracy. So the fact that materialist would say "yes" to the doctor does > not mean they are guilty of contradiction when they point out that your > duplication experiment is nomologically impossible. > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15f1a3e0-f720-410e-2967-5c842137318e%40verizon.net. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d0032618-eb26-dc40-16a4-4404a03fc5fa%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/79B5F550-B9A7-41E0-9EE5-9FA0D3ABE2C1%40ulb.ac.be.
