> On 19 Aug 2019, at 21:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, August 19, 2019 at 9:43:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 19 Aug 2019, at 11:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, August 19, 2019 at 4:08:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 18 Aug 2019, at 13:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, August 18, 2019 at 4:53:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Model theory illustrate that pure mathematics has meaning. >>> >>> >>> A model is a so-called 'structure': >>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/ >>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/> >>> >>> But allowable structures, typically mathematical entities in the model >>> theories of many, are only material (physical) entities in the model theory >>> of Hartry Field. >> >> That is a bit of nonsense. Or Hartree Field notion of model has nothing to >> do with what logicians called a model (a mathematical structure with a >> notion of satisfaction). >> >> >>> >>> For example, a model of arithmetic could be an actual semiconductor logic >>> gate chip with RAM. >> >> >> I don’t understand this. A model of arithmetic is a set of object which >> provides an interpretation of the terms (0, S(0), …), and an interpretation >> of + and * (in terms of infinite set of couples). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Conventional mathematical logicians only speak, write, and think in terms of >> a fictional world. > > With mechanism, all worlds are fictional. The only real things are 0, 1, 2, > …, or K, S, KK, … > > Intuitively I doubt less that 4*n is even for all n, or that K is an > eliminator, than F = GmM/r^2, which is an infinite extrapolation made from a > finite number of fact. > > Also, when doing metaphysics, it is better to not decide in advance what is > real and what is fiction. > > Now, if you have a doubt that a number, when multiplied by 4, gives an even > number, I am not sure I can help. > > > >> >> And that includes their models/structures/interpretations. > > Mechanism is OK with this. It simplifies the life to admit, even if > temporarily, that a bit more exist, but at some point, that existence can be > put in the phenomenology. > > >> >> The Field type of semantics of logic and mathematics only has actual >> material entities (like computers at Best Buy, supercomputers at Los Alamos >> National Lab, natural objects found in nature) in its domains. > > That is the Aristotelian axiom where “real” is defined by “physically real”, > or “observable”, but the dream argument rise a doubt on this, especially when > we understand that all computations can be proved to exist in arithmetic > (even before translating this by “all models. > > > >> >> Conventional mathematical logicians may not like it, but that is their own >> psychological problem. > > > If they believe in Digital Mechanism. they become inconsistent. That’s the > whole point of the Universal Dovetailer argument. Unless your “matter” has a > role for consciousness which is not Turing emulable, it will be realised > arithmetically. > > Bruno > > > > Given all the novel, unpredicted stuff one reads every day in the science > news feeds about some new material (materials science), molecules, phases > (of matter), why is it so hard to think that matter is not some naive > ("numerical-Turing-emulable") stuff that most theoretical physicists think it > is and that it has no protopsychical properties.
But matter is NOT Turing emulable, once we assume “we” are Turing emulable. Matter is only maps emerging from all relative computation going through our mind state. It sums the whole universal dovetailing at any instant. At first sight this leads to an inflation of possible histories, but if we take into account the logic of selreference, what subsist is a “nay-world”-like inflation of normal consistent histories, although the normality is only suggested right now, and the work must be pursue to compare the physics extracted from the statistics on all computations and the empirical world. So why introduce a fundamental magic stuff, when the appearance of that “magic” is explained by Mechanism? And worst, if assumed, it requires us to find a non computationalist theory of mind, despite the lack of evidence for it. Maybe you are right and some stuff exists. In that case Mechanism has to be wrong (by UDA or equivalent). But there are no evidences for this, and as long as there is no evidences, it is preferable, Imo, to not commit oneself in some ontology. In the news feed in physics, we don’t find evidences for stuff, only evidence for a physical reality, and thanks to QM, it pretty well confirm Mechanism (not 19th century mechanism, but a post-Gödel antireductionist sort of Mechanism). Mechanism predicts infinitely many surprises in “theology”, and plausibly many one are inherited in the physical realm, which realise again all computation but with a stable relative measure. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f6eb9aa7-4a38-4bcd-b9a3-ff399727840b%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f6eb9aa7-4a38-4bcd-b9a3-ff399727840b%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4409B316-BF5E-45C1-B7BE-582EF9A223FF%40ulb.ac.be.
