On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:27:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 Aug 2019, at 21:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, August 19, 2019 at 9:43:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Aug 2019, at 11:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, August 19, 2019 at 4:08:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 18 Aug 2019, at 13:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, August 18, 2019 at 4:53:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Model theory illustrate that pure mathematics has meaning. >>>> >>> >>> >>> A model is a so-called 'structure': >>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/ >>> >>> But allowable structures, typically mathematical entities in the model >>> theories of many, are only material (physical) entities in the model theory >>> of Hartry Field. >>> >>> >>> That is a bit of nonsense. Or Hartree Field notion of model has nothing >>> to do with what logicians called a model (a mathematical structure with a >>> notion of satisfaction). >>> >>> >>> >>> For example, a model of arithmetic could be an actual semiconductor >>> logic gate chip with RAM. >>> >>> >>> >>> I don’t understand this. A model of arithmetic is a set of object which >>> provides an interpretation of the terms (0, S(0), …), and an interpretation >>> of + and * (in terms of infinite set of couples). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> Conventional mathematical logicians only speak, write, and think in terms >> of a fictional world. >> >> >> With mechanism, all worlds are fictional. The only real things are 0, 1, >> 2, …, or K, S, KK, … >> >> Intuitively I doubt less that 4*n is even for all n, or that K is an >> eliminator, than F = GmM/r^2, which is an infinite extrapolation made from >> a finite number of fact. >> >> Also, when doing metaphysics, it is better to not decide in advance what >> is real and what is fiction. >> >> Now, if you have a doubt that a number, when multiplied by 4, gives an >> even number, I am not sure I can help. >> >> >> >> >> And that includes their models/structures/interpretations. >> >> >> Mechanism is OK with this. It simplifies the life to admit, even if >> temporarily, that a bit more exist, but at some point, that existence can >> be put in the phenomenology. >> >> >> >> The Field type of semantics of logic and mathematics only has actual >> material entities (like computers at Best Buy, supercomputers at Los Alamos >> National Lab, natural objects found in nature) in its domains. >> >> >> That is the Aristotelian axiom where “real” is defined by “physically >> real”, or “observable”, but the dream argument rise a doubt on this, >> especially when we understand that all computations can be proved to exist >> in arithmetic (even before translating this by “all models. >> >> >> >> >> Conventional mathematical logicians may not like it, but that is their >> own psychological problem. >> >> >> >> If they believe in Digital Mechanism. they become inconsistent. That’s >> the whole point of the Universal Dovetailer argument. Unless your “matter” >> has a role for consciousness which is not Turing emulable, it will be >> realised arithmetically. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > Given all the novel, unpredicted stuff one reads every day in the science > news feeds about some new material (materials science), molecules, phases > (of matter), why is it so hard to think that matter is not some naive > ("numerical-Turing-emulable") stuff that most theoretical physicists think > it is and that it has no protopsychical properties. > > > But matter is NOT Turing emulable, once we assume “we” are Turing > emulable. Matter is only maps emerging from all relative computation going > through our mind state. It sums the whole universal dovetailing at any > instant. At first sight this leads to an inflation of possible histories, > but if we take into account the logic of selreference, what subsist is a > “nay-world”-like inflation of normal consistent histories, although the > normality is only suggested right now, and the work must be pursue to > compare the physics extracted from the statistics on all computations and > the empirical world. > > So why introduce a fundamental magic stuff, when the appearance of that > “magic” is explained by Mechanism? And worst, if assumed, it requires us to > find a non computationalist theory of mind, despite the lack of evidence > for it. > > Maybe you are right and some stuff exists. In that case Mechanism has to > be wrong (by UDA or equivalent). But there are no evidences for this, and > as long as there is no evidences, it is preferable, Imo, to not commit > oneself in some ontology. > > In the news feed in physics, we don’t find evidences for stuff, only > evidence for a physical reality, and thanks to QM, it pretty well confirm > Mechanism (not 19th century mechanism, but a post-Gödel antireductionist > sort of Mechanism). > > Mechanism predicts infinitely many surprises in “theology”, and plausibly > many one are inherited in the physical realm, which realise again all > computation but with a stable relative measure. > > Bruno > > The reason to suspect that arithmetic comes from matter (M→A) vs. matter comes from arithmetic (A→M) is that with A→M there many Ms. But we together experience only one M. When a new material phenomenon is discovered in one place, someone on the other side of the Earth can check and experience the same material phenomenon. If A→M were the case, then why would there be any stability in observations of M?
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