On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 7:38:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Aug 2019, at 13:03, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 3:28:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Aug 2019, at 19:38, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:27:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 19 Aug 2019, at 21:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, August 19, 2019 at 9:43:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 19 Aug 2019, at 11:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, August 19, 2019 at 4:08:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 18 Aug 2019, at 13:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, August 18, 2019 at 4:53:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Model theory illustrate that pure mathematics has meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A model is a so-called 'structure':
>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/
>>>>>
>>>>> But allowable structures, typically mathematical entities in the model
>>>>> theories of many, are only material (physical) entities in the model
>>>>> theory
>>>>> of Hartry Field.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That is a bit of nonsense. Or Hartree Field notion of model has
>>>>> nothing to do with what logicians called a model (a mathematical
>>>>> structure
>>>>> with a notion of satisfaction).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> For example, a model of arithmetic could be an actual semiconductor
>>>>> logic gate chip with RAM.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don’t understand this. A model of arithmetic is a set of object
>>>>> which provides an interpretation of the terms (0, S(0), …), and an
>>>>> interpretation of + and * (in terms of infinite set of couples).
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Conventional mathematical logicians only speak, write, and think in
>>>> terms of a fictional world.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> With mechanism, all worlds are fictional. The only real things are 0,
>>>> 1, 2, …, or K, S, KK, …
>>>>
>>>> Intuitively I doubt less that 4*n is even for all n, or that K is an
>>>> eliminator, than F = GmM/r^2, which is an infinite extrapolation made from
>>>> a finite number of fact.
>>>>
>>>> Also, when doing metaphysics, it is better to not decide in advance
>>>> what is real and what is fiction.
>>>>
>>>> Now, if you have a doubt that a number, when multiplied by 4, gives an
>>>> even number, I am not sure I can help.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> And that includes their models/structures/interpretations.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Mechanism is OK with this. It simplifies the life to admit, even if
>>>> temporarily, that a bit more exist, but at some point, that existence can
>>>> be put in the phenomenology.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Field type of semantics of logic and mathematics only has actual
>>>> material entities (like computers at Best Buy, supercomputers at Los
>>>> Alamos
>>>> National Lab, natural objects found in nature) in its domains.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is the Aristotelian axiom where “real” is defined by “physically
>>>> real”, or “observable”, but the dream argument rise a doubt on this,
>>>> especially when we understand that all computations can be proved to exist
>>>> in arithmetic (even before translating this by “all models.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Conventional mathematical logicians may not like it, but that is their
>>>> own psychological problem.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If they believe in Digital Mechanism. they become inconsistent. That’s
>>>> the whole point of the Universal Dovetailer argument. Unless your “matter”
>>>> has a role for consciousness which is not Turing emulable, it will be
>>>> realised arithmetically.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Given all the novel, unpredicted stuff one reads every day in the
>>> science news feeds about some new material (materials science), molecules,
>>> phases (of matter), why is it so hard to think that matter is not some
>>> naive ("numerical-Turing-emulable") stuff that most theoretical physicists
>>> think it is and that it has no protopsychical properties.
>>>
>>>
>>> But matter is NOT Turing emulable, once we assume “we” are Turing
>>> emulable. Matter is only maps emerging from all relative computation going
>>> through our mind state. It sums the whole universal dovetailing at any
>>> instant. At first sight this leads to an inflation of possible histories,
>>> but if we take into account the logic of selreference, what subsist is a
>>> “nay-world”-like inflation of normal consistent histories, although the
>>> normality is only suggested right now, and the work must be pursue to
>>> compare the physics extracted from the statistics on all computations and
>>> the empirical world.
>>>
>>> So why introduce a fundamental magic stuff, when the appearance of that
>>> “magic” is explained by Mechanism? And worst, if assumed, it requires us to
>>> find a non computationalist theory of mind, despite the lack of evidence
>>> for it.
>>>
>>> Maybe you are right and some stuff exists. In that case Mechanism has to
>>> be wrong (by UDA or equivalent). But there are no evidences for this, and
>>> as long as there is no evidences, it is preferable, Imo, to not commit
>>> oneself in some ontology.
>>>
>>> In the news feed in physics, we don’t find evidences for stuff, only
>>> evidence for a physical reality, and thanks to QM, it pretty well confirm
>>> Mechanism (not 19th century mechanism, but a post-Gödel antireductionist
>>> sort of Mechanism).
>>>
>>> Mechanism predicts infinitely many surprises in “theology”, and
>>> plausibly many one are inherited in the physical realm, which realise again
>>> all computation but with a stable relative measure.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> The reason to suspect that arithmetic comes from matter (M→A) vs. matter
>> comes from arithmetic (A→M) is that with A→M there many Ms.
>>
>>
>> On the contrary: Arithmetic (A) explains why there is many geographies
>> and history, but only one physics, the same fr all universal machine. That
>> is due to the fact that Physics (Matter, M) emerges from the first person
>> indeterminacy on *all* computations.
>> So A explains why there is only one M possible, and why the physical
>> reality is the same for all universal machine/number.
>> With A, the physical laws are justified being laws, and we get some
>> criteria (lacking in physics+physicalism) to distinguish physics and
>> geography.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But we together experience only one M. When a new material phenomenon is
>> discovered in one place, someone on the other side of the Earth can check
>> and experience the same material phenomenon. If A→M were the case, then why
>> would there be any stability in observations of M?
>>
>>
>> Because, if Mechanism is correct, physics is entirely given by the
>> material modes imposed by incompleteness on all machines. The math confirms
>> the presence of that physics, and already shows it to be a quantum physics,
>> which is indeed a calculus of first person plural indeterminacy on many
>> histories (unless we introduce the infamous collapse, of course …).
>>
>> With Mechanism, the physical universe disappear, but the laws of physics
>> are made more solid, as they become theorems in arithmetic.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> How does Arithmetic define "only one physics”?
>
>
>
> Arithmetic contains or executes (in the block-statical way) all
> computations. Your first person is distributed on all computations going
> through your current (relative) first person state. To make any prediction
> on the future of your possible inputs, you need to take all the
> computations into account, and the laws of physics is what is invariant in
> all consistent extensions.
> See the entire UDA argument in my papers.
>
>
>
>
>
> I know physics (fundamentally) is a disaster today (2019),
>
>
> Let us not exaggerate perhaps. Quantum Mechanics is a jewel, and GR is not
> bad. But a fundamental theory is still lacking. But it could be found, even
> without Mechanism. The advantage of mMechanism is that we get directly
> (almost) a theory of qualia, with a theory of quanta as special case.
>
>
>
> but how does the hodgepodge Standard Model and haphazard unification
> (w/GR) attempts point to anything but an idiosyncratic Matter (which it is
> up to physics to "model")?
>
>
> Noether’s theorem explains already a lot. You might take a look at Vic
> Stenger’s book “The comprehensible universe”.
>
> But time and space are perhaps too much taken for granted, even and
> especially in string theory. I do think that string theory progresses in
> the good direction, from a pure physical point of view. But QM (without
> collapse) might require Mechanism and its extraction of the wave, and
> strings. It certainly does if we want to have both qualia and quanta, and
> decent relations between them.
>
> As long as theology is not back in science, science has not yet even
> begun. But I do think that the standard model will not be overthrown. It
> will be unified from our understanding on the nature of space, and later,
> perhaps unified through arithmetic, group theory and number theory. It will
> take some times. Before that, let us remain open to all possibilities,
> including the possibility that Mechanism is true, in which case we do have
> the TOE, and a lot of work to test it in a better and more precise way
> than today.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
>
>
>
>
The "symmetry" perspective, like that Victor Stenger in The Comprehensible
Cosmos
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/190521.The_Comprehensible_Cosmos
is at odds with Lost in Math / The Ugly Universe (Sabine Hossenfelder
http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2018/03/book-update-german-cover-image.html
Physics is confused by its attraction to beauty and symmetry.
@philipthrift
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/687559d3-c413-47a6-a3cb-82db2b9dc83e%40googlegroups.com.
