On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 3:28:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 20 Aug 2019, at 19:38, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:27:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Aug 2019, at 21:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, August 19, 2019 at 9:43:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 19 Aug 2019, at 11:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, August 19, 2019 at 4:08:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 18 Aug 2019, at 13:57, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, August 18, 2019 at 4:53:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Model theory illustrate that pure mathematics has meaning. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> A model is a so-called 'structure': >>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/ >>>> >>>> But allowable structures, typically mathematical entities in the model >>>> theories of many, are only material (physical) entities in the model >>>> theory >>>> of Hartry Field. >>>> >>>> >>>> That is a bit of nonsense. Or Hartree Field notion of model has nothing >>>> to do with what logicians called a model (a mathematical structure with a >>>> notion of satisfaction). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> For example, a model of arithmetic could be an actual semiconductor >>>> logic gate chip with RAM. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don’t understand this. A model of arithmetic is a set of object which >>>> provides an interpretation of the terms (0, S(0), …), and an >>>> interpretation >>>> of + and * (in terms of infinite set of couples). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> Conventional mathematical logicians only speak, write, and think in >>> terms of a fictional world. >>> >>> >>> With mechanism, all worlds are fictional. The only real things are 0, 1, >>> 2, …, or K, S, KK, … >>> >>> Intuitively I doubt less that 4*n is even for all n, or that K is an >>> eliminator, than F = GmM/r^2, which is an infinite extrapolation made from >>> a finite number of fact. >>> >>> Also, when doing metaphysics, it is better to not decide in advance what >>> is real and what is fiction. >>> >>> Now, if you have a doubt that a number, when multiplied by 4, gives an >>> even number, I am not sure I can help. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> And that includes their models/structures/interpretations. >>> >>> >>> Mechanism is OK with this. It simplifies the life to admit, even if >>> temporarily, that a bit more exist, but at some point, that existence can >>> be put in the phenomenology. >>> >>> >>> >>> The Field type of semantics of logic and mathematics only has actual >>> material entities (like computers at Best Buy, supercomputers at Los Alamos >>> National Lab, natural objects found in nature) in its domains. >>> >>> >>> That is the Aristotelian axiom where “real” is defined by “physically >>> real”, or “observable”, but the dream argument rise a doubt on this, >>> especially when we understand that all computations can be proved to exist >>> in arithmetic (even before translating this by “all models. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Conventional mathematical logicians may not like it, but that is their >>> own psychological problem. >>> >>> >>> >>> If they believe in Digital Mechanism. they become inconsistent. That’s >>> the whole point of the Universal Dovetailer argument. Unless your “matter” >>> has a role for consciousness which is not Turing emulable, it will be >>> realised arithmetically. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> Given all the novel, unpredicted stuff one reads every day in the science >> news feeds about some new material (materials science), molecules, phases >> (of matter), why is it so hard to think that matter is not some naive >> ("numerical-Turing-emulable") stuff that most theoretical physicists think >> it is and that it has no protopsychical properties. >> >> >> But matter is NOT Turing emulable, once we assume “we” are Turing >> emulable. Matter is only maps emerging from all relative computation going >> through our mind state. It sums the whole universal dovetailing at any >> instant. At first sight this leads to an inflation of possible histories, >> but if we take into account the logic of selreference, what subsist is a >> “nay-world”-like inflation of normal consistent histories, although the >> normality is only suggested right now, and the work must be pursue to >> compare the physics extracted from the statistics on all computations and >> the empirical world. >> >> So why introduce a fundamental magic stuff, when the appearance of that >> “magic” is explained by Mechanism? And worst, if assumed, it requires us to >> find a non computationalist theory of mind, despite the lack of evidence >> for it. >> >> Maybe you are right and some stuff exists. In that case Mechanism has to >> be wrong (by UDA or equivalent). But there are no evidences for this, and >> as long as there is no evidences, it is preferable, Imo, to not commit >> oneself in some ontology. >> >> In the news feed in physics, we don’t find evidences for stuff, only >> evidence for a physical reality, and thanks to QM, it pretty well confirm >> Mechanism (not 19th century mechanism, but a post-Gödel antireductionist >> sort of Mechanism). >> >> Mechanism predicts infinitely many surprises in “theology”, and plausibly >> many one are inherited in the physical realm, which realise again all >> computation but with a stable relative measure. >> >> Bruno >> >> > The reason to suspect that arithmetic comes from matter (M→A) vs. matter > comes from arithmetic (A→M) is that with A→M there many Ms. > > > On the contrary: Arithmetic (A) explains why there is many geographies and > history, but only one physics, the same fr all universal machine. That is > due to the fact that Physics (Matter, M) emerges from the first person > indeterminacy on *all* computations. > So A explains why there is only one M possible, and why the physical > reality is the same for all universal machine/number. > With A, the physical laws are justified being laws, and we get some > criteria (lacking in physics+physicalism) to distinguish physics and > geography. > > > > > But we together experience only one M. When a new material phenomenon is > discovered in one place, someone on the other side of the Earth can check > and experience the same material phenomenon. If A→M were the case, then why > would there be any stability in observations of M? > > > Because, if Mechanism is correct, physics is entirely given by the > material modes imposed by incompleteness on all machines. The math confirms > the presence of that physics, and already shows it to be a quantum physics, > which is indeed a calculus of first person plural indeterminacy on many > histories (unless we introduce the infamous collapse, of course …). > > With Mechanism, the physical universe disappear, but the laws of physics > are made more solid, as they become theorems in arithmetic. > > Bruno > > > >
How does Arithmetic define "only one physics"? I know physics (fundamentally) is a disaster today (2019), but how does the hodgepodge Standard Model and haphazard unification (w/GR) attempts point to anything but an idiosyncratic Matter (which it is up to physics to "model")? @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a5bda4f0-589d-404c-bd58-093413abaa4b%40googlegroups.com.
