> On 25 Aug 2019, at 10:56, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 9:31 PM Russell Standish <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > Assuming you're in principle OK with the concept of a brain in a vat (which > > is a disembodied mind), then the you too do not have an apriori reason for > > the existence of physical things. > > I don't see why a brain in a vat is fundamentally different from a brain in a > skull, both sorts of brains are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
But if the relevant part (relevant for being conscious) is digital, the person conscious will not see the difference between a brain in vat and a brain in a vat itself emulated in arithmetic. Or, again, if you think that there is a difference, what is it? It seems that you will have to invoke some attribute of your “matter”, and that it cannot be Turing emulated (as if it can, it will be emulated by the digital brain, and thus in arithmetic). > I think information is the fundamental thing that makes me be me, Yes, and it is relative information, and that is given by the relation between you and universal numbers, and that happens in infinitely many variations in arithmetic. > but information must be about something and in this case it's information > about how atoms are arranged. How? Could a brain in vat knows anything about those atoms. It could not even know if it is emulated by a Babbage machine or by human with paper, or by a quantum computer. In fact, it can know, by betting on mechanism, that it is executed by infinitely many universal number in arithmetic. > And atoms are physical things that interact with each other according to the > laws of physics. Assuming some physical reality, but that makes no sense when you assume Mechanism. If some “matter” can select a computation in arithmetic, it can only do that by virtue of something not Turing emulable. Or explains how, without mocking elementary result in theoretical computer science (like the fact that the sigma_1 arithmetic reality is equivalent with a universal dovetailer). Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2z1F_P_cwfaZQFAUPp%3DGVuR1F2cOmKM5mPHcHwiCoJ%2BQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2z1F_P_cwfaZQFAUPp%3DGVuR1F2cOmKM5mPHcHwiCoJ%2BQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F6268C83-107E-4F73-A777-D87CC26AD6FF%40ulb.ac.be.
