> On 28 Aug 2019, at 20:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 8/28/2019 8:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> How much? If you ask to much on matter for its role in preserving your >> consciousness, it will be no more Turing emulable. >> >> If it remains Turing emulable, then it is already emulated in the a tiny >> part of the arithmetical reality. > > But in other posts you maintain that consciousness and matter are not > computable. That they are statistical phenomena of infinite threads of the > UD. So which is it.
Simulation, computation, machines, brains (in first approximation relevant with the mechanist ’truncation") UD-threads, etc. are all 3p notions. They admit precise definition, understandable by anybody having its diploma of primary school. Nothing 1p can be identified with anything 3p describable. Consciousness and eventually matter are 1p notion (matter beccomes 1p-plural). We cannot emulate them.But we can enacted them, and indeed, the arithmetical reality enacted them. That point is subtle and fundamental for the understanding of the mechanist reformulation of the mind-body problem. It is easy to understand this, I think, by using the iterated duplication experience: You are cut (read and annihilated) in some room R, and reconstituted, in two rooms, which are distinguished by having a big 1 (resp. 0) paint on the front wall.I denote those room by 1 and 0. Each copy comes back in R and do the experience again, and again. The experience of each copy is a particular sequence of 0 and 1. With mechanism, all those person-copies are conscious, with a sugar experience/history, although none of the experience they live could be simulated by a computer. The experience is mathematically equivalent with a random oracle, which is typically NOT computable. Now, the “real consciousness”, when assuming mechanism, if given by that mixture of “all relative computations” and the fact that you are distributed in infinitely many consistent extensions (in slightly different sense as I allow adding new symboles to the machine, according to some conditions). The arithmetical reality enacted all computations, but what the machines truly “live” is the indetermination on all computations, in a non computable reality (arithmetic). QM confirms this by even just suggesting a multiple histories type of physical reality (and the perpendicularity and proximity relation are given by the quantum logic imposed by incompleteness, which gives rise to the []p & <>t, or even already, with p sigma_1 (partial computable) with []p & p. Consciousness is a semantic fixed point. The tour-de-force permitted by both axiomatic and the definition of Theaetetus, and enforced by incompleteness is that G* can prove []p <-> ([p] & p), but the *truth* is that such a truth is NOT provable by the machine, yet, if “WE” are sound and consistent, living in *some* reality; automatically the builded machine inherit *that* reality (if it exists, and here, with mechanism, we need eventually only to believe in the truth of what we have been taught in High School (1+1=2, etc.). The tour-de-force is made available by mimicking at the object level the truth of p by its assertorical meaning, making truth inflationary into the 1p view, but still obtained syntactically by the machine (relative, local) assertion. A real definition of consciousness or knowledge of truth would be []t & Vt (where Vt means that t is true). But V is not definable for the machine, but can mimic it assertorically (as as we limit ourself to correct machine, we know that it works, the machine does not know that, but will tend to believe that, and she will be lead to confusions on this, like us (that’s why the mind-body problem is hard, and hot). So, we replace Vt by t is []t & t, and more generally we define “to know” by “(to believe/assert p) & p”. If we could emulate the 1p, we would be able to predict the first person indeterminacy. Consciousness is a mixed “syntactical/mechanical/theoretical/number-theoretical” notion with semantical notion, related to Truth, possibilities, consistencies, infinities, models/realties. Mechanism assumes only that a possible syntactical transformation of some sort *preserve* consciousness in but the consciousness in in the truth-part. The machines/numbers “borrow” it from the arithmetical reality. The arithmetical reality itself is largely beyond the emulable (which is only the sigma_1 arithmetical). Most machine attribute are NOT computable. Being a machine/number computing a computable function from N to N is itself NOT computable. Consciousness and matter surf on the frontier between the computable and the non computable, and the self-referential modes generalized this for notion of believable/unbelievable, knowable/not-knowable, observable/not-observable, etc. I think that your intuition to give a role to the environment is correct and can be related to the need of nuancing between []p and []p & <>t, as well as between []p and ([]p & p). The locution “consciousness is Turing emulable” should be seen as a short way of saying that “consciousness is preserved for the one saying yes to the doctor”. What I said early was only that when we bet on YD+CT, the mind-body problem is transformed into a justification of the laws of physics from a sort of theory about how a consciousness flux differentiate (and fuse) on the infinitely many computations relatively realised in elementary arithmetic (or whatever Turing equivalent). Without incompleteness, and the fact that the machine can prove their own incompleteness (Löbian machine), everything I say would be non sensical. I recommend, for those having a sincere interest in computationalism, studying Martin Davis Books, Cutland, Boolos & Jeffery, Smullyan, Epstein & Carnielli, and for thiose who like mathematics, Daniel E. Cohen’s “Computability and Logic” (not to be confused with Daniel J. Cohen, which I would recommend if you want to understand how Mathematical Logic is born from a theological quarrel between British Unionists and Trinitarists. (And it looks the universal machine opted for the trinitarians). Bruno > > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7017dda8-70f7-982a-2069-74d586f764ab%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5002DDFF-49DA-4A2D-B89D-8B76867D7B83%40ulb.ac.be.
