> On 23 Sep 2019, at 13:11, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 3:48:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 20 Sep 2019, at 03:17, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: >> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: >> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> a écrit >> : >> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: > >> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: > >>>> >>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote: >>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must >>>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently >>>> > claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even >>>> > plausibly argued. What's the argument for such a claim? >>>> >>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite >>>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE >>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite >>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in >>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such >>>> a thing. >>>> >>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of >>>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes >>>> coming into existence forever and ever, without any repeats. Think of the >>>> number of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated >>>> with a different universe. AG >>> >>> >>> Tegmark missed this? >>> >>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good >>> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable >>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum >>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the >>> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the >>> least. >>> >>> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I >>> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any >>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG >> >> >> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, >> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the >> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, >> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case. >> >> I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, >> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG >> >> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in 1920x1080 pixels then >> in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more "precision", >> once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at which your >> consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation thant the ones >> at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there are an infinity >> of them) does not make any difference, but there are an infinity of them (at >> the correct level and below it). >> >> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, >> and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a >> continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter how >> many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any >> repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG >> >> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are not >> uncountable. >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of the >> necessary existence of copies. AG >> >> Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is >> finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite? >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable >> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG > > It is a theorem, about *all* universal machinery phi_i that all programs > repeat, with different codings. > > For all i there is a j such that i ≠ j, and for all x phi_j(x) = phi_i(x). > That is obvious for a programmer, you can always add spurious instructions, > for example. > > So, in the arithmetical reality (which is Turing universal) then if you can > survive with a digital brain, you survive in all infinitely many computations > which extends your current experiences. > There is arguably a non countable set of (infinite!) computational extension, > but at all time, a brain or a machine cannot distinguish more than a finite > or countable states. > > Bruno > > If you have a countable set of programs, none of which can calculate an > irrational number, how could they produce copies of everything? They have no > contact with a set so large. AG
First, the UD does compute many irrational numbers, like sqrt(2), PI, e, etc. Those are computable real number, in the sense that an galorothm can generate all decimals. But then you forget the first person indeterminacy, and the step 4 of the UDA. The consciousness of the emulated entities cannot be aware of any delay, and so will fork on a non computable set of “stream”, given by the program dovetailing on all initial sequence of all (Turing) Oracles. I cannot generate one precise non-computable real number, but I can generate them all. The following path illustrates this: 0 1 00 01 10 11 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 Etc. This generate each infinite sequence of 0 and 1, including all non computable real numbers, in the limit, and as the machine cannot be aware of the delays of “reconstitution’ in the universal dovetailing, their first person indeterminacy domain is not countable. Bruno > > > > >> >> >> <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >> Virus-free. www.avast.com >> <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >> <> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/997f6fad-8042-45ec-b1a6-67a20d36a7a4%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/997f6fad-8042-45ec-b1a6-67a20d36a7a4%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/401997b3-2b3a-4406-9bb0-baefdfb27d96%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/401997b3-2b3a-4406-9bb0-baefdfb27d96%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/88BF4DD4-BCF5-45FA-9F5E-077AB9821958%40ulb.ac.be.
