On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 6:38:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Sep 2019, at 13:11, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 3:48:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 20 Sep 2019, at 03:17, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: >>> >>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> a >>>>>>> écrit : >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson < >>>>>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then >>>>>>>>>>>> there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is >>>>>>>>>>>> frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, >>>>>>>>>>>> proven, or >>>>>>>>>>>> even plausibly argued. What's the argument for such a claim?* >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a >>>>>>>>>>> finite number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire >>>>>>>>>>> OBSERVABLE >>>>>>>>>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is >>>>>>>>>>> infinite >>>>>>>>>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of >>>>>>>>>>> them in >>>>>>>>>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go >>>>>>>>>>> to see such a thing. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of >>>>>>>>>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes >>>>>>>>>> coming >>>>>>>>>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats. Think of the >>>>>>>>>> number >>>>>>>>>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated >>>>>>>>>> with a >>>>>>>>>> different universe. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Tegmark missed this? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave >>>>>>>>>> rather good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having >>>>>>>>>> non >>>>>>>>>> countable universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise >>>>>>>>>> to a >>>>>>>>>> continuum (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” >>>>>>>>>> brought by >>>>>>>>>> the measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to >>>>>>>>>> say the >>>>>>>>>> least. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- >>>>>>>>> which I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> any repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat >>>>>>>>> exist, indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At >>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>> point the difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital >>>>>>>>> mechanist >>>>>>>>> truncate, which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non >>>>>>>>> countable >>>>>>>>> case. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they >>>>>>>> occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in 1920x1080 >>>>>>> pixels then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and >>>>>>> more >>>>>>> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level >>>>>>> at >>>>>>> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation >>>>>>> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and >>>>>>> there >>>>>>> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an >>>>>>> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it). >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive >>>>>> integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, >>>>>> such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. >>>>>> No >>>>>> matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no >>>>>> necessity >>>>>> for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any >>>>>> universe. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are >>>>> not uncountable. >>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>>> >>>> >>>> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of >>>> the necessary existence of copies. AG >>>> >>> >>> Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is >>> finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite? >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >> >> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable >> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG >> >> >> It is a theorem, about *all* universal machinery phi_i that all programs >> repeat, with different codings. >> >> For all i there is a j such that i ≠ j, and for all x phi_j(x) = >> phi_i(x). That is obvious for a programmer, you can always add spurious >> instructions, for example. >> >> So, in the arithmetical reality (which is Turing universal) then if you >> can survive with a digital brain, you survive in all infinitely many >> computations which extends your current experiences. >> There is arguably a non countable set of (infinite!) computational >> extension, but at all time, a brain or a machine cannot distinguish more >> than a finite or countable states. >> >> Bruno >> > > If you have a countable set of programs, none of which can calculate an > irrational number, how could they produce copies of everything? They have > no contact with a set so large. AG > > > First, the UD does compute many irrational numbers, like sqrt(2), PI, e, > etc. Those are computable real number, in the sense that an galorothm can > generate all decimals. > > But then you forget the first person indeterminacy, and the step 4 of the > UDA. The consciousness of the emulated entities cannot be aware of any > delay, and so will fork on a non computable set of “stream”, given by the > program dovetailing on all initial sequence of all (Turing) Oracles. > > I cannot generate one precise non-computable real number, but I can > generate them all. The following path illustrates this: > > 0 > 1 > > 00 > 01 > 10 > 11 > > 000 > 001 > 010 > 011 > 100 > 101 > 110 > 111 > > Etc. > > This generate each infinite sequence of 0 and 1, including all non > computable real numbers, in the limit, and as the machine cannot be aware > of the delays of “reconstitution’ in the universal dovetailing, their first > person indeterminacy domain is not countable. > > Bruno >
Because irrational numbers have non repeating decimal representations, they can't be exactly calculated by any finite process. Period! AG > > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>> Virus-free. >>> www.avast.com >>> <https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/997f6fad-8042-45ec-b1a6-67a20d36a7a4%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/997f6fad-8042-45ec-b1a6-67a20d36a7a4%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/401997b3-2b3a-4406-9bb0-baefdfb27d96%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/401997b3-2b3a-4406-9bb0-baefdfb27d96%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/12eb8aed-8a8a-4074-9e22-cf9042971cc8%40googlegroups.com.
