> On 15 Dec 2019, at 13:29, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 15, 2019 at 6:06:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 12 Dec 2019, at 22:46, John Clark <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 8:59 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> >> For the 998th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a first person >> >> experience duplicating machine is invoked there is no such thing as THE >> >> first person experience; >> >> > There is. It is what you can expect to feel when doing the experience. >> >> Bruno Marchal would be utterly lost without his best friend, good old >> Mr.You. >> >> > In Helsinki, you believe that you will survive (because [...] >> >> In Helsinki John Clark can make a educated guess about what will happen to >> John Clark tomorrow, but no living thing has a clue what Mr.You's fate will >> be because thanks to Bruno's "You Duplicating Machine" nobody has a clue who >> Mr.You is. >> >> > you know that it is impossible in Helsinki to write its name in the first >> > person [...] >> >> In a world that contains a "THE Duplicating Machine" there is no such thing >> as "THE first person" >> >> > The first “he” is the guy, when unique, in Helsinki. >> >> If that's what it means then "he" will not survive because tomorrow nobody >> will be unique in Helsinki because tomorrow nobody will be in Helsinki. That >> doesn't contradict Mechanism it just shows that you've made yet another >> goofy definition and I'm sure it won't be your last. >> >> > The second “he” refers to each copies’ first person experience accessible >> >> And now in addition to goofiness we have ambiguity, the same personal >> pronoun referring to two different people. >> >> > So now, move to step 4 >> >> You must be joking! >> >> >> It's impossible to say if that's true or not because nobody knows what >> >> question was asked, certainly Bruno doesn’t. >> >> > The question is simple, >> >> The question is not simple, the question is retarded. >> >> > and most people get the answer by themselves >> >> Most people, including a certain Mr.Marchal, just assumes that articles >> "the" and "a" and common personal pronouns can keep on being used in exactly >> the same way as they always have been even in the presence of something that >> has never existed before like a "Matter Duplicating Machine", a "People >> Duplicating Machine", a "First Person View Duplicating Machine", a "THE >> Duplicating Machine". And a few years ago John Clark would have just assumed >> that a professional logician would know better than to make the same sort of >> silly mistake that most people make, but John Clark's assumption turned out >> to be wrong. >> >> >> If the referent is the man that is experiencing H right now on December 9 >> >> then obviously even without duplicating machines we can say with absolute >> >> certainty "you" will not survive tomorrow because on December 10 nobody >> >> will be experiencing H on December 9. >> >> > Nobody has ever considered such useless identity criterion. >> >> WHAT?! You said just a few lines before that "The first “he” is the guy, >> when unique, in Helsinki."! >> >> >> But if we take the everyday meaning of the personal pronoun, somebody >> who remembers being the H man of December 9, then "you" will survive in >> December 10. >> >> > That’s far better. >> >> Yes, but December 10 is after the duplication so the personal pronoun "he" >> is now open to more than one meaning, in other words "he" is ambiguous. >> >> >> And if a you duplicating machine is thrown into the mix then the "you" as >> >> used in the above is ambiguous >> >> > No it is not. We have agreed that both copies have the right identity. >> >> Sometimes John agrees with Bruno for half a sentence but then in the second >> half Bruno contradicts the first half. If today both remember being the >> Helsinki man yesterday and that is when the question was asked, and if >> today, to nobody's surprise, both answer to the name Mr.You, then yesterday >> it would be ambiguous to ask about what Mr.You would or would not see on the >> next day. If that's not a example of ambiguity what is? >> >> > It is just that the prediction is impossible to make. >> >> If you've found something where the prediction is impossible and the >> postdiction is impossible too then what you have found is not profound, it's >> just stupid. >> >> >>> FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW, they did get one bit of information. >> >> >> And what was that one bit of information that the W Man got? >> That he ended up seeing W. >> >> > Yes, >> >> So the "experiment" provided zero bits of new information because yesterday >> before the "experiment" everybody already knew that would happen, even >> Mr.You (whoever that is) knew it because everybody knows that tautologies >> are always true. > > > > You keep confusing the indexical third person self, that in my thesis is > defined with the second recursion theorem, and the indexical first person > self, which know very well who he is, and, once he accept that he survives a > duplication, know that he survives in both places from a third person view, > but only in one non ambiguous place (Washington OR Moscow) from any first > person reality where surviving met the mechanist sense of surviving such an > experience. > > You put the indeterminacy into a tautology by ignoring the diverging content > of the 1p experience of the copies. You talk like if the guy could feel to be > in the two places at once, which is pure nonsense. > > When you agree that the guy in M does not feel to be the guy in W, and vice > versa, you need to just take into account that in H, he is unable to write > down in its diary (taken with him in the duplication experience) the > particular outcome he can expect, except using an “or” (I will feel myself to > be in W, or in M, but I cannot say which for now). That will be confirmed by > both, and that makes the point, if we don’t change the definition, of course. > > Bruno > > > > > I've realized that (in panpsychist/materialist view at least) there are no > first-persons, second-persons, third-persons, fourth-persons, etc. That's all > philosophical nonsense. Just selves (persons) in the midst of everything.
When we assume Digital Mechanism, we are duplicable, and in that setting, a good first approximation of the difference between 3p and 1p is the content of the diary that the candidate (for duplication) take with him in the cut-read-copy box. I don’t see the non-sense you allude too. It helps the intuition about the fact that a machine cannot know which computations (in arithmetic or any model of a first order Turing-complete theory) is running him/her. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fd055418-f5dc-47b1-bddf-da25e5a4c4e9%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fd055418-f5dc-47b1-bddf-da25e5a4c4e9%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/548F5E99-7748-4D32-8A42-BBBBE1996B09%40ulb.ac.be.
