> On 15 Dec 2019, at 13:29, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 15, 2019 at 6:06:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 12 Dec 2019, at 22:46, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 8:59 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> >> For the 998th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a first person >> >> experience duplicating machine is invoked there is no such thing as THE >> >> first person experience; >> >> > There is. It is what you can expect to feel when doing the experience. >> >> Bruno Marchal would be utterly lost without his best friend, good old >> Mr.You. >> >> > In Helsinki, you believe that you will survive (because [...] >> >> In Helsinki John Clark can make a educated guess about what will happen to >> John Clark tomorrow, but no living thing has a clue what Mr.You's fate will >> be because thanks to Bruno's "You Duplicating Machine" nobody has a clue who >> Mr.You is. >> >> > you know that it is impossible in Helsinki to write its name in the first >> > person [...] >> >> In a world that contains a "THE Duplicating Machine" there is no such thing >> as "THE first person" >> >> > The first “he” is the guy, when unique, in Helsinki. >> >> If that's what it means then "he" will not survive because tomorrow nobody >> will be unique in Helsinki because tomorrow nobody will be in Helsinki. That >> doesn't contradict Mechanism it just shows that you've made yet another >> goofy definition and I'm sure it won't be your last. >> >> > The second “he” refers to each copies’ first person experience accessible >> >> And now in addition to goofiness we have ambiguity, the same personal >> pronoun referring to two different people. >> >> > So now, move to step 4 >> >> You must be joking! >> >> >> It's impossible to say if that's true or not because nobody knows what >> >> question was asked, certainly Bruno doesn’t. >> >> > The question is simple, >> >> The question is not simple, the question is retarded. >> >> > and most people get the answer by themselves >> >> Most people, including a certain Mr.Marchal, just assumes that articles >> "the" and "a" and common personal pronouns can keep on being used in exactly >> the same way as they always have been even in the presence of something that >> has never existed before like a "Matter Duplicating Machine", a "People >> Duplicating Machine", a "First Person View Duplicating Machine", a "THE >> Duplicating Machine". And a few years ago John Clark would have just assumed >> that a professional logician would know better than to make the same sort of >> silly mistake that most people make, but John Clark's assumption turned out >> to be wrong. >> >> >> If the referent is the man that is experiencing H right now on December 9 >> >> then obviously even without duplicating machines we can say with absolute >> >> certainty "you" will not survive tomorrow because on December 10 nobody >> >> will be experiencing H on December 9. >> >> > Nobody has ever considered such useless identity criterion. >> >> WHAT?! You said just a few lines before that "The first “he” is the guy, >> when unique, in Helsinki."! >> >> >> But if we take the everyday meaning of the personal pronoun, somebody >> who remembers being the H man of December 9, then "you" will survive in >> December 10. >> >> > That’s far better. >> >> Yes, but December 10 is after the duplication so the personal pronoun "he" >> is now open to more than one meaning, in other words "he" is ambiguous. >> >> >> And if a you duplicating machine is thrown into the mix then the "you" as >> >> used in the above is ambiguous >> >> > No it is not. We have agreed that both copies have the right identity. >> >> Sometimes John agrees with Bruno for half a sentence but then in the second >> half Bruno contradicts the first half. If today both remember being the >> Helsinki man yesterday and that is when the question was asked, and if >> today, to nobody's surprise, both answer to the name Mr.You, then yesterday >> it would be ambiguous to ask about what Mr.You would or would not see on the >> next day. If that's not a example of ambiguity what is? >> >> > It is just that the prediction is impossible to make. >> >> If you've found something where the prediction is impossible and the >> postdiction is impossible too then what you have found is not profound, it's >> just stupid. >> >> >>> FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW, they did get one bit of information. >> >> >> And what was that one bit of information that the W Man got? >> That he ended up seeing W. >> >> > Yes, >> >> So the "experiment" provided zero bits of new information because yesterday >> before the "experiment" everybody already knew that would happen, even >> Mr.You (whoever that is) knew it because everybody knows that tautologies >> are always true. > > > > You keep confusing the indexical third person self, that in my thesis is > defined with the second recursion theorem, and the indexical first person > self, which know very well who he is, and, once he accept that he survives a > duplication, know that he survives in both places from a third person view, > but only in one non ambiguous place (Washington OR Moscow) from any first > person reality where surviving met the mechanist sense of surviving such an > experience. > > You put the indeterminacy into a tautology by ignoring the diverging content > of the 1p experience of the copies. You talk like if the guy could feel to be > in the two places at once, which is pure nonsense. > > When you agree that the guy in M does not feel to be the guy in W, and vice > versa, you need to just take into account that in H, he is unable to write > down in its diary (taken with him in the duplication experience) the > particular outcome he can expect, except using an “or” (I will feel myself to > be in W, or in M, but I cannot say which for now). That will be confirmed by > both, and that makes the point, if we don’t change the definition, of course. > > Bruno > > > > > I've realized that (in panpsychist/materialist view at least) there are no > first-persons, second-persons, third-persons, fourth-persons, etc. That's all > philosophical nonsense. Just selves (persons) in the midst of everything.
When we assume Digital Mechanism, we are duplicable, and in that setting, a good first approximation of the difference between 3p and 1p is the content of the diary that the candidate (for duplication) take with him in the cut-read-copy box. I don’t see the non-sense you allude too. It helps the intuition about the fact that a machine cannot know which computations (in arithmetic or any model of a first order Turing-complete theory) is running him/her. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fd055418-f5dc-47b1-bddf-da25e5a4c4e9%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fd055418-f5dc-47b1-bddf-da25e5a4c4e9%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/548F5E99-7748-4D32-8A42-BBBBE1996B09%40ulb.ac.be.
