> On 9 Dec 2019, at 18:58, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sun, Dec 8, 2019 at 6:20 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > the question is on the first person experience, > > For the 998th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a first person experience > duplicating machine is invoked there is no such thing as THE first person > experience;
There is. It is what you can expect to feel when doing the experience. In Helsinki, you believe that you will survive (because you believe in Mechanism, say), and you know with certainty that you will bring a cup of coffee, because this has been promised by both the Washingtonians and the Moscowians. But for that same reason, you know in Helsinki that both copies will have incompatible first person experience, as none will feel to drink Russian and American coffee simultaneously. So in H, you know that (always assuming Mechanism of course) whatever happens, you will feel to find yourself in one city, and you know that it is impossible in Helsinki to write its name in the first person diary (the one embarked in the annihilation-copy box). > so if the "question" is about THE first person then the "question" is about > absolutely positively nothing. Then you admit that you die in that experience, but that contradicts Mechanism. > > > he cannot have any certainty if he will live personally the experience “I > > see M” or the experience “I see W”. > > That's 4 personal pronouns with no referent in just 21 words, We did agree on the reference of the pronouns. The first “he” is the guy, when unique, in Helsinki. The second “he” refers to each copies’ first person experience accessible from H in this setting. We agree that in the 3p description, the guy finds himself in both places (indeed, that is part of the protocol). We did agree that each first person experience is felt as a well definite experience of feeling to be in a well determined city. It can only be W or M. Just do the thought experience. Imagine that in H, the guy write “W and M”. Then both copies refute the prediction, given that one lives “W but not M” and the other lives “M but not W”. Imagine that in H, the guy write “W”. Then the W guy get his prediction confirmed, but the guy in M refutes the prediction, and that makes the prediction false. (We agreed that both copies are digne successor of the guy in H, by Mechanism). It is the same if the guy predicts “M”. Imagine that the guy in H write “W or M”. Then both copies get the prediction confirms. Success!. It is as simple and banal as that. Your semantical trick reminds me the GOP republicans, so brilliant in evading the questions they dislike. > and that rate is not unusual, such flagrant use of personal pronouns is > typical in Bruno's entire thought "experiment" even though the entire purpose > of the thing is to discover new stuff about personal identity and forms the > foundation of the entire "proof". And yet you ask with a straight face why I > stopped reading it! > > Yes, with Everett if you ask me which version of me will be the man that sees > the coin come up heads when the coin is tossed tomorrow I will say it will be > the version of me that sees heads. And yes the answer is banal, but then it > was a banal question. > > > That makes my point. > > Then we agree, when your conclusions are not dead wrong they are banal. You have often agreed. So now, move to step 4, perhaps. The banality of a result does not make it wrong, and it is just a passage toward something more interesting: the necessity to derive physics from arithmetic when we assume computationalism (aka indexical digital mechanism). > > > It's physically impossible to put myself in the shoes of the guys having the > experiences because 4 feet are involved and I only have 2, there are 2 guys > having A first person experience. > > > In the 3p description. But that is not what is asked. > > It's impossible to say if that's true or not because nobody knows what > question was asked, certainly Bruno doesn’t. The question is simple, and most people get the answer by themselves when asked (and when they have a bit of training in reasoning with mechanism). The question is asked to any candidate to a duplication, or a superposition, about what they expect to live. There is no ambiguity about who is who. The only difficulty is that in the duplication experience, we need to be clear is the question is about *THE* possible first experience that the candidate will live just after having push the button. We know that this experience has to be “I am in once city right now and it is W”, or “ am in once city right now and it is M”. > > > The question was “where do you expect to survive”. > > And my question is who exactly is the referent to the personal pronoun "you" > in the above? The guy in Helsinki, before the experience. > If the referent is the man that is experiencing H right now on December 9 > then obviously even without duplicating machines we can say with absolute > certainty "you" will not survive tomorrow because on December 10 nobody will > be experiencing H on December 9. Nobody has ever considered such useless identity criterion. > But if we take the everyday meaning of the personal pronoun, somebody who > remembers being the H man of December 9, then "you" will survive in December > 10. That’s far better. > And if a you duplicating machine is thrown into the mix then the "you" as > used in the above is ambiguous No it is not. We have agreed that both copies have the right identity. It is just that the prediction is impossible to make. > and any question involving it that demands a single answer is ridiculous. That is contradicted by all copies. If they predicted W or M, they both get the confirmation, and that is not the case with other prediction. If you prefer “ambiguous” to “not determined”, there is no problem. The followup of the reasoning will make physics into an ambiguity calculus”. That does not touch the substance of the reasoning, just the vocabulary. > > > The sewer is plain, simple and banal: I expect to [...] > > And that word "expect" is irrelevant. Who knows what Mr.You expects to > happen, perhaps Mr.You expects to end up in Santa Claus's workshop, I neither > know or care. I'm interested in what will happen not what somebody expects to > happen, and basing personal identity on expectations of the future is nuts. We have never based “personal identity” of expectation of the future. We do the exact contrary: we compute the expectation of the future based on a machine which respect our identity, by copying us at the relevant substitution level. > > > > FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW, they did get one bit of information. > > And what was that one bit of information that the W Man got? > That he ended up seeing W. Yes, he, who remember that he was in Helsinki before pushing the button. He looks at his diary and if the prediction was “W or M”, he write success, and if it was anything else, he write “non-success”. > And what is the referent to the personal pronoun "he" in the above? > "He" refers to the W Man. Who is also the H-man, like the M-man is a&lso the H-man, despite the M-man &nd the W-man have diverging incompatible experience, which explains the indetermination predicted in H. > And what is the W man? > The man who sees W. > And who is the man who sees W? > The W man. > And yesterday did the H man already know that all tautologies are true? > Yes. > So how many new bits of information were learned from this "experiment? > Zero bits. Then you deny both personal experience of the M and W people. Which makes my point. You follow the 1500 years of tradition to put the mind-)body problem under the rug. But you illustrate your inconsistency by using it in Everett QM. Bruno > Are you sure? > Yes, I counted them twice. > > > the description of the protocol [...] > > Wow protocol, that sounds sooo oficial and scientific, but the reality is to > call it amateurish would be to unfairly categorize amateurs. > > > You just keep moving from what is asked, which concerns the 1p [...] > > > For the 999th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a 1p duplicating machine > is involved there is no such thing THE 1p, there is only A 1p. The fact is I > have no idea what exactly is asked and you know even less about it than I do. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2J7Hz8Goae6qPYYsihVtzkpZYcVC3_vm9tR%3DNS8mkeiQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2J7Hz8Goae6qPYYsihVtzkpZYcVC3_vm9tR%3DNS8mkeiQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B87871C8-3922-4284-AE71-7A11E021C0B2%40ulb.ac.be.
