> On 17 Dec 2019, at 12:54, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 10:35 PM 'Brent Meeker'  
> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> 
> wrote:
>  
> > Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to 
> > thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki 
> > man. 
> 
> OK, but the very definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the man who is 
> experiencing Helsinki right now today.


That definition has never been adopted by anyone, and is non sensical when we 
assume mechanism, as mechanism is defined by a bet on surviving a special 
experience, and with the definition above, no one survives any experience.




> Or at least that's the definition on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, but on 
> other days of the week the definition is the man who REMEMBERS experiencing 
> Helsinki today,

That is ambiguous. It is the guy who remember having been the guy in Helsinki, 
today, tomorrow, and for the rest of his life, by default (i.e. assuming no 
amnesia or Alzheimer, ...).




> and on those days the Helsinki Man would be a fool to expect that the 
> Helsinki Man would experience one and only one thing tomorrow.


Yet, he can predict, when still in Helsinki (as always since day one), that he 
will feel to live being in only one city. Both copies confirms that fact. If he 
was just asked “do you predict that you will feel to be in W and in M, or do 
you predict that you will feel to be in M or in M, but not in both at once”, 
the obvious correct (with resect to mechanism) is the first one.



>  
>  
> > And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before the 
> > button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the future. 
> 
> Right, and John Clark expects that tomorrow nobody will be experiencing 
> Helsinki today.

But tomorrow, both copies will say “I experience only one city”. Both will be 
unsure of the existence of the doppelganger without some added clues, like a 
phone call.

Or you assume telepathy.




> It may seem like John Clark is being overly pedantic but Brent Meeker needs 
> to be that way too if the conversation is about the nature of personal 
> identity and personal identity duplicating machines are involved.
> 
> But all this confusion could be totally avoided if people on this list would 
> simply STOP USING PERSONAL PRONOUNS and replace them with their proper noun 
> referent;


The very existence of those thought experience explains entirely why this is 
just logically impossible. The first person pronoun is an indexical. 

That will eventually lead to open individualism (the idea that there is only 
one person, just living unconnected experience).

Personal identity is not the subject of the discussion, as we have adopted the 
natural mechanist definition: the owner of the personal history memory, or the 
content of the diary taken during the cut and copies.

In Helsinki, nobody needs to know who you are to ask you “what do you expect?”, 
and a child can predict that if you expect to survive (mechanism), you can be 
sure that you will feel to be in once city. Both copies will obviously confirm 
that prediction.



> they don't need to do this all the time, only when personal pronoun 
> duplicating machines are thrown into the hypothetical mix. The very fact that 
> nobody, absolutely positively nobody on this list except for John Clark is 
> able to stop themselves from continuing to use them is clear indication to 
> John Clark that they cannot because personal pronouns are being used to cover 
> up multiple holes in the logical structure of their argument.  

Because the “I” pronoun, lost all its ambiguity if we Ade clear what the 
question is about. I survive means I will live some experience, and mechanism 
forbid to live the experience of feeling to be in two places when obtained 
after a duplication.

Bruno





> 
> John K Clark  
> 
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