On Wednesday, January 29, 2020 at 2:32:36 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, January 28, 2020 at 7:31:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 1/28/2020 3:31 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> >> Maybe. But the failure I wrote of applies if consciousness occurs only in >> brains (or even in just human brains) and IIT only applies to that. Unless >> IIT is modified as Mørch proposes, but then IIT would not be the same >> IIT that Aaronson is writing about 6 years ago. >> >> >> It would still fail though, because Scott's counter example includes >> things made of matter: >> >> *In my view, IIT fails to solve the Pretty-Hard Problem because it >> unavoidably predicts vast amounts of consciousness in physical systems that >> no sane person would regard as particularly “conscious” at all: indeed, >> systems that do nothing but apply a low-density parity-check code, or other >> simple transformations of their input data. Moreover, IIT predicts not >> merely that these systems are “slightly” conscious (which would be fine), >> but that they can be unboundedly more conscious than humans are.* >> >> Brent >> > > > Hedda negates the *unboundedly more.* > > Even rocks have information-processing properties. > > Quartz crystal computer rocks > "Irrational Computing" has interlinked a series of untreated crystals and > minerals to create a primitive signal processor. > https://www.cnet.com/news/quartz-crystal-computer-rocks/ > > @philipthrift >
*Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?* https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCITI.pdf The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that IIT and Russellian panpsychism are not compatible as they currently stand, because of a problem which I will call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all and jointly enable significant progress on the mind-body problem. Conclusion I have suggested two ways of resolving the coarse-graining problem and rendering IIT and Russellian panpsychism compatible. These suggestions involve substantive modifications of some basic principles of IIT, either the Exclusion postulate or the coarse-graining principle. Given one of these modifications, IIT would support (significant progress towards) a solution to the combination problem for Russellian panpsychism. IIT would support this solution either on its own, in view of its explanatory claim according to which the principles of mental combination are a priori deducible from phenomenological axioms, or on the basis of its purely correlational claim taken together with either the phenomenal bonding view or the fusion view of mental combination. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e657e074-8cf1-499e-ab97-c1d8f33638d3%40googlegroups.com.
