> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Feb 23, 2020 at 10:56 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > On 2/22/2020 2:39 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> On Sun, Feb 23, 2020 at 9:23 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> On 2/22/2020 2:10 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> On Sun, Feb 23, 2020 at 7:17 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> But isn't that just a matter of it's proponents overselling it. If you >>> say, well it's a probabilistic theory, then that the Born rule is the way >>> to get a probability is fairly compelling. >>> >>> Many-world proponents certainly oversell Everett. I have not seen anybody >>> admit openly that there is a problem with getting probability into a >>> deterministic theory so it just has to be put in by hand. If, as you say, >>> people admit that what they really want is a probabilistic theory, even if >>> they have to force it in by hand, then at least some of the arguments for >>> the Born rule make sense. But if you insist that your theory is pure >>> SWE/Everett, then all attempts at deriving the Born rule from this >>> deterministic position fail. >>> >>> The arguments that I have developed here, based on Kent's insight, take >>> Many-worlds at face value. Then the theory is clearly incoherent, or at >>> least incompatible with observation. However, if you take a classical >>> deterministic theory, such as Bruno's WM-duplication thought experiment, >>> then there is no way you can sensibly interpret such a theory >>> probabilistically. >> >> You don't think copying of persons has a probabilistic implication for >> copies? >> >> Only if you say so. The trouble, as I have pointed out, is that if they >> estimate their probabilities on the basis of the data they each collect from >> repeated trials, they all come to different answers. And all of these >> answers are equally justifiable. The concept of "a probability" in this >> situation is valueless. > > You're still assuming that there is no statistical convergence in the MWI > answers, as is assumed in one world? > > I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's > WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each > branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = 0.5 > on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these > probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every binary > sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number of > 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants. > > The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only > probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each Bernoulli > trial is one,
That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written in the personal diary, which is taken with in the duplication box. But then the guy in M will open its diary and see that his P = 1 is refuted. It is enough that once copy refute a prediction to abandon it as valid. > since W certainly occurs for each trial. Not from the first person perspective. Sometimes it could be M, and the first person experience of “felling being in M” is logical incompatible (with the protocole described here) with the experience of “feeling to be in W”. No copies at all will feel to be in the two cities at once. That never occurs. Bruno > In other words, there is no natural probability associated with this > duplication process, so imposing one is ad hoc and arbitrary. > > In MWI, it seems that Carroll gives the conventional answer -- weights are > arbitrarily assigned to branches according to the branch amplitude (modulus > of the coefficient squared). This is arbitrary too, designed merely to give > the same answer that is naturally obtained in the single world case. What I > object to about this is not only its arbitrariness, but also the fact that it > is advertised as a "derivation" from the SWE, when it is no such thing. It is > arbitrarily imposed. So MWI is cheating. At least in text-book Copenhagen > approaches, there is no secret about the fact that the Born rule is adopted > merely to give agreement with experiment. The data are probibalistic, so the > theory is modified to also be probabilistic. Honesty is a virtue in my eyes. > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRbX0O3hmVHc%2BwS2UAyFZR99DG1x3%3D4Qq2UQBRHwZgGBQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRbX0O3hmVHc%2BwS2UAyFZR99DG1x3%3D4Qq2UQBRHwZgGBQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5CC0F293-2E7E-409A-90EC-8DFF53BC80CD%40ulb.ac.be.
