On Fri, Mar 17, 2023 at 8:53 PM <spudboy...@aol.com> wrote:

> I am far, less, the philosopher then you are. All this peasant (me!)
> requires for both animals and machines is a basic mechanical, cause +
> effect diagram on how both sets attained self-awareness? Call it a working
> theory.

What is consciousness? I think the best place to start is with a definition.

First we might attempt to dissect the word "consciousness" itself:

The word *"con•scious•ness"* has three parts:

   - con- <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/com-> meaning *"with"*
   - scious <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/scious> meaning *"knowledge"*
   - -ness <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/-ness> turns an adjective *'X'*
   into a noun meaning *"the state of being X"*

So the meaning of *"con•scious"* is simply *"with knowledge." * And just as
*'happiness'* means *"the state of being happy,"* adding *-ness* to
*conscious* implies *"con•scious•ness"* is *"the state of being with

So consciousness is anything which has a state of being with knowledge.
Next, what is knowledge? The oldest definition is that knowledge is a "true
belief". But here we run into a problem. Truth is not definable, not even
in mathematics. This was proven in Tarski's *undefinability theorem*
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarski%27s_undefinability_theorem>. So if
consciousness is being with knowledge, and knowledge is true belief, then
the undefinability of truth, means we will never have a complete definition
of knowledge of consciousness. The best we can do is understand the
relation between them.

The next question that poses itself to us, is what is belief? What is
required to have a belief? Is it a particular structure or state of matter,
or is it a mathematical or functional relationship or property, might it,
in either case, be related to information or information processing

I don't have a firm answer on this, and will instead leave you with some
speculations by others on this question of what consciousness is:

Douglas Hofstadter in "Godel Escher Bach" (1979):
"My belief is that the explanations of “emergent” phenomena in our
brains–for instance, ideas hopes, images, analogies, and finally
consciousness and free will–are based on a kind of Strange Loop, an
interaction between levels in which the top level reaches back down towards
the bottom level and influences it, while at the same time being itself
determined by the bottom level. In other words, a self-reinforcing
“resonance” between different levels–quite like the Henkin sentence, which
by merely asserting its own provability, actually becomes provable. The
self comes into being at the moment it has the power to reflect itself."

Daniel Dennett in “Consciousness Explained” (1991):
"Anyone or anything that has such a virtual machine as its control system
is conscious in the fullest sense, and is conscious because it has such a
virtual machine."

David Chalmers in "The Conscious Mind" (1996):
"Given the laws of coherence, we have a partial answer: consciousness
arises in virtue of the functional organization associated with awareness.
We can even arrive at a fairly specific understanding of parts of the
supervenience relation by virtue of the principle of structural coherence:
not only does consciousness arise from awareness, but the structure of
consciousness is determined by the structure of awareness."

David Darling in "Zen Physics - The Science of Death, The Logic of
Reincarnation" (1996):
"But there is also an interior view, to which you alone are privy. In
mechanistic terms, as well as the appearance of the brain-body machine,
there is the feeling of what it is like to be that machine — the subjective
experience of being a certain someone. Consciousness, we might say, is the
symmetry-breaking factor between the objective and the subjective."

Gerald Maurice Edelman and Giulio Tononi in "A Universe of Consciousness"
"For the first time in evolution, information acquires a new potential–the
possibility of subjectivity. It is information “for somebody”; in short, it
becomes consciousness itself."

Bruno Marchal in discussion list (2020):
"Consciousness is just anything simultaneously true, non provable,
knowable, even indubitable (knowingly for “rich" entities) and non
definable, and indeed the logic of machine self-reference shows that all
machine looking inward, in the way allowed by mathematical logic
(theoretical computer science) will bring a term to describe this, and is a
good candidate to be called consciousness."

Stephen Wolfram in “What is Consciousness” (2021):
"In a sense what’s important is that it seems we may have a realistic way
to formalize issues about consciousness, and to turn questions about
consciousness into what amount to concrete questions about mathematics,
computation, logic or whatever that can be formally and rigorously

We see recurring themes of information, recursion, computation, and
machines and logic. I think these are likely key to any formal definition
of consciousness. I also think part of the difficulty rests in the fact
that there are infinite possibilities of different realizable conscious
states, and creating a single definition to cover all these cases is as
hard as making a single definition to  cover all possible mathematical
objects, or all possible universes in an ensemble type multiverse theory.

> It's remarkable that we attained consciousness and even more remarkable
> that a server farm could do so.

There might not be much to it. A thermostat may be conscious. Consciousness
might be easy to achieve. What is difficult is developing a system capable
of describing its conscious states, or at least its own bafflement over the
fact that it is something that experiences conscious states.

> If one is a pantheist, then I suppose one sees consciousness in
> everything, being, "as right as rain." I have no objection to that view
> either, because maybe the pantheists are correct or will be found so?
> Now, by choice, would I prefer to have a Turning-surpassable computer, or
> something that unconsciously, churns out wonderful technologies for
> humanity? I'll pick the later, because we have 8 billion people to chat
> with on this world, and I choose to chat with people. I personally, would
> like to chat with my fellow humans about the new, asteroid mining craft
> GPT6 just produced, but so far, there's zero in the news about that.
> This, comes from my values, but it's non-obligatory that all humans need
> value this as a first. Each to their own.

In any case it is important that we solve this problem quickly. If our
machines are conscious, it is important to know that so we don't create and
mistreat a slave race. If our machines have no consciousness whatever, that
is also important to know, if we create robot companions and colleagues, or
prosthetic robot bodies to upload sick and dying biological brains into, or
if we create self-replicating machines that fill the galaxy, we should know
beforehand if they are conscious or not. These questions will become
pressing very soon.


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
> To: Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> Sent: Fri, Mar 17, 2023 11:32 am
> Subject: Re: 4 Tests Reveal Bing (GPT 4) ≈ 114 IQ (last test is nuts)
> On Thu, Mar 16, 2023, 6:37 PM spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> To get to the point, I did advocate for a bit of skepticism for claiming
> consciousness for a computer system, and the retort was from JC that
> essentially, we cannot even define what makes a human conscious, and I am
> going with an au contraries', Pierre! I took me under 10 min to locate a
> worthy article submitted for JC's criticisms.
> Here tis'
> What Neuroscientists Think, and Don't Think, About Consciousness - PubMed
> (nih.gov) <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35280212/>
> So, we are much closer to understand human consciousness. I am ask to to
> put the same effort into how a network developed this in so little time.
> Our our analog chips so mighty in 2022-3???
> Neurologists know that neurons and neural activity is correlated with
> consciousness, but for the most part their understanding stops there, (and
> by their own admission.)
> I would say neurologists are almost in the worst position to understand
> consciousness as they look at it from the lowest level, the neurons. This
> is like trying to decipher a word processor program by looking at the
> patterns of electrical impulses in the circuits of a computer's CPU.
> Here are some quotes about our complete lack of understanding of
> consciousness and the disappointment regarding what help neurology has
> offered (emphasis mine):
> “How it is that anything so remarkable as a *state of consciousness*
> comes about *as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
> unaccountable* as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.”
> -- Thomas Huxley in " “Lessons in Elementary Psychology,” (1866)
> “An electron is neither red nor blue nor any other colour; the same holds
> for the proton, the nucleus of the hydrogen atom. But the union of the two
> in the atom of hydrogen, according to the physicist, produces
> electromagnetic radiation of a certain discrete array of wavelengths. The
> homogenous constituents of this radiation, when separated by a prism or an
> optical grating, *stimulate in an observer the sensations of red, green,
> blue, violet* by the intermediary of certain physiological processes,
> whose general character is sufficiently well known to assert that they are
> not red or green or blue, in fact that *the nervous elements in question
> display no colour in virtue of their being stimulated; the white or gray
> the nerve cells exhibit whether stimulated or not is certainly
> insignificant in respect of the colour sensation* which, in the
> individual whose nerves they are, accompanies their excitation.”
> -- Erwin Schrödinger in "Mind and Matter
> <https://archive.org/details/mindmatter0000schr/page/n11/mode/2up>" (1958)
> “Few questions have endured longer or traversed a more perplexing history
> than this, *the problem of consciousness and its place in nature.*
> Despite centuries of pondering and experiment, of trying to get together
> two supposed entities called mind and matter in one age, subject and object
> in another, or soul and body in still others, despite endless discoursing
> on the streams, states, or contents of consciousness, of distinguishing
> terms like intuitions, sense data, the given, raw feels, the sensa,
> presentations and representations, the sensations, images, and affections
> of structuralist introspections, the evidential data of the scientific
> positivist, phenomenological fields, the apparitions of Hobbes, the
> phenomena of Kant, the appearances of the idealist, the elements of Mach,
> the phanera of Peirce, or the category errors of Ryle,* in spite of all
> of these, the problem of consciousness is still with us.*”
> -- Julian Jaynes in "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
> Bicameral Mind
> <https://www.julianjaynes.org/resources/books/ooc/en/introduction-the-problem-of-consciousness/>"
> (1976)
> “*We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness*,
> but we have, it seems, *no understanding whatever of how this can be so.*
> It strikes us as miraculous, eerie, even faintly comic. Somehow, we feel,
> the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of consciousness,
> but *we draw a total blank on the nature of this conversion*. Neural
> transmissions just seem like the wrong kind of materials with which to
> bring consciousness into the world, but it appears that in some way they
> perform this mysterious feat. The mind-body problem is the problem of
> understanding how the miracle is wrought, thus removing the sense of deep
> mystery. We want to take the magic out of the link between consciousness
> and the brain.”
> -- McGinn “Can we solve the mind body problem?” (1989)
> “IT IS REMARKABLE that *most of the work in both cognitive science and
> the neurosciences makes no reference to consciousness* (or 'awareness'),
> especially as many would regard consciousness a the major puzzle
> confronting the neural view of the mind and indeed *at the present time
> it appears deeply mysterious* to many people.”
> -- Francis Crick in "Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness
> <https://authors.library.caltech.edu/40352/1/148.pdf>" (1990)
> “At the time, I uncritically accepted the view that the troublesome
> phenomenal, or “what it is like,” aspect of experiences had nothing to do
> with their representational contents, and *I supposed that
> neurophysiology would ultimately tell the full story*. In the course of
> reflecting on this pair of assumptions in later years, I Came to think that
> I had made a serious mistake. Not only are the phenomenal or felt aspects
> of our mental lives representational but also (relatedly) they are not even
> in the head at all. So, *neurophysiology certainly will not reveal to us
> what it is like to smell or skunk or to taste a fig. Look at the neurons
> for as long as you like, and you will not find phenomenal consciousness.*”
> -- Michael Tye in "Ten Problems of consciousness" (1995)
> “Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the
> mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious
> experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. *All sorts of
> mental phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years,
> but consciousness has stubbornly resisted.* Many have tried to explain
> it, but the explanations always seem to fall short of the target. Some have
> been led to suppose that the problem is intractable, and that no good
> explanation can be given.”
> -- David Chalmers in "Facing Up to the Hard Problem
> <http://consc.net/papers/facing.html>" (1996)
> *“We should therefore not expect the search for a neural correlate of
> consciousness to lead to the holy grail of a universal theory.* We might
> expect it to be valuable in helping us to understand consciousness in
> specific cases, such as the human case: learning more about the processes
> underlying awareness will certainly help us understand the structure and
> dynamics of consciousness, for example. But in holding up the bridge from
> physical processes to conscious experience, preexperimental coherence
> principles will always play a central role”
> -- David Chalmers in "The Conscious Mind" (1996)
> “Two decades later, *we know an astonishing amount about the brain*: you
> can’t follow the news for a week without encountering at least one more
> tale about scientists discovering the brain region associated with
> gambling, or laziness, or love at first sight, or regret – and that’s only
> the research that makes the headlines. Meanwhile, the field of artificial
> intelligence – which focuses on recreating the abilities of the human
> brain, rather than on what it feels like to be one – has advanced
> stupendously. But like an obnoxious relative who invites himself to stay
> for a week and then won’t leave, *the Hard Problem remains*. When I
> stubbed my toe on the leg of the dining table this morning, *as any
> student of the brain could tell you, nerve fibres called “C-fibres” shot a
> message to my spinal cord, sending neurotransmitters to the part of my
> brain called the thalamus, which activated (among other things) my limbic
> system. Fine. But how come all that was accompanied by an agonising flash
> of pain?* And what is pain, anyway?”
> -- Oliver Burkeman in “Why can’t the world’s greatest minds solve the
> mystery of consciousness?
> <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jan/21/-sp-why-cant-worlds-greatest-minds-solve-mystery-consciousness>”
> (2015)
> I think any satisfying answer must involve all the levels of processing
> that sit between the top level user-interface of consciousness (which we
> see and which presents the mystery), and the lowest level of the neural
> circuitry, which we also see. But between these two layers is a vast bridge
> of various levels of processing, processing of neurons and dendrites,
> processing of neocortical columns, algorithms in the cerebellum, processing
> of sub-brain regions in the visual cortex for recognizing colors, shapes,
> patterns, motion, faces, etc., the whole regions such as the complete
> visual cortex, whole brain hemispheres, the complete brain of both
> hemispheres and connection via the corpus callosum. We might make the
> analogy between the brain and a cell phone, where again we have the UI
> presented to us on the screen, and the circuitry at the bottom. In the
> middle layers are the machine code, the system calls, operating system
> kernel, functions, routines, modules, sub processes, processes,
> applications, etc. which finally work their way up to presenting a screen
> with buttons, text and images. All the meat required for understanding
> exists in the middle layers. Analyzing the top-most and/or the bottom-most
> layers, while ignoring the middle is sure to lead to bafflement.
> As neurology works its way up to building a complete map of neural regions
> and functioning, we will know how the brain does what it does, but will
> that explain consciousness? Here philosophers disagree. Some like Dennett
> say that is as far as we can go and that will answer all the questions we
> have about consciousness. Others like Chalmers say that will still leave
> the "hard problem" unresolved.
> I see merit in both aspects of their argument. I agree with Dennett that
> consciousness is nothing other than awareness. But I also agree with
> Chalmers that even with such an objective and complete brain map, there
> will remain some things that are unexplainable/shareable (in my opinion due
> in part to similar reasons as Gödelian incompleteness). First-person
> experiences are not explainable in third-person terms and can only be
> understood/experienced/known by being the system that has that particular
> experience.
> Jason
> -----Original Message-----
> From: John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
> To: spudboy...@aol.com
> Cc: everything-list@googlegroups.com <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> Sent: Thu, Mar 16, 2023 5:55 pm
> Subject: Re: 4 Tests Reveal Bing (GPT 4) ≈ 114 IQ (last test is nuts)
> On Thu, Mar 16, 2023 at 4:50 PM <spudboy...@aol.com> wrote:
> *> America executes prisoners for capital murder. So, legally, if a
> murderer died 50 years ago for a capital crime, does that mean, once,
> revived, *
> To my knowledge no executed prisoner has ever been cryogenically
> preserved, however Joseph Paul Jernigan was executed by lethal injection
> in 1981 and he became part of the "Visible Human Project". His body was
> sliced into 1871 1 millimeter thick slices. and each slice was then
> photographed with a very high resolution camera. I've wondered if there was
> enough information preserved in those photographs to upload him, probably
> not but maybe. You can watch a one minute video of a journey through Mr. J
> ernigan's body here.
> The visible human project - Male (HD)
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPPjUtiAGYs>
> A few years later they took even higher resolution photographs of a woman
> who died of a heart attack and they used even thinner slices, only 0.33
> millimeters thick
> Visual Human Project Female <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3atjsVqFlhs>
> *> they are no longer liable because of Double Jeopardy and that their
> victims will also be revived? A Civil Case then??*
> As I've said, I'm not a lawyer.
> John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
> ws8
> u6c
> -----Original Message-----
> From: John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
> To: 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> Sent: Thu, Mar 16, 2023 1:30 pm
> Subject: 4 Tests Reveal Bing (GPT 4) ≈ 114 IQ (last test is nuts)
> Forget the Ukraine war, forget climate change, forget Donald Trump, I now
> think GPT-4 is by far the most world shaking event and the most
> underreported one.  Many of us have been talking about the singularity for
> decades, but now it looks like we're on its doorstep. You've got to look at
> this video!
> 4 Tests Reveal Bing (GPT 4) ≈ 114 IQ (last test is nuts)
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFvDJnf0GXs&list=PLYXp_rV1HrBAOZqPJTOSo91275hKQrfpl&index=13>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2neEP50SN7NCGRqtm1uzwNaE668DFu4-QdQa-OGFei8A%40mail.gmail.com
> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2neEP50SN7NCGRqtm1uzwNaE668DFu4-QdQa-OGFei8A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
> .
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/382281143.709221.1679006249871%40mail.yahoo.com
> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/382281143.709221.1679006249871%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
> .
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUju2F-JRy%2B0Updaqw879kbQAfj8WBkQ7z36_%3DLFFnAZ0g%40mail.gmail.com
> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUju2F-JRy%2B0Updaqw879kbQAfj8WBkQ7z36_%3DLFFnAZ0g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
> .

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 

Reply via email to