If Popper had been more scrupulous and less provincial, esp. given what I'm told is a skepticism towards institutionalism, he could have easily differentiated the intrinsic revisability of a theory vs. the specific way it has resisted testing and improvement due to a specific institutionalization. The experimental natural sciences involve application of uniform methods and thus replicability and thus are intrinsically at odds with arbitrary manipulation. However, this is a restrictive conception of rational methods. One could differentiate, for example, between Marxism or psychoanalysis as scholarly research programs and as self-justifying institutionalized doctrines insulated against revision. The idea of natural science as the only model for the rational understanding of the surrounding world is itself ideological through and through. That model, interestingly enough, is insulated against criticism and revision, precisely because of the way it is ideologically propagated and reinforced.
At 07:19 PM 4/1/2008, CeJ wrote: >Popper at one time had wanted to join the Circle and was evidently >very envious of the admiration Wittgenstein received from them (though >by most accounts, Wittgenstein did not see himself as engaged in their >scientific world view and did not encourage their acclaim of him). > >Here is a nice summing up of Popper, especially if you follow it up >with a bit of Lakatos and Feyerabend. : > >http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ > > >>Popper's final position is that he acknowledges that it is >impossible to discriminate science from non-science on the basis of >the falsifiability of the scientific statements alone; he recognizes >that scientific theories are predictive, and consequently prohibitive, >only when taken in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses, and he also >recognizes that readjustment or modification of the latter is an >integral part of scientific practice. Hence his final concern is to >outline conditions which indicate when such modification is genuinely >scientific, and when it is merely ad hoc. This is itself clearly a >major alteration in his position, and arguably represents a >substantial retraction on his part: Marxism can no longer be dismissed >as 'unscientific' simply because its advocates preserved the theory >from falsification by modifying it (for in general terms, such a >procedure, it now transpires, is perfectly respectable scientific >practice). It is now condemned as unscientific by Popper because the >only rationale for the modifications which were made to the original >theory was to ensure that it evaded falsification, and so such >modifications were ad hoc, rather than scientific. This contention-- >though not at all implausible--has, to hostile eyes, a somewhat >contrived air about it, and is unlikely to worry the convinced >Marxist. On the other hand, the shift in Popper's own basic position >is taken by some critics as an indicator that falsificationism, for >all its apparent merits, fares no better in the final analysis than >verificationism.<< _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
