DMB, Ron, Everybody
On 2 Nov. DMBuchanan wrote:
> Ron quoted Pirsig:
"Any philosophic explanation of quality is going to be both
false and true precisely because it is a philosophic
explanation. The process of philosophic explanation is an
analytic process, a process of breaking something down
into words, into subjects and predicates. What I mean
(and everybody else means) by the word quality cannot
be broken down into subjects and predicates. This is not
because quality is so mysterious but because quality is so
simple, immediate and direct."
(I want to keep Pirsig's words apart for our own)
> Ron said to Bo:
> > This is what's confusing the shit outta me...the
> > pre-conceptual/pre-intellectual distinction... I think I need some help
> > in understanding.
> dmb says:
> I can't help explain Bo's distinction (As I understand it, the terms
> are interchangable) but David Hildebrand's paper "The Linguistic Turn"
> contains a great explanation of the problem Pirsig presents in the
> quote above. I learned that Douglas Browning calls it "the
> phenomenological paradox". The paper quotes Browning. Here he is
> talking about Dewey's "pre-reflective experiences" but it could just
> as well be James's pure experience, Mead's primordial prereflective
> experience or Pirsig's quality....
> "How can [Dewey] adequately describe our immediately lived,
> pre-reflective experiences without assuming a stance for surveying
> them which, being reflective and retrospective, cannot help but
> disclose them, not as they were experienced in the imtimacy of our
> living through them, but as 'objects' which we are viewing
> externally."
But for heaven's sake, can't you get it into your respective
"coconuts" (Ron's term ;-) that the MOQ's dynamic component
isn't pre-language. Language as something we (theoretically) may
detract from experience is a SOM-induced ghost. If language
were the absolute we can't escape then there better be a
Metaphysics of Language.
The early Phaedrus understood and didn't say that Quality is pre-
language (rather pre-intellect or before SOM) but for some
inscrutable reason the later LILA Pirsig suddenly "discovered"
these SOM-induced ghosts and - instead of seeing that the MOQ
makes SOM nil and void (by making it its own intellectual level) -
he began all kinds of strange manoeuvres to adapt the MOQ to
SOM. A hopeless task.
> I mean, radical empiricism doesn't entail a rejection of the idea that
> language powerfully shapes our world but its emphasis on experience
> won't allow that fact to trump everything else, so to speak. As we see
> here, Pirsig, Hildebrand and Dewey acknowledge the problem but its not
> enough to stop them from including the pre-intellectual in their
> intellectual descriptions. In doing this they are also acknowledging
> that reality is too big, rich and fluid to be stuffed into little
> conceptual boxes and that seems right as rain to me.
I show this this from DMB's message because the sudden
appearance of (pre) intellect (instead of (pre) language) meaning
that Quality is before SOM and its LANGUAGE/REALITY split)
But it's a short lucid moment before DMB is back in SOM about a
reality too rich ...etc. as if the MOQ is another academical
(subjective) theory about an (objective) reality .... instead of
seeing that the MOQ subsumes SOM as its own 4th. level.
Bo
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