Hi Ham My point was that you seemed to be saying the sensate is not differentiated earlier which I'd suggest is wrong and you now seem to agree.
The main thing I disagree witrh below is that you appear to suggest that we aresome how 'wired' to experience value. Like the MOQ, it seems better to suggest that all existence and activity involves values. The only real alternative to this suggestion is really that certain processes are not active but mechanical. But this assumes that there are laws acting that rule out any possibilities so that there is no choice or action. And at base, science finds that processes have to be described in terms of choices and not mechanistic laws. Perhaps law needs to be seen differently? Is law simply habit? Are habits like actions or mechanisms? Do habits lead to a kind of unconsciousness or sleep. DQ is full awareness SQ is the falling away of awareness? Regards David M ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ham Priday" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, November 26, 2007 6:37 AM Subject: Re: [MD] The Top Down Fallacy > > Hi David -- > > > >> What about pre-intellectual but differentiated experience, >> like when my pre-linguistic nephew carries the same toy >> around for weeks, only to suddenly move on to a new favourite? > > Intellectual development progresses by degree in the toddler, and you've > provided a good example of how this works. Although I'm not a > psychologist, > I would suggest that your nephew senses the value of his favored toy as a > challenge to his intellect. Once he has mastered that challenge, the toy > and his "intellectual experience" of it loses his interest. He moves on > to > explore a new value, and that becomes his next favorite toy--another > object > added to his experience, and so on. In this successive exploration of > objective otherness, he builds a knowledge base about the identities and > physical properties of "things" and how they relate to each other, > eventually accumulating enough knowledge to assemble or structure objects > in > ways that demonstrate intellectual competence. > > Epistemology (how we learn) starts with experience; but Value is primary > to > experiential knowledge. My argument is that the "pure" or > "pre-intellectual" experience that James, Rorty, and Pirsig refer to is > not > knowledge but Sensibility. We perceive otherness as Value, because we are > value-sensible creatures. But because the Value we are sensible of is > filtered through our organic sense receptors and becomes conscious in the > space/time mode of human awareness, all experience (intellection) is > differentiated and relational. Pre-intellectual awareness is our > psycho-emotional response to Value. The intellect cannot deal with pure > sensual data as anything but abstract "feeling". Instead, the > cerebro-nervous system converts (reduces) primary Value to specific > objects > which are experienced and remembered as the things and events that make up > our physical world. And because that world is intellectualized as a > cause-and-effect reality, we are deluded into thinking that the objects > experienced are primary to the values sensed. > > I believe we are pre-wired for the precept that Value is intrinsic to the > objects of our experience. Otherwise, we would not have such difficulty > convincing ourselves that Value is primary. Also, if we did not perceive > being as the source of Value, rather than the reverse, we would be > confounded by living in a "virtual reality" which, I submit, is a more > accurate metaphysical ontology. > > Essentially yours, > Ham > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
