dmb disagreed entirely: The idea that mental events arise from physical substance is exactly what James and Pirsig are against. They assert that "mental" and "physical" are products of reflection, abstractions of the qualitative differences known in direct experience. I posted the relevant quotes from James recently, so I'll spare you.
Krimel replied: Actually I wish you would at least remind me which post you are talking about. I always find your use of James amusing. I recall a post not long ago that had a bunch of them in it. But I decided not to embarrass you by commenting but... “The first great pitfall from which a radical standing by experience will save us is an artificial conception of the relations between knower and known. Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities” and their relations have “assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome.” William James John Stuhr, Editor of "Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy" says, “In beginning to understand his view, it cannot be overemphasized that Dewey is not using the word ‘experience’ in its conventional sense. For Dewey, experience is not to be understood in terms of the experiencing subject, or as the interaction of a subject and object that exist separate from their interaction. Instead, Dewey’s view is radically empirical” In this radically empirical view, “experience is an activity in which subject and object are unified and constituted as partial features and relations within this ongoing, unanalyzed unity”. Compare Dewey's "unanalyzed unity" to the way James describes “pure experience” or “the instant field of the present”. James says it is “experience in its ‘pure’ state, plain unqualified actuality, a simple that, as yet undifferentiated into thing and thought, and only virtually classifiable as objective fact or as someone’s opinion.” As Dewey puts it in the “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy”, “the characteristic feature of this prior notion [SOM] is the assumption that experience centres in, or gathers about, or proceeds from a centre or subject which is outside the course of natural existence, and set over against it”. dmb says: I think its not just that we disagree about James or Pirsig. I think your position is a classic case of a worldview they saw as a problem and found most worthy of destruction. Its sort of ironic the way you offer this view as an alternative or counter to the MOQ. Its an option wherein we throw away the solution and replace it with the problem. Naturally, in a forum like this, that would be the least attractive option. You DO realize that, don't you? I figure you have your own little game of "outcast" going. That's cool. Enjoy it. _________________________________________________________________ Get the power of Windows + Web with the new Windows Live. http://www.windowslive.com?ocid=TXT_TAGHM_Wave2_powerofwindows_122007 Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
