dmb disagreed entirely:
 The idea that mental events arise from physical substance is exactly what
James and Pirsig are against. They assert that "mental" and "physical" are
products of reflection, abstractions of the qualitative differences known in
direct experience. I posted the relevant quotes from James recently, so I'll
spare you.

[dmb allegedly relevant James quote]

"The first great pitfall from which a radical standing by experience will
save us is an artificial conception of the relations between knower and
known. Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have
been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities" and their relations have
"assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be
invented to overcome."  William James

[Krimel]
No where is James saying that physical substance does not give rise to
mental events. Quite the contrary, in "The Conterminousness Of Different
Minds" he says this:

"To me the decisive reason in favor of our minds meeting in _some_ common
objects at least is that, unless I make that supposition, I have no motive
for assuming that your mind exists at all. Why do I postulate your mind?
Because I see your body acting in a certain way. Its gestures, facial
movements, words and conduct generally, are 'expressive,' so I deem it
actuated as my own is, by an inner life like mine."

Later he says:

"Practically, then, our minds meet in a world of objects which they share in
common, which would still be there, if one or several of the minds were
destroyed."
 
(Footnote: The notions that our objects are inside of our respective heads
is not seriously defensible, so I pass it by.) 

"I can see no formal objection to this supposition's being literally true.
On the principles which I am defending, a 'mind' or 'personal consciousness'
is the name for a series of experiences run together by certain definite
transitions, and an objective reality is a series of similar experiences
knit by different transitions. If one and the same experience can figure
twice, once in a mental and once in a physical context (as I have tried, in
my article on 'Consciousness,' to show that it can), one does not see why it
might not figure thrice, or four times, or any number of times, by running
into as many different mental contexts, just as the same point, lying at
their intersection, can be continued into many different lines."

In Does Consciousness Exist he says:

"Let the case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I am of
anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognize
emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when
scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my
breathing. The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my
objects, is the 'I breath' which actually does accompany them. There are
other internal facts besides breathing (intracephalic muscular adjustments,
etc., of which I have said a word in my larger Psychology), and these
increase the assets of 'consciousness,' so far as the latter is subject to
immediate perception..."

In "What is an Emotion" he is pretty clear:

"And yet it is even now certain that of two things concerning the emotions,
one must be true. Either separate and special centres, affected to them
alone, are their brain-seat, or else they correspond to processes occurring
in the motor and sensory centres, already assigned, or in others like them,
not yet mapped out. If the former be the case we must deny the current view,
and hold the cortex to be something more than the surface of "projection"
for every sensitive spot and every muscle in the body. If the latter be the
case, we must ask whether the emotional "process" in the sensory or motor
centre be an altogether peculiar one, or whether it resembles the ordinary
perceptive processes of which those centres are already recognised to be the
seat. The purpose of the following pages is to show that the last
alternative comes nearest to the truth, and that the emotional
brain-processes no only resemble the ordinary sensorial brain-processes, but
in very truth are nothing but such processes variously combined. The main
result of this will be to simplify our notions of the possible complications
of brain-physiology, and to make us see that we have already a brain-scheme
in our hands whose applications are much wider than its authors dreamed. But
although this seems to be the chief result of the arguments I am to urge, I
should say that they were not originally framed for the sake of any such
result. They grew out of fragmentary introspective observations, and it was
only when these had already combined into a theory that the thought of the
simplification the theory might bring to cerebral physiology occurred to me,
and made it seem more important than before."

[Krimel]
If you need more let me know there are plenty to choose from. James claims
that thoughts are not "stuff" or substances but processes and functions of
the brain.

As for Dewey I have not read much of his work and will refrain from
commenting.

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