Gav said: the intellect *represents* static patterns symbolically. the intellect then relates these symbols. this means that the levels of the MOQ are all actually intellectual (slightly confusing i know). the 'intellectual level' of the MOQ is that level that deals with *abstract* symbols, as opposed to the concrete symbology of the other levels.
dmb says: It occurred to me that you might be talking ontologically and epistemologically at the same time. The state of the evolved universe and empiricist doctrines do seem to overlap in some weird way that's beyond me, but it seems wrong to say that all the levels "are all actually intellectual". This would be untrue in terms of evolution and in terms of what we actually experience. Let me step back from the isms and ologies on this. Take the regular world as it comes and forget the philosophy. If we say that the levels of MOQ cover all the stuff that would be contained in the world's most current and comprehensive encyclopedia, I think it only means the levels draw lines on what is commonly understood about ourselves and the world. It's true that SOM-based common sense takes the encyclopedia as a more-or-less factual description of the objective world, but there's a section on philosophy in that set of books too. References to Pirsig's ideas would be included there. Among the things we know and experience in ordinary reality, there are some that belong in the intellectual category. I think Pirsig's books belong there along with many other ordinary things. That's really all there is to it. Now in that book, there is an unusual philosophical idea. There is an empirical doctrine that puts experience first in such a way that it challenges the common sense attitude toward that encyclopedia and its ability to mirror an objective reality. Again, this challenge can even be found in the encyclopedia itself, not least of all in the philosophy section. As a part of his books and ideas, DQ itself is referenced in that section. This presents a paradox, apparently. Pirsig says that the levels include everything in the world, everything in the encyclopedia so that the MOQ leaves nothing out of its account. The only thing missing is DQ, he says, because DQ can't be turned into a static thing, can't be nailed down by words or concepts. This quality of experience presents some difficulty for a philosopher because he's expected to do exactly that, nail things down with words and concepts. The radical empiricist argues that if experience doesn't fit our conceptual schemes then th ere must be something wrong with our conceptional scheme, but it also says there is a kind of experience that doesn't fit into any of the static levels because its just not static. I mean, there is a difference between the notion that traditional philosophy has not included the idea of DQ and the notion that the dynamic is qualitatively and actually different from the static as we know it in experience. Same with SOM. There is a difference between the qualitative differences between thoughts and things and the metaphysical view that all of reality is either one or the other. We can know the difference between jagged broken glass and Alice's imaginary leap in actual experience without SOM. As James says, "real" fire cannot be put our with imaginary water and "real" water won't necessarily put out a mental fire. Those differences are real and are known in experience. Then the analytic knife goes to work on that. This is what it means to put experience first. It doesn't negate the experience from which SOM is derived, it only negates that particular derivation. How's that? dmb _________________________________________________________________ Connect and share in new ways with Windows Live. http://www.windowslive.com/share.html?ocid=TXT_TAGHM_Wave2_sharelife_012008 Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
