Hey Ron,

Matt said:
I'm wary of your manner of use of the objective/subjective distinction, but 
what I'm really interested in is what you are referring to in Pirsig's texts 
for his attempts to:

"redefine distinctive expression"

and

"redefine the terms of truth-finding by placing it in pre-intellectual 
experience"

Ron said:
What I meant by the latter statement "redefine the terms of truth-finding by 
placing it in pre-intellectual experience" is that objectivism defines 
Certainty intellectually where as Pirsig places certainty pre-intellectually. 
He stated in a letter to Dr. Gurr that he felt Pre-intellectual experience was 
more empirical than objectivism Because it's verifiability is experience itself 
not in a logically Supported statement of truth. I may have mashed together a 
few terms creating a vague statement When I said "redefine distinctive 
expression" I admit I hastily Threw that phrase together. What I mean is that 
Pirsig is not Creating an axiom in the use of DQ/SQ but he is asking us to 
Rethink how we view and therefore describe experience.

Matt:
I tell you what, I liked your phrases because they had the virtue of being 
interesting. I just didn't know what they meant. You're explanation is 
interesting because for the latter phrase it selects an area of Pirsig's text 
that is quite conventionally looked to, but gives it an explicit spin that 
isn't often given explicitly (though I think very often implicitly) and in the 
former phrase, it gives an intriguing spin to a conventional explanation of 
what Pirsig is doing. If I were you, I would follow up and explore on how you 
relate phrases like those, the idiosyncratic spin you want to give to pieces of 
Pirsig that have been debated and tossed around many times, to Pirsig, and 
potentially to these alternative interpretations.

Firstly, I would be looking for more explicit engagement between the new tools 
and lines of thought and with Pirsig's texts. Secondly, the claim of resolving 
"MoQ conflicts" always runs across, not just the problem of textual connection, 
but the problem of other explanations (which means you have to not only 
establish problems within a text, but also how your way is superior of other 
text-interpreters--which means you have to spend time on your way and other 
people's ways, let alone Pirsig's way).

I'm not really worried about any of that, though. I'd like to just comment on 
the notion that Pirsig places truth-finding in pre-intellectual experience. I 
described it as conventional because I think it is what lays behind many of 
Platt's rants about pre-intellectual experience (which Platt's praise lends 
credence to), but many others, too, mainly dealing with the notion of radical 
empiricism needing to act as foundation to pragmatism or else it'll spin off 
into relativism. I don't like this notion, I think it is antithetical to both 
pragmatism and Pirsig, and I don't think it is necessary to much of what you 
talked about in relation to language and the view of grammar as being a key to 
understanding Pirsig's intellectual level. So I shall try and briefly explain 
my distaste and then say some good things about your approach to the 
intellectual level.

You said that "objectivism defines 'certainty' intellectually, whereas Pirsig 
places 'certainty' pre-intellectually." I'd like to first point out that the 
phrase I asked for expansion on was about "truth-finding" and in doing so, you 
moved to talk about "certainty." This isn't inherently bad, all one needs to do 
is connect the two. However, I think very traditional, philosophical problems 
will arise when you do, problems we Pirsigians know of as "SOM."

Pirsig does, indeed, locate "certainty" pre-intellectually. This is the same 
move Descartes made to inaugurate modern philosophy, part of the move I called 
earlier the shift from talking about reality to talking about experience.  I 
would contend that Pirsig, in Platt's most beloved passage to quote (if only 
because he perceives a lot of people perjuring it), is taking a stance similar 
to Descartes.

All depending on how you perceive Descartes' relation to SOM, this could be 
bad.  I'm going to skip this relationship because I've spent a good amount of 
time elsewhere exploring different angles and move straight to the problem, 
which is problematical whether or not Descartes is seen as the beginning of or 
paradigmatic of Pirsig's SOM.  So, is this stance good or bad?

I think the stance itself, of noting the difference between the first-person 
and third-person point of view (and that we all begin irrevocably from it), 
this was a step forward in the history of philosophy.  Plato accused the 
Sophists of relativism for noting that "man was the measure of all things."  
The Greek skeptical tradition that extends out from the 5th-century BCE, beyond 
the Sophists, continued this opposition to what it perceived as Platonic 
pretensions of absolute certainty in our knowledge.  Descartes performed one of 
the great reversals in intellectual history by taking the skepticism of the 
Pyhrronian tradition (whose final exemplar was Montaigne, before it lapsed in 
the face of the modern revolution) and turning it into a method designed to 
prove the existence of what it was kept around to deny--a foundation for 
knowledge that certified our certainty.

This method involved turning inwards, to our own experience of the world, what 
Arlo called "the vantage point of that particular person."  Descartes thought 
that our knowledge, _all_ of our knowledge--including God and much else--was 
certified because we could not doubt that we were thinking.  Everybody after 
Descartes thought that was a stretch.  But they were quite taken with this new 
avenue, there did seem to be something to Descartes' suggestion that everything 
has to begin with our own experience of the world, that there is nothing the 
mind knows better than itself.

But what does this pan out to?  Pirsig agrees with Descartes that we have 
absolute certainty about our experiences--when we experience the stove, we 
cannot be wrong that we experienced it.  How far does that certainty go?  After 
all, the person dying of dehydration in the desert is absolutely certain that 
he sees water.  The trouble with the absolute certainty conferred by the 
first-person point of view is that it seems to maintain it, you also need to 
allow for the possibility of being wrong about that which you _were_ absolutely 
certain of.

So what does that do for our knowledge and the truth finding process?  No 
doubt, we cannot doubt our experience of the world in the moment of 
experiencing it.  And it is agreed by most philosophers (and all laypeople) 
that knowledge and process of finding truth begins with our experience of the 
world.  But what is the utility in placing truth in the moment of presentness 
if it might be false when it becomes the past in the next moment?

Ron said:
What greatly interested me about this was that the first cultures To develop 
grammar were the first to develop logic and philosophy, The Indic culture and 
the Greek culture respectively.

Matt:
I don't know about "rules" in relation to grammar or language or the 
intellectual level, but if you just mean that language is the DNA of the 
intellectual level, then I would say you are right and that understanding more 
about how languages function in the world, and their development and histories, 
will tell us something interesting and important about how we exist and 
function in the world.

I think there is a reason that Greece saw the development of what we call 
philosophy and, in general, self-consciousness about the linguistic process.  
The reason has to do with the creation of written language, the development of 
literacy in oral cultures.  The basic idea is that long chains of reasoning 
weren't possible in oral cultures because of the impairment of relying on your 
memory.  The two key scholars are Walter Ong and Eric Havelock.  As an 
introduction to the problem, there's nothing better than Ong's Orality and 
Literacy.  _The_ text on this problem in relation to the Greeks and Plato and 
the creation of philosophy is still, after more than 40 years, Havelock's 
Preface to Plato.

Matt
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