On Wednesday 14 May 2008 8:01 PM Matt writes to Ron: <snip>
But what does this pan out to? Pirsig agrees with Descartes that we have absolute certainty about our experiences--when we experience the stove, we cannot be wrong that we experienced it. How far does that certainty go? After all, the person dying of dehydration in the desert is absolutely certain that he sees water. The trouble with the absolute certainty conferred by the first-person point of view is that it seems to maintain it, you also need to allow for the possibility of being wrong about that which you _were_ absolutely certain of. So what does that do for our knowledge and the truth finding process? No doubt, we cannot doubt our experience of the world in the moment of experiencing it. And it is agreed by most philosophers (and all laypeople) that knowledge and process of finding truth begins with our experience of the world. But what is the utility in placing truth in the moment of presentness if it might be false when it becomes the past in the next moment? Ron said: What greatly interested me about this was that the first cultures To develop grammar were the first to develop logic and philosophy, The Indic culture and the Greek culture respectively. Matt: I don't know about "rules" in relation to grammar or language or the intellectual level, but if you just mean that language is the DNA of the intellectual level, then I would say you are right and that understanding more about how languages function in the world, and their development and histories, will tell us something interesting and important about how we exist and function in the world. I think there is a reason that Greece saw the development of what we call philosophy and, in general, self-consciousness about the linguistic process. The reason has to do with the creation of written language, the development of literacy in oral cultures. The basic idea is that long chains of reasoning weren't possible in oral cultures because of the impairment of relying on your memory. The two key scholars are Walter Ong and Eric Havelock. As an introduction to the problem, there's nothing better than Ong's Orality and Literacy. _The_ text on this problem in relation to the Greeks and Plato and the creation of philosophy is still, after more than 40 years, Havelock's Preface to Plato. Hi Matt, Ron and all, An interesting observation: ³it might be false when it becomes the past in the next moment?² Pirsig observed that: ³Culture hands us a set of glasses. There is a duality in my experience: 1. what I learned at my momma¹s knee, 2. What I learned when the house fell in. How do I choose what is my experience? Conscious/Mechanical or Conscious/ undefined? I examine the conscious/mechanical with minimal attention. ³I¹ve done it lots of times!² It is forgotten the next moment, when the opposite occurs, I don¹t even know there is a difference. I aver that both are my experience! On the other hand there are life changing events for the good and the bad! The bullet missed. The bullet struck my heart and I died. I think I would know the difference. I do not know of a logic in memory based on time. Memory of experience can err. When I write it down, figures don¹t lie, but liars cam figure. How do I determine that what I read is true? It is not well that man should be without companionship; I will give him a mate of his own kind. The place of quiet? Or ³it might be true when it becomes the past in the next moment?² Joe On 5/14/08 8:01 PM, "Matt Kundert" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Hey Ron, > > Matt said: > I'm wary of your manner of use of the objective/subjective distinction, but > what I'm really interested in is what you are referring to in Pirsig's texts > for his attempts to: > > "redefine distinctive expression" > > and > > "redefine the terms of truth-finding by placing it in pre-intellectual > experience" > > Ron said: > What I meant by the latter statement "redefine the terms of truth-finding by > placing it in pre-intellectual experience" is that objectivism defines > Certainty intellectually where as Pirsig places certainty pre-intellectually. > He stated in a letter to Dr. Gurr that he felt Pre-intellectual experience was > more empirical than objectivism Because it's verifiability is experience > itself not in a logically Supported statement of truth. I may have mashed > together a few terms creating a vague statement When I said "redefine > distinctive expression" I admit I hastily Threw that phrase together. What I > mean is that Pirsig is not Creating an axiom in the use of DQ/SQ but he is > asking us to Rethink how we view and therefore describe experience. > > Matt: > I tell you what, I liked your phrases because they had the virtue of being > interesting. I just didn't know what they meant. You're explanation is > interesting because for the latter phrase it selects an area of Pirsig's text > that is quite conventionally looked to, but gives it an explicit spin that > isn't often given explicitly (though I think very often implicitly) and in the > former phrase, it gives an intriguing spin to a conventional explanation of > what Pirsig is doing. If I were you, I would follow up and explore on how you > relate phrases like those, the idiosyncratic spin you want to give to pieces > of Pirsig that have been debated and tossed around many times, to Pirsig, and > potentially to these alternative interpretations. > > Firstly, I would be looking for more explicit engagement between the new tools > and lines of thought and with Pirsig's texts. Secondly, the claim of resolving > "MoQ conflicts" always runs across, not just the problem of textual > connection, but the problem of other explanations (which means you have to not > only establish problems within a text, but also how your way is superior of > other text-interpreters--which means you have to spend time on your way and > other people's ways, let alone Pirsig's way). > > I'm not really worried about any of that, though. I'd like to just comment on > the notion that Pirsig places truth-finding in pre-intellectual experience. I > described it as conventional because I think it is what lays behind many of > Platt's rants about pre-intellectual experience (which Platt's praise lends > credence to), but many others, too, mainly dealing with the notion of radical > empiricism needing to act as foundation to pragmatism or else it'll spin off > into relativism. I don't like this notion, I think it is antithetical to both > pragmatism and Pirsig, and I don't think it is necessary to much of what you > talked about in relation to language and the view of grammar as being a key to > understanding Pirsig's intellectual level. So I shall try and briefly explain > my distaste and then say some good things about your approach to the > intellectual level. > > You said that "objectivism defines 'certainty' intellectually, whereas Pirsig > places 'certainty' pre-intellectually." I'd like to first point out that the > phrase I asked for expansion on was about "truth-finding" and in doing so, you > moved to talk about "certainty." This isn't inherently bad, all one needs to > do is connect the two. However, I think very traditional, philosophical > problems will arise when you do, problems we Pirsigians know of as "SOM." > > Pirsig does, indeed, locate "certainty" pre-intellectually. This is the same > move Descartes made to inaugurate modern philosophy, part of the move I called > earlier the shift from talking about reality to talking about experience. I > would contend that Pirsig, in Platt's most beloved passage to quote (if only > because he perceives a lot of people perjuring it), is taking a stance similar > to Descartes. > > All depending on how you perceive Descartes' relation to SOM, this could be > bad. I'm going to skip this relationship because I've spent a good amount of > time elsewhere exploring different angles and move straight to the problem, > which is problematical whether or not Descartes is seen as the beginning of or > paradigmatic of Pirsig's SOM. So, is this stance good or bad? > > I think the stance itself, of noting the difference between the first-person > and third-person point of view (and that we all begin irrevocably from it), > this was a step forward in the history of philosophy. Plato accused the > Sophists of relativism for noting that "man was the measure of all things." > The Greek skeptical tradition that extends out from the 5th-century BCE, > beyond the Sophists, continued this opposition to what it perceived as > Platonic pretensions of absolute certainty in our knowledge. Descartes > performed one of the great reversals in intellectual history by taking the > skepticism of the Pyhrronian tradition (whose final exemplar was Montaigne, > before it lapsed in the face of the modern revolution) and turning it into a > method designed to prove the existence of what it was kept around to deny--a > foundation for knowledge that certified our certainty. > > This method involved turning inwards, to our own experience of the world, what > Arlo called "the vantage point of that particular person." Descartes thought > that our knowledge, _all_ of our knowledge--including God and much else--was > certified because we could not doubt that we were thinking. Everybody after > Descartes thought that was a stretch. But they were quite taken with this new > avenue, there did seem to be something to Descartes' suggestion that > everything has to begin with our own experience of the world, that there is > nothing the mind knows better than itself. > > But what does this pan out to? Pirsig agrees with Descartes that we have > absolute certainty about our experiences--when we experience the stove, we > cannot be wrong that we experienced it. How far does that certainty go? > After all, the person dying of dehydration in the desert is absolutely certain > that he sees water. The trouble with the absolute certainty conferred by the > first-person point of view is that it seems to maintain it, you also need to > allow for the possibility of being wrong about that which you _were_ > absolutely certain of. > > So what does that do for our knowledge and the truth finding process? No > doubt, we cannot doubt our experience of the world in the moment of > experiencing it. And it is agreed by most philosophers (and all laypeople) > that knowledge and process of finding truth begins with our experience of the > world. But what is the utility in placing truth in the moment of presentness > if it might be false when it becomes the past in the next moment? > > Ron said: > What greatly interested me about this was that the first cultures To develop > grammar were the first to develop logic and philosophy, The Indic culture and > the Greek culture respectively. > > Matt: > I don't know about "rules" in relation to grammar or language or the > intellectual level, but if you just mean that language is the DNA of the > intellectual level, then I would say you are right and that understanding more > about how languages function in the world, and their development and > histories, will tell us something interesting and important about how we exist > and function in the world. > > I think there is a reason that Greece saw the development of what we call > philosophy and, in general, self-consciousness about the linguistic process. > The reason has to do with the creation of written language, the development of > literacy in oral cultures. The basic idea is that long chains of reasoning > weren't possible in oral cultures because of the impairment of relying on your > memory. The two key scholars are Walter Ong and Eric Havelock. As an > introduction to the problem, there's nothing better than Ong's Orality and > Literacy. _The_ text on this problem in relation to the Greeks and Plato and > the creation of philosophy is still, after more than 40 years, Havelock's > Preface to Plato. > > Matt > _________________________________________________________________ > With Windows Live for mobile, your contacts travel with you. > http://www.windowslive.com/mobile/overview.html?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_Refresh_mobi > le_052008 > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
