DMB and Group
8 Mar.
Bo before:
> > By and by SOM transformed language into its S/O mold: a subjective
> > shadow of objective reality. And - again - Phaedrus did NOT speak about
> > Quality as pre-concept, but pre-intellect and that intellect = SOM. In
> > LILA however Pirsig agrees with James about Dynamic/Concept and the
> > damage was done. Can't you get this David?.
DMB
> If I do get it, then everything you've said here is incorrect. In the
> first sentence you say SOM transformed language into its S/O mold.
> That's backwards.
Not, backwards at all. Language arrived with the social level, but at
this level language was a powerful means to get in touch with the
powers/gods that were embedded in existence ...etc. Only with
intellect was language transformed the said way and the pre-
concept/concept dualism emerge.
> As Pirsig puts it, "our rationality is shaped by" the underlying
> mythos. That's where the subject-object distinction comes from, from
> the language.
This is from ZAMM and says:
The mythos includes not only the Greek myths but the Old
Testament, the Vedic Hymns and the early legends of all
cultures which have contributed to our present world
understanding. The mythos-over-logos argument states
that our rationality is shaped by these legends, that our
knowledge today is in relation to these legends as a tree is
in relation to the little shrub it once was.
"Rationality shaped by those legendes" (intellect-out-of-society)
but nothing about "shaped by language".
> And it existed long before anyone turned it into a rational,
> philosophical distinction.
Language certainly existed as a social pattern, but it was NOT
"..turned into a rational philosophical distinction" (whatever that
means) It was turned into an mindish superstructure above an
material world. This was intellect's objective "logos over mythos",
later came its subjective "mythos-over-logos". And the paradox-
producing "see-saw" has run ever since.
> In the second sentence you make a distinction between pre-conceptual
> and pre-intellectual. I use them interchangeably with Pirsig's DQ and
> James' "pure experience".
NB!
I've been informed by Krimel that concepts is more than language,
more=mind? Do you agree?
I know that James, Pirsig and DMB do, but Phaedrus did NOT
speak about concepts or mind. To equalize DQ and "mind" is
adopting intellect's premises: DQ the "thing in itself" that our mind
makes into a "thing for us". Pirsig agreeing with James' regarding
"before subjects and objects (S/O=mind/matter) was the step out
of SOM, but "before mind" was a step back into SOM.
> It's important to realize that this is epistemology, the area of
> philosophy that asks "how to we know what we know"? Empiricism is an
> epistemological stance and so is the radical empiricism of the
> classical pragmatists. But Phaedrus' thesis is aimed at the cultural
> transformation that occurred in ancient Greece, which we find
> summarized nicely in chapters 28 and 29. This doesn't contradict the
> empiricism we find in Lila, but you've confused the two. I'm talking
> about the nature of experience and you're talking about historical
> developments. When talking about radical empiricism, I'm talking about
> DQ as the pre-intellectual as the cutting edge of experience
Anyway, ZAMM's was "pre-intellectual/intellectual". What made
Pirsig of LILA swallow James' "pre-concept/concept?? At least, it
messes the MOQ thoroughly.
> but then you want to refute this with a discussion about the emergence
> of the intellectual level out of the social level. Simply put, these
> are two different topics. I'm happy to talk about either one or even
> both of them at the same time, but one is not the other. In effect,
> Pirsig does say that DQ is pre-conceptual even back in ZAMM.
He does not "in effect" say that. You want to make ZAMM a
conceptual mind-theory about the real experience (the Q-evels)
This is the SOM that the MOQ is supposed to trash.
> As I mentioned recently, the train analogy gets at this. But in terms
> of historical development, both mythos and logos, both social and
> intellectual patterns are generated by it. In Lila this notion is
> expanded into a full-blown evolutionary force behind all four levels.
> In that sense, in the historical sense, DQ isn't just prior to the
> intellectual level. It's prior to all levels.
Mythos and logos is "society" and intellect, but fast-forward to the
MOQ where the inorganic level is DQ's first creation. You and so
many want everything to take place on the intellectual level
regarded a concept-idea realm - the MOQ another idea - and this
requires some strange logical loops.
> Phaedrus was looking at ancient Greece, as we all know, to find the
> dirty bastards who killed quality. That IS about cultural development
> and the emerge of rationality out of the mythic way of thinking. This
> part is important to the MOQ too, which is all the more reason NOT to
> confuse it with the claims in his radical empiricism. So let's put some
> relevant text on the table...
Right, in retrospect "the Greeks" was rationality (the intellectual
level) emerging out of the mythological past (the social level). You
will certainly out-write, out-last and out-everything me, but you
can't out-wit the MOQ.
Bo
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