Bo said: MOQ's basic (always) "discrepancy" is DQ/SQ and the Quality/Concept discrepancy can NOT be deduce from it.
dmb says: One doesn't need to "deduce" the discrepancy between concepts and reality from the DQ/sq distinction because that distinction and the discrepancy are exactly the same thing. Concepts are static intellectual patterns and reality is Dynamic Quality. This doesn't mean concepts are unreal. It only means that there static concepts are qualitatively different than dynamic reality. That's why DQ can't be defined. You can't have a definition without concepts and DQ is the pre-conceptual reality. One doesn't deduce the latter from the former because the latter IS the former. Bo said: The MOQ says that Quality is Reality, but it also says that there is a split between the dynamic, undifferntiated reality and the static differentiated reality. However, there is nothing about the latter being "conceptual". Language did not occur until the social level. Come to your senses. dmb says: There is nothing about the static differentiated reality being conceptual? Huh? Concepts ARE differentiations. When you define something, that definition is what distinguishes from everything else. Words, definitions, concepts, abstractions are all forms of differentiations. That's what makes them static. The social level is static too and is also full of differentiations. > > > I mean, you've confused two completely different distinctions. But > > then, I've already responded to this charge several times. To make it > > stick, dmb said: ...don't you need to show that the MOQ's distinction between concepts and reality is the same as SOM's distinction between words and what's "out there"? And isn't that impossible because in the MOQ, there is no "out there" there. In the MOQ "out there" IS a concept, not reality. Bo replied: No, I don't confuse, you do. MOQ's metaphysical distinction is the DQ/SQ one and this has no real/irreal content, while SOM has tons of it. This REAL/IRREAL aggregate is what SOM has been about from its start with the Greeks. Truth/appearance, eternal/perishable, permanent/provisional, primary/secondary ....etc. Don't you see a shade of this with your Quality as real and concepts as irreal. dmb says: Again, this distinction does not mean that concepts are unreal. They are real AS concepts, as static patterns. It seems to me that all distinctions look like SOM to you but that's just sloppy thinking. Even in the MOQ, distinctions have to made and concepts have to be involved or you don't have any kind of philosophy. The trick is to make better distinctions than the other guy and Pirsig's distinctions are designed to do just that, with the "other guy" in this case being SOM. The MOQ's distinction between dynamic and static replaces the distinction between subjects and objects. Pirsig isn't saying that subjects are more real than objects nor is he saying objects are more real than subjects. He's saying that both of thes are static concepts derived from dynamic reality. He's saying SOM itself is just an idea derived from the primary empirical reality. He's saying that SOM commits "the error of conferring existential status upon the products of reflection". He's saying subjects and objects are reified concepts, are abstractions that are mistaken for concrete realities. _________________________________________________________________ Windows Live™ SkyDrive™: Get 25 GB of free online storage. http://windowslive.com/online/skydrive?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_SD_25GB_062009 Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
