To show off my MD-age (though not to take an official stance
on any of the issues currently being discussed) --
Steve had said:
I was just defending DMB's claim that DQ/sq amounts to
reality/concept where reality simply refers to the conceptually
unknown.
Krimel then said:
Just to jump in and clarify something here. To the extent that
"reality" is infinitely divisible, constantly changing, and
unpredictable I agree that that is what DQ means. To the
extent that concepts are static descriptions of this dynamic
flux, order emerging from chaos, I agree that that is what SQ
means. But that is not how Dave sees it. He thinks of DQ as a
sense of Value, as the perception of "betterness." His is a
purely subjective stance.
Steve replied:
I don't think DMB would say DQ is the *perception* of
betternesss or *sense of* value. It is just betterness. As I
understand Pirsig, what he is saying is that the "infinitely
divisible, constantly changing, and unpredictable" stimulus that
we know as reality is also the continuing immediate flux of
"betterness" and "worseness" known as Quality. At least he
wants us to to suppose for the sake of argument that that is
what reality is and see where that postulate takes us. Now
some people like Ham and maybe you object and say that that
is simply not what anyone means by value or quality. Value is
merely subjective. So MOQers are making all of reality
subjective. Quality simply isn't the sort of thing that we should
ever talk about as the "infinitely divisible, constantly changing,
and unpredictable" conceptually unknown reality. But Pirsig is
talking about it that way anyway, and many of us have found
the Quality metaphor to be extremely fruitful. We seem to
agree that Pirsig uses the words value and quality in ways that
we never thought of using them before and is thereby
expanding or changing the definitions of the terms to even
include the undefinable. Where we may disagree is about
whether that is worth doing.
Matt:
I haven't been following the conversation at all (so perhaps this
has been brought up and is already in play), but anybody who
wants to figure out the particular issue of DQ, perception and
"sense of" need to take into account, in particular, this passage
from Pirsig's SODV (page 14):
"In the third box are the biological patterns: senses of touch,
sight,
hearing, smell and taste. The Metaphysics of Quality
follows the empirical
tradition here in saying that the senses are
the starting point of reality,
but -- all importantly -- it includes
a sense of value. Values are phenomena.
To ignore them is to
misread the world. It says this sense of value, of
liking or
disliking, is a primary sense that is a kind of gatekeeper for
everything else an infant learns. At birth this sense of value is
extremely
Dynamic but as the infant grows up this sense of
value becomes more and
more influenced by accumulated static
patterns. In the past this biological
sense of value has been
called the 'subjective' because there values cannot
be located
in an external physical object. But quantum theory has
destroyed
the idea that only properties located in external
physical objects have
reality."
This passage received extended concentration by former
MD-mainstays Rick Budd, Mark Maxwell, Wim Nusselder, Sam
Norton, and David Morey and by current mainattractions David
Buchanan and Bo Skutvik (and, technically, two other dudes I
don't remember--Jay Casler and Matt Kundert).
The topic of the sadly-defunct-but-difficult-to-maintain MF in
January 2004 was: "Does Pirsig adequately support his notion
that we have a 'sense of value' analogous to the five
traditional senses?" The topic was then directed to this
passage. At the time, I offered this extended, very close
reading and analysis of the passage and its consequences
(with particular attention, as it happens, to the issue of
redescription that Steve brings up):
-----
I think the quote can be read "as implying that the 'sense of
value' is not analogous to the five traditional senses, but
'primary.'" [from Wim's earlier post--MK] Interpreting the
passage this way is consistent with Pirsig's redescription of
reality as Quality. With a "sense of value" as primary, I take
it this means that all other senses evolve out of the original
historically and in each individual's case the five senses are
simply five different kinds of a "sense of value."
However, I think this (my preferred interpretation) is already
stretching the text a bit and I think Pirsig is far too
ambiguous to say one way or the other. The first three lines
supply heavy weight for interpreting him as saying that the
sense of value _is_ separate from the five senses. The fourth
supplies a heavy gloss over the first three, towards Wim's
interpretation, but I don't think it is a clear cut gloss at all.
Pirsig says, "it includes a sense of value," which is hard to
interpret any other way than as an _addition_, not as a
redescription. His next line is the chopped, "Values are
phenomena." This is more ambiguous than the first, but if it
were to read as a redescription, we would have to read the
line as "Values are what phenomena are." This, I think, is a
more strained interpretation than reading it as "Values are
phenomena also." If we read it this way, that makes values a
separate commodity then other things bouncing around reality.
This would imply a sense of value as separate. In addition, if
we read the second line linearly with the first, with the first
providing the gloss for the second, the interpretation leans
heavily towards reading it as the latter
(values-as-additional-phenomena), rather than the former
(values-as-phenomena). The third line then prompts us to
gloss backwards to the meaning of the second. "To ignore
them is to misread the world." "Them" refers to "values" in the
proceeding line and it steers us to interpret that line as
values-as-additional-phenomena. If values were the sum total
of reality, if it were used redescriptively, then it wouldn't be
possible to ignore them because you are everywhere and
always in touch with reality.
It would seem the major problem with reading this passage is
ambiguity in the way Pirsig uses the term "value," and I find
this throughout his books and throughout our writings on this
forum. I think Pirsig uses "value" in two ways, as synonymous
with Quality, i.e. in its redescriptive, ubiquitous sense, and in
the more traditional sense of being synonymous with morals.
So, in answer to the topic question, "Does Pirsig adequately
support his notion that we have a 'sense of value' analogous to
the five traditional senses?" I think we have to answer in one
of two ways: 1) "mu," because we do not have a sense of
value that is analogous to the other senses because all Pirsig
means is his redescription of reality or 2) no, because if we have
a "sense of value" analogous to our five senses then it would be
empirically testable as a physical section in our brains (like the
other five senses) and I severely doubt we find a section in our
brain that senses morals and can be developed or
underdeveloped _physically_.
A corrollary of 1) is that we can still keep the sentiment of
"Values are phenomena," despite the fact that it clutters up this
passage, when values are synonymous with morals. I took the
entire point of the Quality redescription to be that values are as
real as rocks.
-----
DMB offered some views to this question in that thread, but it's
been over five years (at the time he did see the value in the
locution "sense of value").
I don't think Krimel in this specific instance is willy-nilly ignoring
Pirsig's redescription of reality in his comments on DMB, but
rather accusing DMB of regressing (which is a common and fair
enough charge for us to use on each other). So, if I'm right,
then where you, Steve, and Krimel disagree in this limited
instance is not wholesale over Pirsig, but narrowly over what
DMB means in his understanding of Pirsig (which is important if
people are going to defend other people against still more people).
I would also add, Steve, that your addition of "worseness" to
"betterness" in your description of what Pirsig means by DQ is a
conspicuous alteration of what Pirsig says with fair consistency
in Lila (despite the SODV passage just discussed, where he says
"liking and disliking"). A paradigm instance is his reformulation of
Darwinian evolution in teleological terms: "All life is a migration of
static patterns of quality toward Dynamic Quality." (160) To
gloss DQ here as "betterness and worseness" would be as
meaningless as Pirsig finds the unconcerned, Darwinian
tautological response: "But 'survival of the fittest' is one of
those catch-phrases like 'mutants' or 'misfits' that sounds best
when you don't ask precisely what it means. Fittest for what?
Fittest for survival? That reduces to 'survival of the survivors,'
which doesn't say anything. 'Survival of the fittest' is meaningful
only when 'fittest' is equated with 'best,' which is to say,
'Quality.'" (166) (And, note, the very often ignored fact that
Pirsig not only often glosses DQ in betterness-terms, but also
Quality, which creates even more problems for a neutral
reservation of "Quality" for reality-redescriptive duties.)
I hope perhaps the above will aid in the arrangement of the
conversation.
Matt
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