Matt, thanks for that long response ... I can never do justice to them, but here's a try ...
First some preamble Starting at the bottom, you said > Being inconsistent with Pirsig does no harm to a > living philosophical tradition, which is the only point in saying > there exists a class of philosophers called "Pirsigian." And if > there isn't such a thing, then I don't know what the hell > we're all doing here. Well no, being Pirsigian is not a well bounded set. That kind of taxonomic ontological classification is for subjects and objects - for the explicit purpose of categorizing them in a SOMist world. What there is, is a loose collection of overlapping interests and ideas here - overlapping with plenty of other schools of thought and in fact overlapping on ***many different axes / levels*** too. The label is a convenient (and very approximate) short-hand - only. Being inconsistent with Pirsig ? That would presume there was a consistency within Pirsig (see above). There cannot be consistency of the kind where every statement is consistent with every other ***on the same level***. Pirsig explicitly highlights levels (in one evolutionary dimension) but he uses levels in other dimensions too - like the primary dynamic / static axis of divison, like patterns within and across levels, and Pirsig barely scratched the surface. Being (apparently) inconsistent is a very good sign - it shows that ***multiple levels*** are being addressed. Pause - Question - is Ian completely barmy ? Levels, got it ? I'm talking about the assertions being made on different levels. Now, I did actually say this is my earlier response, when there were just two assertions, but you now seem to have three. So I am going to have to dive into the latest text .... Inserting where I can ... On Wed, Jul 8, 2009 at 3:40 AM, Matt Kundert<[email protected]> wrote: > > Matt mentioned: > I would also add, Steve, that your addition of "worseness" > to "betterness" in your description of what Pirsig means by > DQ is a conspicuous alteration of what Pirsig says with fair > consistency in Lila (despite the SODV passage just > discussed, where he says "liking and disliking"). > > DMB replied: > Better and worse are just two sides of the same coin. > > Matt responded: > While it is certainly true that better and worse are two > sides of the same coin, I find it difficult to think one is > using a single, unified sense of the term denoted by "DQ" if > one wants to say both 1) "DQ is reality and therefore both > betterness and worseness" and 2) "DQ is the best." To say > that all Pirsig was saying about evolution was that the best > survive and the worst die, it seems to me, is to fall into the > same meaninglessness Pirsig accused Dawinianian > tautologists who say survivors survive. > > Ian then said: > I think I agree with all your "logic" Matt, but I don't believe > DMB or Steve or anyone is making those those two > assertions (1) and (2) - at least not on the same level. > > Matt: > So, it sounds to me like your agreeing that there is _not_ > a single, unified sense of the single term "DQ"? Ian - No I don't think I am agreeing with that. I was simply saying the assertions (if they had been made) must have been made on different levels. > I think we need far more explicit clarification and > explication of Pirsig's terms--it is the ambiguity in Pirsig's > texts (as befits any philosopher with his intellectual > ambition) that creates, I would suggest, almost all of the > communicative confusion in our discussion forum. Ian - Absolutely no, not for me. It's the harmony of within Pirsig's work and the harmony with so much other enlightened philosophy and science and knowledge (enlightened notice, not enlightenment). The confusion and noise is caused by people trying to drive out ambiguity in order to put everything back into conventional SOMist boxes. (Ask Gav, he'll tell you.) (That's > not true--by far and wide the biggest stumbling block to > discussion is the unconscious background assumption, > which we get from how easy it is to buy groceries and the > like, that philosophical communication is easy because we > all speak the "same language"--or rather, _should_ be easy, > which is why communication breaks down.) Ian - Good, you agree it's not true. > > That might sound rich coming from me, but I've tried to be > as open, honest, and explicit as I can in explicating Pirsig's > philosophy (qua _his_ philosophy). The biggest difficulty in > explicating any philosopher doesn't come from those who > disagree with the philosopher, however--it comes from > those who identify with the philosopher's philosophy, > because the instinct will be to speak in his voice and, quite > unconsciously and unknowingly, not notice when your voice > has modulated to something different (a problem I can > appreciate quite well). > > I see the irony surrounding this brief discursus on what we > might call DMB's "radical empiricism reading of DQ" to be > that I came to think some years ago that holding the two > senses of DQ above together was untenable and Pirsig > must be using two different senses. But I also became > convinced, through conversation here over what Pirsig > meant, that Pirsig A) did have a unified concept of DQ and > B) didn't think it was untenable. (If I remember correctly, > I'm pretty sure it was Anthony and DMB who were pushing > back against my assertions.) In other words, any "different > senses of DQ" reading is not strictly an accurate reading of > how Pirsig views his philosophy hanging together. Ian - there is a lot of history in that paragraph - you might simply have to state the unified concept in A and explain its tenability in B. But it seems I would agree with you - different "sense" - different contexts / aspects / levels I'm trying to say. > > I don't know what the answer is--I haven't spent time > researching or excavating Pirsig's philosophy in a long time. > But I don't know how one put's together > > 1) DQ as force (from the stove) > > 2) DQ as the purpose of life (in the alteration of evolution) > > 3) DQ as better than static patterns (as in the "all things > being equal" clause, p. 183) > > I'm not sure you've exactly appreciated the problem, > though, Ian - Almost certainly not - I said I could not see how the two (now three) assertions had actually been made. And notwithstanding that I agreed with what Dave had said. DQ as a " force" sounds like a metaphor, so that SOMist who like to think of objects acted on by forces as their model of the world, can get some idea what he is talking about - hardly an attempt at unambiguous always true assertion. The heat of the stove interacts with the awareness (openness to posible states) in the arse - fuck that's hot - the expletive comes before the characterization of the quality as hot. DQ as the "purpose". Hmm, teleology. That is so loaded with possibilities in what was meant by purpose - objective and agent. I like the metaphor, but we ain't going to build any tight unamibuous definitions with it. DQ is better than static patterns. This was the one I reacted to originally. This is simply a statement of the primacy of the dynamic / static split - rather than the betterness or worseness of different patterns. There is nothing "disunited" about DQ (the possibility of states). The disunity is in different linguistic metaphors for different contexts, explaining things at different levels. Ian because you said this: "DMB's > (simplified-in-context) statement of Darwinian evolution is > about as interesting as Pirsig's - ie not very." That is > demonstrably _not_ what Pirsig thinks, or at least as I read > it in the previous post (which means you might have been > more explicit in deviating from what I had said). Pirsig was > suggesting that the traditional explication of Darwinian > evolution was _lacking_ because of the tautology. Pirsig > was offering a more interesting understanding of evolution. Ian - Yes I get that. Which was why I was very terse about "not very interesting". We have had so many deiscussions about more enlightened understanding of evolution, that it is clear that whilst Pirsig knew the orthodox take on Darwinism was lacking, His slightly more interesting view was only marginally so, since he clearly hadn't researched much about what was really understood about evolution, other than the orthodox (caricature) view. > But I don't know how the two get put together. The only > way radical empiricism (which is (1)) can be a teleology > (which is (2)), it seems to me, is if one commits to saying > that, when all other things are equal, if one chooses static > over Dynamic, then one is misunderstanding reality. And I > don't think anyone wants to say that. Ian - as you know I am very much concerned with putting the radical empiricist and teleological views together without misunderstanding reality, so clearly I'm not a person who wants to say that either. Perhaps the simplest thing would be to summarise. All I did was agree with something DMB had said, and questioned that the assertions must have been made in quite different contexts - where I wouldn't have expected to find any neat consistency. I don't think I actually disagreed with you. I thing I disagreed that there was anything being argued about (as usual). > > I'm not trying to get lost in "logic" (which I don't understand > pejoratively anyways, and I'm not sure why anyone would > want to), Ian - I appreciate you're not. Yes I am using logic pejoratively, to remind people that the things they are trying to link logically may be spread across levels where there isn't any simple logical link to be found. nor am I trying to refute any piece of Pirsig's > philosophy. I'm simply trying to help understand what Pirsig > means. As I see it, understanding the tensions in anyone's > philosophy with other pieces of typical cultural > understandings (let alone the potential conflicts within a > text) simply afford the opportunity for creative articulation. > The above is one problem-area, an area that needs careful > interpretation, an area that provides the excuse for > productive analysis (as opposed to simple quotation). > Problems aren't problems--they're opportunities. > > Perhaps DMB's reading is the accurate one. Or, perhaps, > DMB's right _and_ Pirsig sees himself as having a unified > concept in DQ with a single, extended sense (which is either > tenable or untenable). I'm not sure. If the radical empiricism > reading of DQ is accurate, so much the better, since I've > been talking like that for a while, though I've not comitted > to a self-description as "radical empiricist." (And I apologize > to everyone who sees such an assertion on my part as > strange, perverse, and disingenuous. I think it simply a > problem of communication.) If it's not, I'm not sure why > anyone, say DMB, should abandon it if they think it's the > way to go. Being inconsistent with Pirsig does no harm to a > living philosophical tradition, which is the only point in saying > there exists a class of philosophers called "Pirsigian." And if > there isn't such a thing, then I don't know what the hell > we're all doing here. > > Matt > > _________________________________________________________________ > Insert movie times and more without leaving Hotmail®. > http://windowslive.com/Tutorial/Hotmail/QuickAdd?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_HM_Tutorial_QuickAdd_062009 > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
