DMB said: Even if my radical empiricist reading of DQ (of the MOQ, actually) is not accurate, that reading doesn't suffer from the problems of inconsistency that seem to come from your reading. And I'd like to suggest that if one understands Pirsig's books in such a way that any given quote makes sense next to any other quote such that everything fits together coherently, then you are probably reading his books rightly. Or, to say the same thing from the other direction, if Pirsig's claims seen inconsistent or contradictory, then you are probably not reading him rightly. I'm not saying his books are absolutely perfect, of course, but I really do not remember any case in which a perceived inconsistency between claims was not a result of a misreading of those claims.
Matt: Despite your gesture towards assuming "Pirsig's a bright guy who knows what he's saying," which granting he (or anyone else) is doesn't get us very far in interpretation (it simply pleads patience with an antsy audience--which I doubt I'd be a paradigm case of with regards to Pirsig), I'm taking for granted that your (now) assumption that Pirsig is internally coherent is something you worked for to achieve, and not something you simply assume for everyone. Coherence isn't based on memory (though a good one helps), it's something that's created and displayed. And in that case, I'll absolutely grant you that our respective readings are based on our extensive work with the texts--you don't sense any inconsistencies, I do. And based on your work, you assume that anyone who does find inconsistencies is wrong, and--more or less--vice versa for me. Or rather, I think the jury is still out, because I have not read a reading of Pirsig qua "untensioned" philosopher that makes sense to me, answers all my questions. I still think showing Pirsig's system requires yet more work. (And let me reiterate--it's not like I think it's impossible. I think it might be quite possible, but I seem to think it's a much larger endeavor than others suppose.) Or perhaps, I shouldn't say "inconsistency," but rather "untenability." Now I'm not sure. If you pound language hard enough, any fool thing can be made consistent--the question is, is it worth it? That's work I don't have the energy/time to display for my own case, so I'm willing to concede the battle to your authority, and limp back to my barracks to decide whether the war is worth continuing. Let me also say this--I take it as an interpretive principle that you must extend as far as possible the attempt to treat a philosopher/text as coherent. Of course, that doesn't always mean success will be met (and for the great ones, it's never in my experience met because a great philosopher's mind will always be bigger than his time/language, and the spillover will always generate incoherence and wrong notes in the larger song--a consequence of trying to sing so radically: or to put it in Pirsigian language: coherence is the sign of static patterns, and in pounding out the static latches of his Dynamic breaks with old crusts of convention, it would surprising indeed if every latch he suggested was in fact the best way forward). DMB said: I think it is no accident that everyone of them rejects and/or misunderstands the MOQ's mysticism and radical empiricism. Without that, as I see it, the MOQ can't be understood coherently. I would even go so far as to say that this is the only thing that stands between you and a completely coherent understanding of the MOQ. Matt: I still deny radical empiricism is my missing link, still because of my belief that the problems solved by that -ism--as far as I can tell--are the same problems solved by psychological nominalism (though I might now say "inferentialism" because of Rorty's student Robert Brandom). I still maintain in the face of adversity that radical empiricism and psychological nominalism are mirror-image positions, simply in different philosophical vocabularies. Choice of vocabulary does count, but perhaps I'm more ecumenical. (I've elaborated a little more fully an explanation of the parallel in a post that was based on my little Quine MD-post a while ago, which we fought over. If I remember correctly, about 13 paragraphs down begins new, additional stuff, if you're curious: http://pirsigaffliction.blogspot.com/2009/04/quine-sellars-empiricism-and-linguistic.html.) That being the case, I'll grant you (separately) that A) I might not be seeing Pirsig's Great Unity, B) this might be because of other philosophical commitments (these are separate because I do think someone can see clearly when they are willfully altering a loved one for their own good), and C) it might be because of my relative ignorance of and/or insouciance towards the mystic traditions of the world. The former (ignorance) can certainly be cleared up by arduous study, but the latter (insouciance) is trickier--I've never understood why I can't grant the mystic tradition its validity and utility under a broader banner that doesn't require me to take part in meditation (narrowly defined as sitting and humming). One of the first blog posts I wrote was a commentary on Hediegger, Dewey, and Pirsig, via two essays Rorty wrote on the former two. It opens with a brief ditty on mysticism that might spur thoughts (good or bad, about me, Rorty, or Pirsig). http://pirsigaffliction.blogspot.com/2006/03/heidegger-dewey-pirsig.html Matt _________________________________________________________________ Insert movie times and more without leaving Hotmail®. http://windowslive.com/Tutorial/Hotmail/QuickAdd?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_HM_Tutorial_QuickAdd_062009 Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
