On Sun, Jul 10, 2011 at 12:24 AM, X Acto <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Steve replied to Dave: >> I don't disagree with Pirsig or the dictionary as far as the "classic >> dilemma." >>I disagree with how YOU think this dilemma could possibly still come up in the >>MOQ while Pirsig specifically says this dilemma does not come up in the MOQ! > > Ron: > Bob specifically states that when we follow Dynamic Quality we are free. He > states that natural selection > aka evolution is dynamic quality at work, which is what touched this whole > pissing match off.
Steve: My point is that the traditional notion of free will is a completely different concept from Pirsig's conception of freedom in terms of DQ. Do you disagree? Also, does Lila have Quality? Ron: > What you Steve seem to insist on, is that free-will or dynamic quality as > re-named by Pirsigs > MoQ, can not be or should not be talked about. Yet we see how he connects the > two concepts > not as diametrically opposed but as a cohesive total explanation. Steve: I've never said that free will can not be talked about. In fact, I think most would agree that I've talked quite a lot about this SOM concept. Ron: > What would be a more relevent and meaningful discussion on the MD but a > discussion involving > deterministic static patterns and their freedom to evolve? > > How does the denial and rejection of a dilemma ever solved or "dissolved"? not > by avoiding it > or ignoring it as a non-issue but by it's explanation, and the power that lies > in Pirsigs MoQ > is explanitory not negation. > > The Dilemma is disolved by explanation, not ignoring the debate entirely as > meaningless. > > Only rigid pricks do that. Steve: My position is that the traditional question, "is the cause of man behavior internal to the subject or externally imposed by objects?," is a version of the question, "is the quality the subject or the object?" Far from being a question that gets ignored by the MOQ, it is a question that got the whole ball rolling. But it is a question that gets called out by Pirsig as one based on a flawed premise--that the only way to talk about the world philosophically is to begin by cutting reality into subjects and objects. Instead, Pirsig suggests that a better "first cut" is sq/DQ in a reality conceived of as equivalent to experience or Value. If human beings are a set of values with the capacity to respond to DQ rather than existing in a universe of metaphysical subjects and objects, it makes no sense to ask the age old free will/determinism question, "is the cause of man behavior internal to the subject or externally imposed by objects?" This question gets replaced in the MOQ by the question, "to what extent is human behavior governed by static patterns of value , and to what extent is it a response to DQ?" Perhaps you can answer, Ron, to exactly what extent is that? As far as I can see, this is a question with no clear answer, but we do have the picture of an evolutionary hierarchy where evolution is characterized as a migration of static patterns toward dynamic quality, so human's as having intellectual patterns are more free than social or biological or inorganic patterns. Though the SOM concept of free will seems to be a cherished belief for you, Pirsig nevertheless re-tools the notion of free will to be the capacity to respond to DQ. In Pirsig's conception, everything including atoms, rocks, and trees has this capacity to varying degrees. I'm sorry that it offends you to say so, but free will in the MOQ is just not at all the sort of thing referred to in the SOM traditional definition that you seem to cherish. It is not the concept of a subject having freedom from casual forces imposed by an objective world since it rejects the SOM premise upon which that definition rests. With regard to that sort of free will, the MOQ says, "mu." Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
