Hello everyone On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 2:41 PM, David Morey <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Dan > > Thanks for your comments. Please see my clarifications, comments, > questions below... > > >> Interesting. So for you memories are not a form of experience? > > >>> Dan: Well, I thought we were discussing the MOQ, here. Right? > > > DM: Yes, and I am asking how you understand the status of memories > in the MOQ in terms of SQ and DQ. I have been assuming that for the MOQ > everything > is a form of experience and all expereince can be divided into SQ or DQ. now > you seem to bring up ideas and memories to explain what SQ is, I am > suggesting that we experience both SQ and DQ aspects to any given > experience, such as experiencing a banana. You seem to be saying we only > experience DQ, all SQ is only something built out of DQ after the event, > using ideas and memories.
Dan: I am not saying we only experience Dynamic Quality. Using the term 'experience' in that manner, you are suggesting a subject experiencing the world of objects (bananas), or in this DQ case, a subject experiencing, what? If Dynamic Quality is not this, not that, then what is one experiencing? Rather, in the MOQ experience is primary while subject and objects, patterns of value, memories, and everything else is secondary. Dynamic Quality and experience become synonymous within the MOQ. Maybe you'll get it. Most people don't. > I am suggesting that we experience a level > of SQ prelinguistically, yes there is obviously a post-linguistic level > of SQ involving words, ideas, memories and concepts. But do we > not construct post-linguistic forms of SQ and construct names like > banana out of pre-linguistic SQ elements, elements such as repeating > patterns of smell, taste, sight, etc. You could object that such comparisons > involve a time delay and memory and therefore imply the use of ideas and > analogies to construct a pattern and the relevant SQ. But then this seems > to make ideas and memories more fundamental to the MOQ than SQ. > But is the MOQ not meant to see DQ and SQ as the originating qualities, > does Pirsig really see ideas and memories as underlying SQ, thereby making > SQ non-fundamental to his metaphysics? Dan: Static quality patterns are secondary. They arise from experience. See, when you say we experience a banana, what you are really saying is that the banana is primary and our experience of it is secondary. But a banana like all other static patterns are always secondary to experience. A banana is a reconstruction of the experience. There is always a time lag involved between experience and what we take as reality. > > Alternatively, what about looking at two items, one in each hand, you have > them present to you at the same time, is not the fact of their similarity > experienced by you prior to putting a label on it and calling them both > out as bananas. I'd also that you can experience not only the similarity > between these two items, but their difference. Now the similarities > is all about SQ, but we always experience more than any patterns, > similarity, SQ. We also experience difference, and if this difference > is not patterned, what do we call it? I suggest all difference is part > of what we mean by DQ. This is something like what Heidegger > means when he says if we look at all the being (SQ) we complete > fail to notice the Being (DQ) of experience. Same with scientism, > it has all the best theories (SQ) to explain the world but these are > never complete and a surplus or remainder as Zizek says remains. > I appreciate that you and others are trying to explain SQ and DQ > in terms of what Pirsig has said but what I am trying to do is test > the MOQ against a wider context of ideas and thinkers to see > how it contrasts with or fits in with these other ways of thinking > about experience-reality. Dan: Good luck with that. I am probably the last person you want to talk with as I write much more philosophy than I read. If I am having problems sleeping, I pick up a copy of Marty's Being and Time and I am soon happily snoring. God, is there anything so dry as dead white men going on and on about nothing at all? > > > > DM said: >> >> Is experience only something that you can have about what is >> present in the now? This looks like a version of presentism and various >> philosophers have seen this as part of standard empiricism and >> I am surprised to find that you think it is part of the MOQ >> but is that your position? > > > Dan: > I have no idea what you are talking about. The MOQ subscribes to pure > empiricism. > > DM: I have always seen the MOQ as a form of radical empiricism so that it > considers not only the perceptual realm as a key aspect of experience but > anything we can experience as vital to the full plurality of our > experiences, > so we also experience feelings, values, ideas, images, memories, numbers, > fantasies, etc, whatever we experience is real and part of experience and > is either made up of statric/repeating qualities or dynamic ones. Seems to > me > you are thinking ideas and memories are some sort of add ons to experience > that are allowing us to make SQ out of DQ. Is that really what Pirsig is > suggesting? Dan: No, that is not what I am saying. Ideas, or intellectual patterns of quality, emerge from experience to inform us of the world. Again, you seem to be insinuating that we as subjects are (somehow) using the objects of our experience to inform us of the world. You seem to be saying these objects are primary and experience is secondary. In the MOQ, experience is primary. All these feelings, desires, ideas, numbers, anything we imagine, even bananas, all emerge from experience. So in the MOQ, experience and Dynamic Quality become synonymous. We aren't making anything out it Dynamic Quality for that would imply we as subjects are primary. Rather, the concept of we as subjects emerges from Dynamic Quality. > DMB has given some quotes that do seem to suggest this. But giving this sort > of > status to ideas and memories make them sound like they are subjective, does > this > not trap us back in SOM? Does such an approach not threaten the MOQ with > falling back into SOM? Do you see why I fear this may be a dangerous way to > construct out understanding of SQ? What is your defence of this view and > how does it avoid this potential problem, have I correctly described the MOQ > interpretation you are trying to explain? Dan: Well, as I have explained, I think you are coming at this problem from the opposite direction of the MOQ. Again, all such concepts like subject and object, patterns of value, even Dynamic Quality, are secondary to experience. The MOQ is pure empiricism where everything begins with experience. > > > > DM said: > >> I can see that it is possible to cut the MOQ this >> way, so for you SQ is only something that can be established >> in thinking after the event of dynamic experience, all experience >> is dynamic for you, only in thinking and memory is SQ able to become >> something we are aware of for you? > > > Dan said: > You seem to be under the (mistaken) impression that I am making this > up. I am not. A little reading will verify what I say. Rather than > asking a lot of questions that don't much make sense, perhaps you > might avail yourself to some of Robert Pirsig's writings, both his > books as well as his subsequent work with Anthony McWatt and me. > Until you catch up, I see little hope of continuing this discussion. > > DM: No I know you are probably more acquainted with Pirsig than me > but I have more than a good knowledge of these, I am simply questioning > whether your interpretation is the best approach or not, it might be, but > I am not yet convinced but I wish to discuss this with you to test the case > and see if it is possible to make interpretative improvements or not. I > believe > my interpretation is different, it is based less on an exhaustive study of > Pirsig, but rather on comparing my good knowledge of Pirsig to a set of > other thinkers who I think have also written wisely against the limits and > problems of SOM and explored alternatives. For me Pirsig is an important > thinker in this wider context and I'd like to see Pirsig more recognised as > a > key thinker in a wider general movement against SOM and scientism. > I have raised Pirsig's works with a number of UK academics and thinkers, > many of whom have usually read ZAMM but not Lila and I have encouraged > them to do so. My view is that given the right interpretation there is great > hope for Pirsig to be even more appreciated and used by many such thinkers > and their > students. I would hope everyone on this list would appreciate this and what > I am able to do in this respect, I won't name drop, but I have done quite > well > with my contacts promoting Pirsig in the last few years since I was last a > contributor > here. I also appreciate the work, others who contribute here, have done to > promote the appreciation of Pirsig's books. What a shame that so many little > groups like this end up fighting amongst themselves when they are all meant > to > be interested in the same ends. Dan: I think what a lot of us are fighting is the misconceptions about Robert Pirsig's work that are continually arising. I've spent a lot of time dealing with these very same issues with David Harding. I get dizzy going round and round in circles. I am sure dmb feels the same frustration. If I seem short with you, it is on account of that. > There are obviously going to be differences > of > opinion and interpretation, and whilst it is worth debating these in the > context > of what Pirsig and others have written and what other thinkers have also > said > about SOM, many long before Pirsig, we should surely be more tolerant of > such difference, and if you can't understand someone else's views or > comments, > further questions are surely the best way forward, good enough for Socrates! Dan: Yes, this is usually how it starts. We are accused of not understanding the viewpoints of others. I assure you we do understand. We've been through the very same thing dozens of times. It might be nice for once if someone came here actually looking to learn a little something rather than trying to impress us all with the veracity of their knowledge. > > Sorry if you have been round some of these areas before but I have been off > list > for a few years, so with a little patience and good will we should be able > to > make some progress and perhaps tease out the strengths and perhaps > weaknesses > of what you and others see as the best available understanding of the MOQ, > or whether my own understanding is flawed or better than what is current > orthodoxy on this list. Dan: Again, I realize you've been off the list for some time and I don't mean to sound bombastic. Answering basic questions concerning the MOQ isn't what I am here for, however. I expect a certain level of proficiency from other contributors. Now, maybe it's asking too much that someone at least take the time to read up a bit: perhaps re-read ZMM and Lila, maybe check out Anthony McWatt's work, maybe browse the archives. But as dmb says, a person has to understand the work of Robert Pirsig before they can start offering something better. Calling us the orthodoxy is rather rude, in my opinion. It is suggestive of dogmatic thinking and inflexibility. I am all for learning new things about the MOQ. But if someone is going to teach me something, they better do their homework first. So far, I don't see that you have done that. Thank you, Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
