Hello everyone On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 1:14 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]>wrote:
> > Dan said to dmb and everybody: > I take it then that these articles concerning Pragmatic Truth are wrong? > Or am I misreading them somehow? And if so, how? > > > dmb says: > There is one slightly misleading line in these quotes but otherwise they > seem quite right to me. The description of pragmatism as "a synthesis of > correspondence theory of truth and coherence theory of truth" would be okay > as way to introduce the basic idea but it's really much more subtle than > that. Dan: >From what I understand, James takes his Pragmatism from Charles Peirce's writings. It isn't until James popularizes it that Peirce is acknowledged at all. I think I read somewhere that the seminal paper on Pragmatism by Peirce laid around collecting dust for twenty years before James used it as a basis for his theories. Doing a bit of reading I see that Charles Peirce was more interested in using pragmatism as a tool in scientific inquiry--a one-truth notion--whereas William James appears to use it more along the lines of religious and psychological inquiry, or multiple truths. This seems interesting to me in that Robert Pirsig uses his MOQ to marry idealism and materialism. > James's thinks our truths must "agree with experience" but this really > isn't the same as correspondence to reality. Likewise with "coherence". > James thinks our truths have to fit into the conceptual order (the mythos) > but this really isn't the same as coherence theory. > Dan: What is the 'experience' that pragmatic truth agrees with? > > We can also see this in Pirsig's description of James's radical > empiricism, wherein they are both rejecting the basic ontological premise > of the correspondence theory. Once you reject subject object metaphysics, > it no longer makes sense to construe truth as the correspondence between > objective reality and the subject's ideas. In Pirsig's book, this rejection > of SOM immediately follows the description of James's pragmatism, wherein > Pirsig says, "That was right on. That was EXACTLY what is meant by the MOQ. > Truth is a static intellectual pattern WITHIN a larger entity called > Quality." > Dan: Yes I understand this and agree with it. Robert Pirsig follows that up with: "What the Metaphysics of Quality adds to James' *pragmatism *and his *radical empiricism *is the idea that the primal reality from which subjects and objects spring is *value. *By doing so it seems to unite pragmatism and radical empiricism into a single fabric. Value, the pragmatic test of truth, is also the primary empirical experience. The Metaphysics of Quality says pure experience is value. Experience which is not valued is not experienced. The two are the same. This is where value fits. Value is not at the tail-end of a series of superficial scientific deductions that puts it somewhere in a mysterious undetermined location in the cortex of the brain. Value is at the very front of the empirical procession." [Lila] Dan comments: So if pragmatism and radical empiricism are united by value, and pure experience is value, as Robert Pirsig surmises, what is pragmatic truth? Does James answer that other than to say it agrees with experience? And does he equate experience with value like Robert Pirsig? > > There are different kinds of pragmatism but, I think, we want to know > about James's version in particular because of the way Pirsig puts him to > use in explaining the MOQ's theory of truth. I mean, my main point is to > say that Pirsig is not opposed to James on this point. The are not enemies > on this. Quite the opposite. He says James's truth theory is "EXACTLY what > is meant by the MOQ". > > > Just to be sure we are talking about the same thing here... > > Wiki on the Correspondence Theory: > > "The correspondence theory of truth states that the truth or falsity of a > statement is determined only by how it relates to the world and whether it > accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world. The theory is > opposed to the coherence theory of truth which holds that the truth or > falsity of a statement is determined by its relations to other statements > rather than its relation to the world. Correspondence theories claim > that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of > affairs. This type of theory attempts to posit a relationship between > thoughts or statements on one hand, and things or facts on the other. It is > a traditional model which goes back at least to some of the classical Greek > philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. This class of theories > holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is determined > solely by how it relates to a reality; that is, by whether it accurately > describes that reality." > > > Wiki on the correspondence theory's relation to ontology: > > "Historically, most advocates of correspondence theories have been > ontological realists; that is, they believe that there is a world external > to the minds of all humans. This is in contrast to metaphysical idealists > who hold that everything that exists is, in the end, just an idea in some > mind. However, it is not strictly necessary that a correspondence theory be > married to ontological realism. It is possible to hold, for example, that > the facts of the world determine which statements are true and to also hold > that the world (and its facts) is but a collection of ideas in the mind of > some supreme being." > Dan: Yes we are talking about the same thing as far as I can see. The more reading I do on pragmatic truth the more confused people seem to be about exactly what it means. You seem to have as good a grasp as anyone. I appreciate your input. Thank you, Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
