> [Platt] > With unique experience at all levels, not just biological. Anyway, your > mind and mine are anything but united, as anyone can plainly tell. > > [Arlo] > Not according to Pirsig, who rightly describes how the collective > consciousness unites our minds as cells in a body.
You mean "common knowledge" rather than "collective consciousness" don't you? > [Platt] > So can mine. But it's a static, not a dynamic pattern, predictable, > repeatable. > > [Arlo] > You mean you can predict everything your cat does? Really? Not mine. Mine > responds to DQ biologically very well. My cat does nothing that cats don't predictably do. If he starts staring at his paw in wonder and delight, then I'll say he responds to DQ. > [Platt] > Well, if you read Lila you would know that responses to DQ become static > patterns very quickly. When you show me a dog that can stare at its paw in > wonder, then I will believe there is a biological response to DQ. > > [Arlo] > "State at in wonder" is a social-intellectual response. I never said a dog > can respond to DQ on these levels. But answer my question, what responded > to DQ before humans entered the scene? Did dogs in North America suddenly > stop responding to DQ because a few humans over in Africa caused a social > pattern? No. "Stare at in wonder" is a human baby's response to DQ long before she knows anything about social-intellectual patterns. As for what responded to DQ before humans, read the chapter in Lila explaining evolution from the MOQ perspective. > [Platt] > How do you know what my cat knows? As far as I can tell, my cat is very > much self aware. > > [Arlo] > How can it be "self-aware", and yet be completely an automaton to static > patterns? Your cat is very much aware... biologically... but not socially > or intellectually, and as such (according to Pirsig) has no "I am". > [Platt] > It doesn't lick any fur but its own. He doesn't need "culture" to know that > he's different from the dog down the block. > [Arlo] > What it has is a sense of biological quality. It knows what hurts, what > feels good, what makes it full, etc. (not in symbolic terms, of course). > Again, "I am", according to Pirsig, is dependent first on "so and so > culture exists", which enables a "therefore I think", which enables an "I > am". Like I said, my cat knows it's own fur and can distinguish itself from other cats, dogs, people and things. At least, it exhibits the behavior of someone who knows himself from others even if it can't verbalize it. > [Arlo] > There is a difference between using S/O language and reifying a S/O > metaphysics. Pirsig's "self" (or subject) does not exist apart from the > world (object), they are mutually containing. > > [Platt] > Whatever that means. > > [Arlo] > It means that Pirsig recognized that "I" is just a pragmatic reference > point, that the "self" is not "apart from" that patterns from which it > emerges. Your idea of "self" is about as pure S/O as you can get, with > lone, removed, separate "selves" interacting with external, removed > "objects" (patterns that are "not it"). " A human being is a collection of ideas, and these ideas take moral precedence over a society. Ideas are patterns of value. They are at a higher level of evolution than social patterns of value." (Lila, 13) This is the "self" I hold dear, morally separate and higher than "collective consciousness." But I understand you reluctance to acknowledge this. moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
