Ben, List Thanks for forwarding Robert’s post. I didn’t receive it.
As Robert said - there are no singular tokens! As has been pointed out the term ’token’ means an individual replica of a ‘type’. That is - the type, a general mode of common organization of matter/mind [ ie Thirdness] has to exist such that the token can be understood as a replica of it. What if the triadic entity, theSign, doesn’t contain such a commonality? Peirce was quite clear that habits[3ns], which is another term for Type, can emerge, grow, develop. That is, we must understand that Thirdness is ‘alive’, so to speak. Robert pointed out four of the ten classes that have, in themselves, no habits of organization. Now - does this mean that they are, in themselves, just singular instances of a Sign that does in itself, contain Thirdness, and thus, does control the formation of this singularity? This is certainly possible- as the Iconic Sinsign [112] could be understood as such. Or, as Robert pointed out - it could be an individual diagram without any understanding or knowledge that it actually represented a law/legisign. And could remain as such for decades/centuries. This ignores the very real question of the ORIGIN of these laws which govern Signs. Peirce rejected the necessitarianism of Platonic idealism where all the Forms/habits/3ns are pre-existent, and equally rejected the determinism of a priori forms which exist ‘from the beginning of the universe’/god’s will. Instead, referring to Peirce’s clear outline that habits can emerge and grow - he declares that novelty is real, and new species, which is to say, new habits of morphological formation, can emerge, on their own, and develop as continuity of Types. I’ve already referred to such events, in a previous post - with the realities of Firstness, chance, and that specification “has been continually been taking place” 6.59. What does this mean - that specification, pure spontaneity of life as a character, infinitesimal departures from law’are constantly taking place [6.64]? It means that instances of matter/mind are emerging, which are NOT tokens of existent Types [but departures from such] and have no ability in themselves to replicate-[since they contain no laws..understanding a law as a general habit of formation -. So- what happens? As Peirce writes about habits - he acknowledges the ’tendency to form habits [6.63] which means that IF enough of these non-token singularities emerge, they can in themselves, form habits which enable Type-Token continuity. The examples of exactly this occurring in the biological realm of speciation and new, totally new species emerging, with totally new habits/DNA/s..are too numerous to outline.. And too numerous to reject. What about in the societal realm? Surely we cannot believe that the concepts of , as I pointed out..the wheel’,[ a monumental idea], the mariner’s compass’, the plough, vaccines…electricity, etc..were all ‘pre-existent’ as potentialities ..[where?] - Can’t one consider that they are genuinely new habits of thought? Therefore - my view of Peirce and his clear comments is that singular signs[I mean the triadic entity] do and can emerge, which are not Tokens of a Type, but are ‘on their own, so to speak’[112, 122] ..and, given the reality of Thirdness and habit formation, these singulars can gradually form a new habit particular to their own identity..and become, a Type capable of producing Tokens. Thus - enabling diversity and adaptation. Edwina > On Nov 13, 2025, at 2:48 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > > Robert, Jon, all, > > I didn't know what you meant by "singular token" before. You mean a typeless > token. I hadn't been following the thread. Also, Robert, I can't get the > peirce-l server to re-send your post to me, which i had not received in the > first place. So I include it below in case anybody else hasn't received it. > Removing unnecessary HTML markup seemed to help last time - not a single > bounce of my previous post. > > Peirce called himself a Scholastic Realist of an extreme stripe. I don't know > why he would bar an undiscovered type, an unknown type, if it were a type > about which any investigator _would_ agree upon sufficient investigation. > Unknown does not equate to unknowable. I also worry about the idea of > sinsigns that are not tokens. My system-building instinct would be then seek > out qualisigns that are not tones, and legisigns that are not types, if there > are any such. > > Best, Ben > > * *From*: robert marty <robert.marty98 AT gmail.com> > * *To*: peirce-l AT list.iu.edu, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschmidt AT > gmail.com> > * *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign Tokens and Sign Types (was Peirce's > Categorial Involution, and Contemporary Peirce Scholarship) > * *Date*: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 18:46:26 +0100 > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Jon, List, > > JAS: "there are no singular tokens, i.e., there no singular sinsigns." > > JAS:"there are no singular tokens", > > YES! It's a tautology, since it's a token, it's a replica of a type. > > Do we agree on that after all ? > > JAS: "i.e., there no singular sinsigns" > > NO ! > > Peirce: CP 2.254: First: A Qualisign …is any quality … a quality can only > denote *an* > > * Object* .. > > CP 2.255: Second: An Iconic Sinsign [*/e.g., /*an individual > diagram]… it determine the idea of *an object* … > > CP 2.256: Third: A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign …it directs > attention to *an Object* … > > CP 2.257: Fourth: A Dicent Sinsign … affords information > concerning *its Objec*t … *The only information it can afford is of actual > fact *… > > CP 2.265: In the course of the above descriptions of the classes, > certain subdivisions of some of them have been directly or indirectly > referred to. Namely, beside the *normal varieties of Sinsigns*, Indices, and > Dicisigns, there are others which are *Replicas of Legisigns*, Symbols, and > Arguments, *respectively.* > > RM: That is to say, among the *normal varieties* *of Sinsigns* there are > *replicas* *of Legisigns*; among *the normal varieties* *of Indices* there > are *replicas* *of Symbols*; among *the normal varieties of Dicisigns* there > are *replicas of* *Arguments* … > > Conclusion:*the normal varieties of Sinsigns that are not replicas of > Legisigns are singular signs that are not tokens.* > > *Example by Peirce*: by CP 2.255 an *individual diagram*, is an Iconic > Sinsign and by CP 2.258, a diagram, *apart from its factual individuality* is > any general law *or type* named Iconic Legisign … In other words, an > individual diagram retains its singularity until an expert identifies it as a > token of a type, which can take a very long time (this was the case for DNA). > How many diagrams drawn by bricoleurs in their articles will retain this > status forever ? Indeed: > > /It was necessary for me to determine what I should call *one science*. For > this purpose I have united under one science studies such as the same man, in > the present state of science, might very well pursue. I have been guided in > determining this by noting how scientists associate themselves into > societies, and what contributions are commonly admitted into one journal: > being on my guard against the survival of traditions from bygone states of > science. /(NEM IV: 15, 1902, List of Proposed Memoirs on Logic, N^o . 1. /On > the Classification of the Theoretic Sciences of Research/) > > *QED* > > Do we agree on that after all ? > > Regards, > > Robert Marty > > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
