Ben, Robert, Jon, List, As I currently see it a token is not equivalent to a sinsign in Peirce's semeiotic although they are closely related concepts, but coming from different classification schemes. 'Sinsign' comes from Peirce's first classification trichotomy (based on the sign's mode of being):
Qualisign: A quality that is a sign Sinsign: An actual existent thing or event that is a sign Legisign: A general law or type that is a sign On the other hand, 'token' comes from the later type-token distinction: Type: A general form or law in some 'conventional' sense. Token: A particular instance or replica of* that* type. So, in short, a token is a sinsign, but not all sinsigns are tokens. And every 'type' signifies through an instance or replica of it, and the replica is a sinsign. So, an example of a token (replica of a legisign) would be Peirce's famous example of the word 'the'which is a replica of the legisign "the"' (the conventional meaning of "the"). An example of an sinsign that is *not* a token would be the well-known example of a weathervane pointing in a particular direction. Some additional Peirce examples include a spontaneous cry of pain and smoke as a sign of fire which are individual existent sinsigns but* not* replicas of a conventional type. In short, tokens are sinsigns that replicate legisigns (as conventional types) while sinsigns include tokens but also non-conventional individual signs. So, again, in my view while all tokens are sinsign, not all sinsigns are tokens: *no* sinsign can function independently of some general law, while tokens essentially depend on their relation to a conventional type. Ben: "My system-building instinct would be then seek out qualisigns that are not tones, and legisigns that are not types, if there are any such." If what I wrote above is correct then there are qualisigns which are not tones (such as the qualitative character of any 'spontaneous cry'. And the natural law that produces flashes of lightning would be a qualisign which is not a tone. Best, Gary R On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 2:49 PM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Robert, Jon, all, > > I didn't know what you meant by "singular token" before. You mean a > typeless token. I hadn't been following the thread. Also, Robert, I can't > get the peirce-l server to re-send your post to me, which i had not > received in the first place. So I include it below in case anybody else > hasn't received it. Removing unnecessary HTML markup seemed to help last > time - not a single bounce of my previous post. > > Peirce called himself a Scholastic Realist of an extreme stripe. I don't > know why he would bar an undiscovered type, an unknown type, if it were a > type about which any investigator _would_ agree upon sufficient > investigation. Unknown does not equate to unknowable. I also worry about > the idea of sinsigns that are not tokens. My system-building instinct > would be then seek out qualisigns that are not tones, and legisigns that > are not types, if there are any such. > > Best, Ben > > * *From*: robert marty <robert.marty98 AT gmail.com> > * *To*: peirce-l AT list.iu.edu, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschmidt AT > gmail.com> > * *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign Tokens and Sign Types (was Peirce's > Categorial Involution, and Contemporary Peirce Scholarship) > * *Date*: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 18:46:26 +0100 > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Jon, List, > > JAS: "there are no singular tokens, i.e., there no singular sinsigns." > > JAS:"there are no singular tokens", > > YES! It's a tautology, since it's a token, it's a replica of a type. > > Do we agree on that after all ? > > JAS: "i.e., there no singular sinsigns" > > NO ! > > Peirce: CP 2.254: First: A Qualisign …is any quality … a quality can only > denote *an* > > * Object* .. > > CP 2.255: Second: An Iconic Sinsign [*/e.g., /*an individual > diagram]… it determine the idea of *an object* … > > CP 2.256: Third: A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign …it directs > attention to *an Object* … > > CP 2.257: Fourth: A Dicent Sinsign … affords information > concerning *its Objec*t … *The only information it can afford is of actual > fact *… > > CP 2.265: In the course of the above descriptions of the > classes, certain subdivisions of some of them have been directly or > indirectly referred to. Namely, beside the *normal varieties of Sinsigns*, > Indices, and Dicisigns, there are others which are *Replicas of Legisigns*, > Symbols, and Arguments, *respectively.* > > RM: That is to say, among the *normal varieties* *of Sinsigns* there are > *replicas* *of Legisigns*; among *the normal varieties* *of Indices* there > are *replicas* *of Symbols*; among *the normal varieties of Dicisigns* > there are *replicas of* *Arguments* … > > Conclusion:*the normal varieties of Sinsigns that are not replicas of > Legisigns are singular signs that are not tokens.* > > *Example by Peirce*: by CP 2.255 an *individual diagram*, is an Iconic > Sinsign and by CP 2.258, a diagram, *apart from its factual individuality* > is any general law *or type* named Iconic Legisign … In other words, an > individual diagram retains its singularity until an expert identifies it as > a token of a type, which can take a very long time (this was the case for > DNA). How many diagrams drawn by bricoleurs in their articles will retain > this status forever ? Indeed: > > /It was necessary for me to determine what I should call *one science*. > For this purpose I have united under one science studies such as the same > man, in the present state of science, might very well pursue. I have been > guided in determining this by noting how scientists associate themselves > into societies, and what contributions are commonly admitted into one > journal: being on my guard against the survival of traditions from bygone > states of science. /(NEM IV: 15, 1902, List of Proposed Memoirs on Logic, > N^o . 1. /On the Classification of the Theoretic Sciences of Research/) > > *QED* > > Do we agree on that after all ? > > Regards, > > Robert Marty > > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
