Robert, Ben, Gary R., List: I received Robert's post (see below with original formatting), but the subject line was slightly different, such that Gmail put it in its own new thread--unlike Ben's and Gary's posts, which it kept in this ongoing thread.
I agree with Ben's "system-building instinct" that if there are no singular tokens, then there can be no singular sinsigns; and if there are singular sinsigns, then there must be singular tokens. Again, "token" is Peirce's replacement term for "sinsign," not "replica"; his replacement term for "replica" is "instance." In short, a type *is *a legisign, a token *is *a sinsign, a tone *is* a qualisign, and an instance *is *a replica. Accordingly, I disagree with Gary's definitions of type and token--they are *not *how Peirce defined those terms. I have been repeatedly citing CP 4.537 (1906) for *his *definitions but now feel like I have no choice but to quote them in full, which I hope will settle the matter. CSP: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty *the's *on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a *Type*. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a *Token*. An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a *Tone*. In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an *Instance* of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. I agree with Robert that Peirce's 1903 taxonomy allows for the *possibility *of sinsigns that are not replicas of legisigns, i.e., sign tokens that are not instances of sign types. However, I remain unconvinced that there are any such *actual *sinsigns/tokens, and I disagree with Robert that an individual diagram qualifies as one. The examples within brackets for the different sign classes in CP 2.254-61 are not in Peirce's original manuscript for the *Syllabus*--they were added by the CP editors, which is why they were omitted from EP 2:294-5. Nevertheless, comparing 2.255 with 2.258 *confirms *my position rather than refuting it--"an individual diagram" (iconic sinsign/token) is *not* singular, it is a replica/instance of "a diagram, apart from its factual individuality" (iconic legisign/type). After all, any diagram is "capable of repetition," and every reproduction of it "is one and the same representamen" (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). Gary suggests that "a weathervane pointing in a particular direction" is a sinsign/token that is *not *a replica/instance of a legisign/type, but Peirce explicitly disagrees, as I pointed out in my post <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00047.html> on Monday. "If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air" (ibid.). "I speak of the weathercock,--the type, not the single instance" (EP 2:406, 1907). I even spelled out what I see as the various correlates of this non-linguistic sign in my post <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00049.html> on Tuesday. Peirce also explicitly states that "smoke as a sign of fire" is a "natural universal," defined as "a natural sign predicable of a plurality of things" (CP 2.371, 1902), i.e., a legisign/type. Likewise, "a spontaneous cry of pain" is a replica/instance of a legisign/type, not a singular sinsign/token. The distinguishing aspect of a legisign/type is *not *that it is "conventional," but that it is "a general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" (CP 8.313, 1905 Jan 22). Finally, I agree with Ben that in accordance with scholastic realism, whether a particular *existent* sinsign/token is a replica/instance of a *real* legisign/type is not dependent on whether or when any human *does *recognize it as such, only on whether an infinite community after infinite investigation *would* recognize it as such. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 4:15 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Ben, Robert, Jon, List, > > As I currently see it a token is not equivalent to a sinsign in Peirce's > semeiotic although they are closely related concepts, but coming from > different classification schemes. 'Sinsign' comes from Peirce's first > classification trichotomy (based on the sign's mode of being): > > Qualisign: A quality that is a sign > Sinsign: An actual existent thing or event that is a sign > Legisign: A general law or type that is a sign > > > On the other hand, 'token' comes from the later type-token distinction: > > Type: A general form or law in some 'conventional' sense. > Token: A particular instance or replica of* that* type. > > > So, in short, a token is a sinsign, but not all sinsigns are tokens. And every > 'type' signifies through an instance or replica of it, and the replica is a > sinsign. > > So, an example of a token (replica of a legisign) would be Peirce's > famous example of the word 'the' which is a replica of the legisign "the"' > (the conventional meaning of "the"). > > An example of an sinsign that is *not* a token would be the well-known > example of a weathervane pointing in a particular direction. Some > additional Peirce examples include a spontaneous cry of pain and smoke as > a sign of fire which are individual existent sinsigns but* not* replicas > of a conventional type. > > In short, tokens are sinsigns that replicate legisigns (as conventional > types) while sinsigns include tokens but also non-conventional individual > signs. So, again, in my view while all tokens are sinsign, not all > sinsigns are tokens: *no* sinsign can function independently of some general > law, while tokens essentially depend on their relation to a conventional > type. > > Ben: "My system-building instinct would be then seek out qualisigns that > are not tones, and legisigns that are not types, if there are any such." > > If what I wrote above is correct then there are qualisigns which are not > tones (such as the qualitative character of any 'spontaneous cry'. And > the natural law that produces flashes of lightning would be a > qualisign which is not a tone. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 2:49 PM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Robert, Jon, all, >> >> I didn't know what you meant by "singular token" before. You mean a >> typeless token. I hadn't been following the thread. Also, Robert, I can't >> get the peirce-l server to re-send your post to me, which i had not >> received in the first place. So I include it below in case anybody else >> hasn't received it. Removing unnecessary HTML markup seemed to help last >> time - not a single bounce of my previous post. >> >> Peirce called himself a Scholastic Realist of an extreme stripe. I don't >> know why he would bar an undiscovered type, an unknown type, if it were a >> type about which any investigator _would_ agree upon sufficient >> investigation. Unknown does not equate to unknowable. I also worry about >> the idea of sinsigns that are not tokens. My system-building instinct >> would be then seek out qualisigns that are not tones, and legisigns that >> are not types, if there are any such. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On Thu, Nov 13, 2025 at 11:47 AM robert marty <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, List, >>> >>> JAS: "there are no singular tokens, i.e., there no singular sinsigns." >>> >>> JAS:"there are no singular tokens", >>> >>> YES! It's a tautology, since it's a token, it's a replica of a type. >>> >>> Do we agree on that after all ? >>> >>> >>> >>> JAS: "i.e., there no singular sinsigns" >>> >>> NO ! >>> >>> >>> >>> Peirce: CP 2.254: First: A Qualisign …is any quality … a quality can >>> only denote *an* >>> >>> * Object* .. >>> >>> CP 2.255: Second: An Iconic Sinsign [*e.g., *an individual >>> diagram]… it determine the idea of *an object* … >>> >>> CP 2.256: Third: A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign …it directs >>> attention to *an Object* … >>> >>> CP 2.257: Fourth: A Dicent Sinsign … affords information concerning *its >>> Objec*t … *The only information it can afford is of actual fact *… >>> >>> >>> >>> CP 2.265: In the course of the above descriptions of the classes, >>> certain subdivisions of some of them have been directly or indirectly >>> referred to. Namely, beside the *normal varieties of Sinsigns*, >>> Indices, and Dicisigns, there are others which are *Replicas of >>> Legisigns*, Symbols, and Arguments, *respectively.* >>> >>> >>> >>> RM: That is to say, among the *normal varieties* *of Sinsigns* there >>> are *replicas* *of Legisigns*; among *the normal varieties* *of Indices* >>> there >>> are *replicas* *of Symbols*; among *the normal varieties of Dicisigns* there >>> are *replicas of* *Arguments* … >>> >>> >>> >>> *Conclusion:* *the normal varieties of Sinsigns that are not replicas >>> of Legisigns are singular signs that are not tokens.* >>> >>> *Example by Peirce*: by CP 2.255 an *individual diagram*, is an Iconic >>> Sinsign and by CP 2.258, a diagram, *apart from its factual >>> individuality* is any general law *or type* named Iconic Legisign … In >>> other words, an individual diagram retains its singularity until an expert >>> identifies it as a token of a type, which can take a very long time (this >>> was the case for DNA). How many diagrams drawn by bricoleurs in their >>> articles will retain this status forever ? Indeed: >>> >>> *It was necessary for me to determine what I should call one science. >>> For this purpose I have united under one science studies such as the same >>> man, in the present state of science, might very well pursue. I have been >>> guided in determining this by noting how scientists associate themselves >>> into societies, and what contributions are commonly admitted into one >>> journal: being on my guard against the survival of traditions from bygone >>> states of science. *(NEM IV: 15, 1902, List of Proposed Memoirs on >>> Logic, No. 1. *On the Classification of the Theoretic Sciences of >>> Research*) >>> >>> *QED* >>> >>> Do we agree on that after all ? >>> >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Robert Marty >>> >>> >>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy >>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty >>> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* >>> >>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
