Thanks Gary R for keeping the door open. That is all I was suggesting. One
might for example see a triad as a structure that has reality. And one
certainly might see continuity as process. Peirce transcends categories
that would limit his influence. And as the influence spreads insights will
inevitably expand understanding beyond what Pierce might have articulated
or understood.

*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>*


On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 5:08 AM, Søren Brier <[email protected]> wrote:

> Dear Sung
>
> Prigogine can be said to deliver a physical support to Peirce's
> evolutionary worldview except that he does not have a theory of
> signification and meaning.
>
> Best
>                  Søren
>
> -----Oprindelig meddelelse-----
> Fra: Sungchul Ji [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sendt: 28. april 2014 04:06
> Til: Gary Richmond
> Cc: Stephen C. Rose; [email protected]
> Emne: [biosemiotics:5904] Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8
>
> Gary R, List,
>
> According to I. Prigogine (1917-2003), there are two types of structures
> in the Universe -- (i) equilibrium STRUCTURES (e.g., table, bible, ec.)
> that do not change with time nor require energy dissiaption for them to
> exist, and (ii) dissipative STRUCTURES(e.g., the flame of a candle, TV
> images, EEG, Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions, action potentials) that change
> in time and require dissipation of energy for their existence.  As is well
> known, Prigogine was awarded a Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1977 for having
> contributed to establishing the concpet of dissiaptive structures.
>
> Can philsophers and semioticians utilize the Prigoginean theory of
> STRUCTURES ?
>
> With all the best.
>
> Sung
> __________________________________________________
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of
> Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers
> University Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > Stephen, Michael, Gene, List,
> >
> > It seems to me that in sum the argumentation so far has been that
> > Michael maintains that Peirce should be seen as a structuralist, Gene
> > has countered that Peirce is best seen as a thorough-going process
> > philosopher, and Michael responded to this by saying that to refer to
> > his philosophy as processual is redundant since a properly understood
> > structuralism includes the ideas of process and growth, and I have
> > suggested that structuralism is generally not understood as such (that
> > is, as involving change and growth), and that many Peircean
> > philosophers see Peirce as a process thinker, but not as a
> > structuralist.
> >
> > Now you may be suggesting--but I'm not exactly sure what your intended
> > meaning was, Stephen--that Michael may well be proven correct and that
> > there is good reason to see Peirce as a structuralist when that theory
> > is "properly understood" to include the notions of history, change,
> > and growth.
> >
> > But currently--and although I'm not a big fan of post-structuralism
> > and deconstruction, etc.--structuralism tends to connote to many
> > certain ideas which are not processual. Thus, at the conclusion of a
> > the overview of structuralism in the Wikipedia article one is give
> > these tenets "common to the various forms of structuralism" as
> > formulated by the feminist theorist, Alison Assiter:
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism
> >
> > *First, that a structure determines the position of each element of a
> > whole. Second, that every system has a structure. Third, structural
> > laws deal with co-existence rather than change. Fourth, structures are
> > the "real things" that lie beneath the surface or the appearance of
> > meaning.*
> >
> >
> > Now I would imagine that Michael would say that Assiter does not
> > properly understand structuralism. Still, and again, structuralism
> > does indeed connote these ideas to many. And especially for this
> > discussion note that the third tenet is that "structural laws deal
> > with co-existence rather than change."
> >
> > So, until structuralism is "properly understood" (and I have no doubt
> > that Michael has things of considerable importance to say about this,
> > especially in the realms of linguistics and semiotics), it's a heavy
> > load at present to suggest that Peirce is more structuralist than
> > processual (or, rather, that that the idea of structure properly
> > understood includes process, as Michael is saying).
> >
> > I'll be eager to learn more about this proper understanding of
> > structuralism, and in that sense I agree with you, Stephen, that we
> > should reserved judgment.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Gary
> >
> >
> >
> > *Gary Richmond*
> > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> > *Communication Studies*
> > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Stephen C. Rose
> > <[email protected]>wrote:
> >
> >> I think it is much too early in the course of things to exclude
> >> Michael's conjectures which I assume are intended to widen in a
> >> radical and original manner the scope of Peirce's influence. It has
> >> after all taken 2000 years to arrive at the start of an appropriate
> >> revision of Aristotle, again based in part on Peirce's growing
> >> influence. It is somewhat a problem for the dead, who cannot respond,
> >> to have exclusive interpretations attached to aspects of their
> >> thought. Particularly if, like Peirce, they were inclined to favor
> >> the growth of communities of discourse and partial to abduction which
> >> means, I assume, guessing.
> >>
> >> *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>*
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:50 PM, Gary Richmond
> >> <[email protected]>wrote:
> >>
> >>> Gene, Michael, List,
> >>>
> >>> I would tend to agree with Gene here, especially given the situation
> >>> that Structuralism is not generally "properly understood" in the
> >>> sense in which you are suggesting, Michael.
> >>>
> >>> Meanwhile, a number of Peircean scholars use 'processual' in this
> >>> context much as Gene does, and these include Andre de Tienne, Floyd
> >>> Merrell, Kelly Parker, Cathy Legg, and, perhaps, and especially,
> >>> Nicholas Rescher.
> >>>
> >>> Even in a group of papers you edited, Michael, as *Peirce Seminar
> >>> Papers: Essays in Semiotic Analysis*, Nils B. Thelin in
> >>> "Biopragmatism, Space/Time Cognition, and the Sense of Language,"
> >>> finds what he calls a "hierarchical-processual understanding"
> >>> implicit in Peirce's treatment of abduction-deduction-induction in
> >>> inquiryh. Thelin's extension of this--involving a model of
> >>> "hierarchical-processual-feedback"--appears
> >>> to
> >>> me to be an attempt at developing further what is implicit in this
> >>> regard in Peirce.
> >>>
> >>> Best,
> >>>
> >>> Gary
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> *Gary Richmond*
> >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> >>> *Communication Studies*
> >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Eugene Halton
> >>> <[email protected]>wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Dear Michael,
> >>>>
> >>>>             Sorry, but it is not in the least redundant to
> >>>> characterize Peirceâ EURO (tm)s philosophy as processual. It clarifies 
> >>>> what
> >>>> pervades his thinking.
> >>>> Calling Peirce a structuralist, on the other hand, does not, in my
> >>>> opinion.
> >>>>
> >>>> Gene
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> *From:* Michael Shapiro [mailto:[email protected]]
> >>>> *Sent:* Sunday, April 27, 2014 12:11 PM
> >>>> *To:* Eugene Halton; [email protected]
> >>>>
> >>>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Gene, list,
> >>>>
> >>>> Structuralism properly understood does not exclude process or
> >>>> growth, just the opposite, so calling Peirce's doctrine
> >>>> "processualism" is both redundant and terminologically inadvisable,
> >>>> given the latter's unusualness.
> >>>> Cf. my 1991 book's title
> >>>>
> >>>> *The Sense of Change: Language as History. *Michael
> >>>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: Eugene Halton
> >>>> Sent: Apr 27, 2014 12:02 PM
> >>>> To: "[email protected]"
> >>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Response to Michael Shapiroâ EURO (tm)s post that Peirce should be seen 
> >>>> as
> >>>> a structuralist. Shapiro: â EURO oeThe use by Peirce of the form
> >>>> "rationalized"
> >>>> (rather than "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the
> >>>> quotation above should be taken advisedly. This use of the
> >>>> participial form, with its adversion to process, should serve as a
> >>>> caveat that when Peirce talks about
> >>>> "*objective* idealism," what he ought to have said is
> >>>> "*objectified*idealism."
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Peirce: â EURO oeThe one intelligible theory of the universe is that of
> >>>> objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits
> >>>> becoming physical lawsâ EURO  Peirce, CP 6.25.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Note â EURO oebecoming.â EURO  And even those physical laws are still 
> >>>> subject
> >>>> to evolution. A habit is a process, semiosis is an inferential
> >>>> process, â EURO oerationalized varietyâ EURO  is a kind of habituated 
> >>>> variety
> >>>> yet still in process. I see no reason for calling Peirce a
> >>>> structuralist, since even a structure, in Peirce, is a
> >>>> habit-process, however slow or even seemingly invariant that
> >>>> inveterate habit may be: it remains potentially subject to growth.
> >>>> Why not simply acknowledge Peirceâ EURO (tm)s thoroughgoing 
> >>>> processualism?
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Gene Halton
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> *From:* Michael Shapiro
> >>>> [mailto:[email protected]<[email protected]>]
> >>>>
> >>>> *Sent:* Sunday, April 27, 2014 7:51 AM
> >>>> *To:* [email protected]
> >>>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Dear Fellow-Listers,
> >>>>
> >>>> I'd like to offer up the following as a take on ch. 7 and an
> >>>> anticipation of ch. 8, from the perspective of a non-philosopher
> >>>> interested in developing a Peircean theory of language for the
> >>>> twenty-first
> >>>> century:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>             Because he was a practicing scientist in the modern
> >>>> sense, Peirce is *the* one great philosopher who escapes my
> >>>> definition of a philosopher as someone who only solves problems of
> his own devising.
> >>>> This
> >>>> makes him also a proto-structuralist (a structuralist *avant la
> >>>> lettre*
> >>>> ).
> >>>>
> >>>>             The essential concept of structuralism, whether applied
> >>>> to physics or linguistics or anthropology, is that of invariance
> >>>> under transformation. This makes theory, following Peirce's whole
> >>>> philosophy and his pragmaticism in particular, the rationalized
> >>>> explication of
> >>>> variety: "[U]nderlying all other laws is the only tendency which
> >>>> can grow by its own virtue, the tendency of all things to take habits
> ....
> >>>> In
> >>>> so far as evolution follows a law, the law or habit, instead of
> >>>> being a movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity, is growth from
> >>>> difformity to uniformity. But the chance divergences from laws are
> >>>> perpetually acting to increase the variety of the world, and are
> >>>> checked by a sort of natural selection and otherwise ... , so that
> >>>> the general result may be described as 'organized heterogeneity,'
> >>>> or, better, rationalized variety'' (CP 6.101). Or, translating law
> >>>> and habit into the appropriate phenomenological category:
> >>>> "Thirdness ... is an essential ingredient of reality" (EP 2:345).
> >>>>
> >>>>                Once we properly understand structuralism not as the
> >>>> putatively debunked epistemology that originated in Geneva with
> >>>> Saussure, but rather as the revised, essentially correct version
> >>>> originating with Jakobson in Prague and Hjelmslev in Copenhagen, we
> >>>> can recognize the patterning of Thirdness and Secondness in
> >>>> languageâ EURO "â EURO "the so-called "passkey semiotic"â EURO "â EURO 
> >>>> "for what it is.
> >>>> Consequently, the fundamental notion of alternation between basic
> >>>> form and contextual variant becomes understandable as immanent in
> >>>> theory, and not merely a construct or an artifact of description.
> >>>> The importance of this notion cannot be overestimated.
> >>>>
> >>>>                A child learning its native language, for instance,
> >>>> is exactly in the same position as an analyst. It has to determine
> >>>> which linguistic form is basic, and which is a contextual variant.
> >>>> Take a simple example from English, that of the voiceless stops
> >>>>
> >>>>                English voiceless (actually, tense) stops are
> >>>> aspirated when they are word-initial or begin a stressed syllable,
> >>>> as in *pen*, *ten*, *Ken*. They are unaspirated when immediately
> >>>> following word-initial s, as in *spun*, *stun*, *skunk*. After an
> >>>> *s* elsewhere in a word they are normally unaspirated as well,
> >>>> except when the cluster is heteromorphemic and the stop belongs to
> >>>> an unbound morpheme; compare dis[t]end vs. dis[tʰ]aste. Word-final
> >>>> voiceless stops are optionally aspirate.
> >>>>
> >>>>                This variation makes aspiration non-distinctive
> >>>> (non-phonemic) in English, unlike, say, in Ancient Greek or Hindi,
> >>>> where aspirated stops change the meaning of words by comparison
> >>>> with items that have their unaspirated counterparts *ceteris
> >>>> paribus*.
> >>>>
> >>>>                I think it is only by taking such variation for what
> >>>> it is, i. e., the working out of Thirdness in the context of
> >>>> Secondness, that we can we understand what Peirce had in mind with
> >>>> his version of Pragmatism.
> >>>>
> >>>> Best regards,
> >>>>
> >>>> Michael
> >>>>
> >>>> P. S. The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather than
> >>>> "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above
> >>>> should be taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with
> >>>> its adversion to process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce
> >>>> talks about "
> >>>> *objective* idealism," what he ought to have said is
> >>>> "*objectified*idealism." This slight grammatical change puts the
> >>>> meaning of the phrase (and the doctrine!) in a whole newâ EURO "â EURO 
> >>>> "and
> >>>> completely acceptableâ EURO "â EURO "light.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> -----------------------------
> >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
> >>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
> >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe
> >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
> >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> -----------------------------
> >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
> >>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
> >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe
> >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
> >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> -----------------------------
> >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
> >> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
> >> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe
> >> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
> >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm.
>
>
>
>
>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to