Jeffrey, Ben, Michael, List, Jeff asks if the PM, the first rule of logic, and the principle of continuity are ordered within Peirce's methodeutic in some way and, if so, how they fit together. Good question.
My first thought is that these three may not even exhaust Peirce's speculative rhetoric (== methodeutic). So, the first matter to get clear on is, I believe, how exactly does Peirce conceive of *speculative rhetoric*(and I think that that very term juxtaposed with what is intended to be its equivalent, viz., *methodeutic*, needs to be at least a bit more fully analyzed)? As early as *The New List *Peirce gives this description of what will later come to be seen by him as the third branch of logic as semeiotic. [T]he third [branch] would treat of the formal conditions of the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be called formal rhetoric. Much later, in 1902, Peirce introduces a new term for this third branch, Transuasional logic, which he makes equivalent to Speculative Rhetoric, which he says is "substantially" the same as methodology (or, methodeutic). Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, is substantially what goes by the name of methodology, or better, of methodeutic. It is the doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine. So, over the many years separating those two descriptions, what remained the same was the reference of symbols and other signs to their interpretants, the rhetorical aspect, and this would appear to be the uniquely Peircean way of conceiving methodology. Still, it is clear from a number of other statements that a theory of inquiry (or, as Phyllis recently put it, a theory of learning) is meant to be the crowning jewel of logic, and that, perhaps is the methodeutical aspect of the third branch. But the two are one for Peirce. As for the ordering of the principles, as Ben has recently suggested, the first rule of logic--the desire to learn the truth--should most probably be placed first. Apparently he originally thought, at the head of or even preceding the first branch of logic as one of the presuppositions of it. As he wrote: BU: In the Carnegie application (1902), the presuppositions of logic [such as fallibilism] http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm precede even the definition and division of logic. But Ben seems to be moving in the direction of thinking that, while these presuppositions perhaps should be *learned *before one plunges into even the first branch of logic, that it yet has a "distinctly methodeutical flavor," in which case it should be probably be placed first in the ordering of the content of the third branch of logic, speculative rhetoric. In this understanding, one *discovers* these presuppositions in methodeutic and then *uses* them everywhere. Michael has argued for continuity as being essential to pragmatism and structuralism, and I agree, a least as to pragmatism. However, I do not think that his recent excellent exegesis of Peirce's understanding of continuity as offered in the 1898 Cambridge Conference Lectures demonstrates that (and I have one important bone to pick with his analysis which I'll leaver that to a future post). Perhaps Michael intends to make those connections of continuity to pragmatism and structuralism more explicit in a future message. Meanwhile, I would for now add only that Peirce makes of continuity in the logical sphere a social matter ("Logic is grounded in the social principle"). CP 5.402 When we come to study the great principle of continuity and see how all is fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same. Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that he is essentially a possible member of society. Especially, one man's experience is nothing, if it stands alone. If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination. It is not "my" experience, but "our" experience that has to be thought of; and this "us" has indefinite possibilities. Matters relating to continuity seen in this way--inquiry as a social matter--might find a place somewhere near the middle of methodeutic, but this is just a guess. It could be earlier on, say, in the presuppositions of logic. On the other hand, it may need its own separate treatment. For example, consider this remark from "What Pragmatism Is": [I hold a theory] that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought. Since this message is getting a little long, I will only say for now, and without argumentation, that I think the pragmatic maxim ought to be placed at the penultimate moment in speculative rhetoric, helping to prepare the way for a clarified, purified, and strictly scientific approach to metaphysical analysis following upon an adequate method of inquiry. So, since Peirce says in several places that the PM can be seen as a summary statement of experimental design, there is, in my opinion, a necessary place for the analysis of "a complete inquiry" in methodeutic, one involving the three relations of hypothesis generation, deductions following from a given hypothesis, and the inductive testing of the hypothesis based on the construction of an experiment based on what can be deduced from that hypothesis (note how different this is from the analysis of the three distinct inferences patterns in critical logic; there they are taken up individually, not yet considered in their relational roles in inquiry). So, while I'm not fully clear on this yet, it seems to me that the question of what goes into a complete inquiry ought to close the third branch of logic as semeiotic. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 1:12 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeffrey D., list, > > I've wanted to take Peirce literally about the FIRST rule of logic or > reasoning, but the CP editors seem to treat it as methodeutical (i.e., > belonging in logic's third department). In Volume 5 "Pragmatism and > Pragmaticism," Book 3 "Unpublished Papers", one finds > Chapter 6: Methods for Attaining Truth > §1. The First Rule of Logic [5.574-589 - this is not "F.R.L.', titled > "First Rule of Reasoning" by eds., 1.135-140] > §2. On Selecting Hypotheses > > The First Rule of Logic, in its "F.R.L." version ( > http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www. > princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm <http://web.archive.org/web/ > 20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ebatke/peirce/frl_99.htm>) > pertains to the presuppositions of logic, involving the embrace of > fallibilism and discoverability. In the Carnegie application (1902), the > presuppositions of logic http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/ > library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm precede even the definition and > division of logic. (See the Table of Contents > http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/toc.htm). > > But I have to admit that the First Rule has a distinctly methodeutical > flavor. Skimming around, I don't at the moment find a discussion along the > lines of "F.R.L." in the Carnegie application. > > Best, Ben > > > On 4/28/2014 11:45 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > > Gary R., List, >> >> The pragmatic maxim is part of Peirce's speculative rhetoric. How does >> this rule of reasoning relate to the other principles that are also part of >> the speculative rhetoric? For example, in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898, >> he articulates two additional principles. I assume that both are part of >> his methodeutic. One is the first rule of logic. The other is the >> principle of continuity. >> >> Are these three principles ordered in some fashion? I assume that, given >> its name, the first rule of logic has priority over the others. How do >> three rules fit together? >> >> Given the ordering and relations between the principles, how should the >> first rule of logic and the principle of continuity shape the proper use of >> the pragmatic maxim? >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeff Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> NAU >> (o) 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] >> Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 5:54 PM >> To: Stephen C. Rose >> Cc: [email protected] >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >> >> Stephen, Michael, Gene, List, >> >> It seems to me that in sum the argumentation so far has been that Michael >> maintains that Peirce should be seen as a structuralist, Gene has countered >> that Peirce is best seen as a thorough-going process philosopher, and >> Michael responded to this by saying that to refer to his philosophy as >> processual is redundant since a properly understood structuralism includes >> the ideas of process and growth, and I have suggested that structuralism is >> generally not understood as such (that is, as involving change and growth), >> and that many Peircean philosophers see Peirce as a process thinker, but >> not as a structuralist. >> >> Now you may be suggesting--but I'm not exactly sure what your intended >> meaning was, Stephen--that Michael may well be proven correct and that >> there is good reason to see Peirce as a structuralist when that theory is >> "properly understood" to include the notions of history, change, and growth. >> >> But currently--and although I'm not a big fan of post-structuralism and >> deconstruction, etc.--structuralism tends to connote to many certain ideas >> which are not processual. Thus, at the conclusion of a the overview of >> structuralism in the Wikipedia article one is give these tenets "common to >> the various forms of structuralism" as formulated by the feminist theorist, >> Alison Assiter: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism >> >> First, that a structure determines the position of each element of a >> whole. Second, that every system has a structure. Third, structural laws >> deal with co-existence rather than change. Fourth, structures are the "real >> things" that lie beneath the surface or the appearance of meaning. >> >> Now I would imagine that Michael would say that Assiter does not properly >> understand structuralism. Still, and again, structuralism does indeed >> connote these ideas to many. And especially for this discussion note that >> the third tenet is that "structural laws deal with co-existence rather than >> change." >> >> So, until structuralism is "properly understood" (and I have no doubt >> that Michael has things of considerable importance to say about this, >> especially in the realms of linguistics and semiotics), it's a heavy load >> at present to suggest that Peirce is more structuralist than processual >> (or, rather, that that the idea of structure properly understood includes >> process, as Michael is saying). >> >> I'll be eager to learn more about this proper understanding of >> structuralism, and in that sense I agree with you, Stephen, that we should >> reserved judgment. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Stephen C. Rose <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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