Jeffrey D., list,
I've wanted to take Peirce literally about the FIRST rule of logic or
reasoning, but the CP editors seem to treat it as methodeutical (i.e.,
belonging in logic's third department). In Volume 5 "Pragmatism and
Pragmaticism," Book 3 "Unpublished Papers", one finds
Chapter 6: Methods for Attaining Truth
§1. The First Rule of Logic [5.574-589 - this is not "F.R.L.', titled
"First Rule of Reasoning" by eds., 1.135-140]
§2. On Selecting Hypotheses
The First Rule of Logic, in its "F.R.L." version
(http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ebatke/peirce/frl_99.htm>)
pertains to the presuppositions of logic, involving the embrace of
fallibilism and discoverability. In the Carnegie application (1902), the
presuppositions of logic
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm precede
even the definition and division of logic. (See the Table of Contents
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/toc.htm).
But I have to admit that the First Rule has a distinctly methodeutical
flavor. Skimming around, I don't at the moment find a discussion along
the lines of "F.R.L." in the Carnegie application.
Best, Ben
On 4/28/2014 11:45 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Gary R., List,
The pragmatic maxim is part of Peirce's speculative rhetoric. How does this
rule of reasoning relate to the other principles that are also part of the
speculative rhetoric? For example, in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898, he
articulates two additional principles. I assume that both are part of his
methodeutic. One is the first rule of logic. The other is the principle of
continuity.
Are these three principles ordered in some fashion? I assume that, given its
name, the first rule of logic has priority over the others. How do three rules
fit together?
Given the ordering and relations between the principles, how should the first
rule of logic and the principle of continuity shape the proper use of the
pragmatic maxim?
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 5:54 PM
To: Stephen C. Rose
Cc: PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8
Stephen, Michael, Gene, List,
It seems to me that in sum the argumentation so far has been that Michael
maintains that Peirce should be seen as a structuralist, Gene has countered
that Peirce is best seen as a thorough-going process philosopher, and Michael
responded to this by saying that to refer to his philosophy as processual is
redundant since a properly understood structuralism includes the ideas of
process and growth, and I have suggested that structuralism is generally not
understood as such (that is, as involving change and growth), and that many
Peircean philosophers see Peirce as a process thinker, but not as a
structuralist.
Now you may be suggesting--but I'm not exactly sure what your intended meaning was,
Stephen--that Michael may well be proven correct and that there is good reason to see
Peirce as a structuralist when that theory is "properly understood" to include
the notions of history, change, and growth.
But currently--and although I'm not a big fan of post-structuralism and deconstruction,
etc.--structuralism tends to connote to many certain ideas which are not processual.
Thus, at the conclusion of a the overview of structuralism in the Wikipedia article one
is give these tenets "common to the various forms of structuralism" as
formulated by the feminist theorist, Alison Assiter:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism
First, that a structure determines the position of each element of a whole. Second, that
every system has a structure. Third, structural laws deal with co-existence rather than
change. Fourth, structures are the "real things" that lie beneath the surface
or the appearance of meaning.
Now I would imagine that Michael would say that Assiter does not properly understand
structuralism. Still, and again, structuralism does indeed connote these ideas to many.
And especially for this discussion note that the third tenet is that "structural
laws deal with co-existence rather than change."
So, until structuralism is "properly understood" (and I have no doubt that
Michael has things of considerable importance to say about this, especially in the realms
of linguistics and semiotics), it's a heavy load at present to suggest that Peirce is
more structuralist than processual (or, rather, that that the idea of structure properly
understood includes process, as Michael is saying).
I'll be eager to learn more about this proper understanding of structuralism,
and in that sense I agree with you, Stephen, that we should reserved judgment.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Stephen C. Rose
<stever...@gmail.com<mailto:stever...@gmail.com>> wrote:
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