Ben, Gary R., List, Where do the presuppositions of logic belong within Peirce's classification of the parts of his semiotic theory?
It is helpful, I think, to consider the trajectory of Peirce's argumentative strategies as they take shape over the course of his early essays. Starting with the arguments in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties," Peirce articulates a number of presuppositions that are needed for the development of a theory of the validity of logical inference. The presuppositions, I take it, are drawn from our common sense--including our conceptions of doubt, belief, reality, error and truth. We find these conceptions at work in our ordinary acts of reasoning, and they are articulated in our logica utens. As Peirce builds a theory of critical logic, which I take him to be doing in "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" and "Further Consequences," the goal is to classify the main forms of inference and provide arguments that show the leading principles of inference are objectively valid. As we reflect on the assumptions that are needed to for the sake of the arguments for the validity of the leading principles of inference, we draw on the nominal definitions of truth and falsity for the sake of clarifying our logical conceptions of the starting and ending points of experimental inquiry. In "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce turns from questions about the objective validity of the leading principles to the question of why I should be logical. In "How to Make our Ideas Clear" he articulates and defends the pragmatic maxim. In doing so, he is trying to show philosophers how to follow the cue of practicing scientists as we seek to arrive at a higher degree of clarity with respect to the conceptions that are part of our philosophical hypotheses. The conceptions of the starting and ending points of inquiry that are articulated in "Consequences" are not contingent psychological truths. Rather, they are corollaries of the meanings that have been assigned to the conception of valid logical implication by Peirce's critical logic. At this point, we are ready to move from the nominal definitions of truth, falsity and reality to more robust real definitions. The movement from the nominal to the real definitions is guided, I take it, by an awareness of the requirements that must be met for the sake of developing reasonable hypotheses. As such, the pragmatic maxim (as a rule that is already a part of our logica utens), is guiding the inquiry. The speculative rhetoric is, at least in part, a theory of what is needed to accomplish the goals that are set by the conception of the terminal point of inquiry. We could ask: where do the conceptions of doubt, belief, reality, error and truth belong? Are they part of the critical logic, or are they part of the speculative rhetoric. I tend to think that these common sense conceptions that are already at work in our logica utens are developed and refined within the context of both of these theories. I also think that the first rule of reason and the principle of continuity are very much part of our common sense, and that they have been growing in their significance over the course of the last few thousand years as human beings have refined their capacities for self-controlled inference and have developed more organized communities of scientific inquiry. Hence the importance of Socrates explaining in the Apology that the first rule of reason is, for him, the first of his commitments as an inquirer. This doesn't answer the question of how we might order these three principles of speculative rhetoric. It also doesn't answer the question of how we might arrive at a more complete statement of all of the principles that are really part of the theory. Having said that, I do agree with the suggestion that the first rule of logic is first because it is needed for the sake of articulating the questions that give impetus to inquiry. The principle of continuity guides us as we seek to develop the kinds of hypotheses that will not close the door on further inquiry. The pragmatic maxim establishes the requirement that any hypothesis be the kind of thing that could--practically speaking--be put to the test. That is an over-simplification of the matter, but I hope it does capture part of the gist of how they are related. --Jeff PS As I have mentioned before, I find Richard Smyth's reconstruction of these essays in <Reading Peirce Reading> to be remarkably helpful and insightful. Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2014 9:19 AM To: Benjamin Udell Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 Ben, Thanks for the clarification. One question: where in the Classification of the Sciences, then, would you put the presuppositions of logic? Or, is that the wrong question given that, for example, the 3 ways of fixing belief other than the method of science don't seem to belong in the the Classification, at least not among the Sciences of Discovery. Maybe, in the Sciences of Review (which for Peirce includes some of philosophy of science)? Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Gary R., Jeffrey D., Michael S., list, Very nicely put together, Gary. Just one thing, sorry I wasn't clear enough, I didn't mean that the presuppositions of logic may belong in methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative rhetoric), I meant just that the First Rule of Logic (or of Reason) may belong in methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative rhetoric). Now, when it comes to forming an argument, the difference is important between what is granted (the premisses) and what remains to be granted (the thesis). This raises a question of ordering. For example, Peirce said that logic is rooted in the social principle and, at another time, said that the social principle is rooted in logic. The first rootedness might be taken as being in the _ordo cognoscendi_, and the second as being in the _ordo essendi_. However, if the First Rule of Logic is first in the _ordo cognoscendi_ in logic, then that would suggest it to be last in the _ordo essendi_ in logic. I suppose that one could split the difference: see it as first in the _ordo essendi_ in methodeutic, and see methodeutic as the first in the _ordo cognoscendi_ in logic. This kind futzing around that I'm doing makes me want to throw my hands up and go back to the view that the First Rule is simply in the presuppositions of logic, and consists in fallibilism conjoined with cognizabilism about the real, stated with particularly normative and assertoric force, from within those isms so to speak (whereas on the other hand in "Fixation" the idea for example that there are reals is treated as a hypothesis), and sometimes in methodological terms. At any rate, that it requires the idea of inquiry doesn't automatically entail that it belongs in methodeutic, which is about inquiry, yes, but inquiry conceived in more detail, in its rivalry of methods (including the three unscientific methods in "Fixation") and in the cyclical but recursive interplay of modes of argument in scientific method. Best, Ben On 4/28/2014 9:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Jeffrey, Ben, Michael, List, Jeff asks if the PM, the first rule of logic, and the principle of continuity are ordered within Peirce's methodeutic in some way and, if so, how they fit together. Good question. My first thought is that these three may not even exhaust Peirce's speculative rhetoric (== methodeutic). So, the first matter to get clear on is, I believe, how exactly does Peirce conceive of speculative rhetoric (and I think that that very term juxtaposed with what is intended to be its equivalent, viz., methodeutic , needs to be at least a bit more fully analyzed)? As early as The New List Peirce gives this description of what will later come to be seen by him as the third branch of logic as semeiotic. [T]he third [branch] would treat of the formal conditions of the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be called formal rhetoric. Much later, in 1902, Peirce introduces a new term for this third branch, Transuasional logic, which he makes equivalent to Speculative Rhetoric, which he says is "substantially" the same as methodology (or, methodeutic). Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, is substantially what goes by the name of methodology, or better, of methodeutic. It is the doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine. So, over the many years separating those two descriptions, what remained the same was the reference of symbols and other signs to their interpretants, the rhetorical aspect, and this would appear to be the uniquely Peircean way of conceiving methodology. Still, it is clear from a number of other statements that a theory of inquiry (or, as Phyllis recently put it, a theory of learning) is meant to be the crowning jewel of logic, and that, perhaps is the methodeutical aspect of the third branch. But the two are one for Peirce. As for the ordering of the principles, as Ben has recently suggested, the first rule of logic--the desire to learn the truth--should most probably be placed first. Apparently he originally thought, at the head of or even preceding the first branch of logic as one of the presuppositions of it. As he wrote: BU: In the Carnegie application (1902), the presuppositions of logic [such as fallibilism] http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm precede even the definition and division of logic. But Ben seems to be moving in the direction of thinking that, while these presuppositions perhaps should be learned before one plunges into even the first branch of logic, that it yet has a "distinctly methodeutical flavor," in which case it should be probably be placed first in the ordering of the content of the third branch of logic, speculative rhetoric. In this understanding, one discovers these presuppositions in methodeutic and then uses them everywhere. Michael has argued for continuity as being essential to pragmatism and structuralism, and I agree, a least as to pragmatism. However, I do not think that his recent excellent exegesis of Peirce's understanding of continuity as offered in the 1898 Cambridge Conference Lectures demonstrates that (and I have one important bone to pick with his analysis which I'll leaver that to a future post). Perhaps Michael intends to make those connections of continuity to pragmatism and structuralism more explicit in a future message. Meanwhile, I would for now add only that Peirce makes of continuity in the logical sphere a social matter ("Logic is grounded in the social principle"). CP 5.402 When we come to study the great principle of continuity and see how all is fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same. Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that he is essentially a possible member of society. Especially, one man's experience is nothing, if it stands alone. If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination. It is not "my" experience, but "our" experience that has to be thought of; and this "us" has indefinite possibilities. Matters relating to continuity seen in this way--inquiry as a social matter--might find a place somewhere near the middle of methodeutic, but this is just a guess. It could be earlier on, say, in the presuppositions of logic. On the other hand, it may need its own separate treatment. For example, consider this remark from "What Pragmatism Is": [I hold a theory] that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought. Since this message is getting a little long, I will only say for now, and without argumentation, that I think the pragmatic maxim ought to be placed at the penultimate moment in speculative rhetoric, helping to prepare the way for a clarified, purified, and strictly scientific approach to metaphysical analysis following upon an adequate method of inquiry. So, since Peirce says in several places that the PM can be seen as a summary statement of experimental design, there is, in my opinion, a necessary place for the analysis of "a complete inquiry" in methodeutic, one involving the three relations of hypothesis generation, deductions following from a given hypothesis, and the inductive testing of the hypothesis based on the construction of an experiment based on what can be deduced from that hypothesis (note how different this is from the analysis of the three distinct inferences patterns in critical logic; there they are taken up individually, not yet considered in their relational roles in inquiry). So, while I'm not fully clear on this yet, it seems to me that the question of what goes into a complete inquiry ought to close the third branch of logic as semeiotic. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 1:12 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Jeffrey D., list, I've wanted to take Peirce literally about the FIRST rule of logic or reasoning, but the CP editors seem to treat it as methodeutical (i.e., belonging in logic's third department). In Volume 5 "Pragmatism and Pragmaticism," Book 3 "Unpublished Papers", one finds Chapter 6: Methods for Attaining Truth §1. The First Rule of Logic [5.574-589 - this is not "F.R.L.', titled "First Rule of Reasoning" by eds., 1.135-140] §2. On Selecting Hypotheses The First Rule of Logic, in its "F.R.L." version (http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm<http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ebatke/peirce/frl_99.htm> <http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ebatke/peirce/frl_99.htm >) pertains to the presuppositions of logic, involving the embrace of fallibilism and discoverability. In the Carnegie application (1902), the presuppositions of logic http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm precede even the definition and division of logic. (See the Table of Contents http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/toc.htm ). But I have to admit that the First Rule has a distinctly methodeutical flavor. Skimming around, I don't at the moment find a discussion along the lines of "F.R.L." in the Carnegie application. Best, Ben On 4/28/2014 11:45 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Gary R., List, The pragmatic maxim is part of Peirce's speculative rhetoric. How does this rule of reasoning relate to the other principles that are also part of the speculative rhetoric? For example, in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898, he articulates two additional principles. I assume that both are part of his methodeutic. One is the first rule of logic. The other is the principle of continuity. Are these three principles ordered in some fashion? I assume that, given its name, the first rule of logic has priority over the others. How do three rules fit together? Given the ordering and relations between the principles, how should the first rule of logic and the principle of continuity shape the proper use of the pragmatic maxim? --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ] Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 5:54 PM To: Stephen C. Rose Cc: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 Stephen, Michael, Gene, List, ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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