Ben, Thanks. I'm not quite as convinced as you appear to be about the placement of these items in a classification of the sciences (which the Carnegie application surely wasn't intended to be as such).
Also, if you can locate the passage where Peirce places the three non-scientific methods of fixing belief in methodeutic, that would be especially helpful. Meanwhile, I'll continue reflect on what you just wrote. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 1:02 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Gary R., list, > > I'd put the three non-scientific ways of fixing belief in methodeutic, > since methodeutic is not defined as being about scientific inquiry only (I > seem to remember also that somewhere Peirce talks about bringing > philosophical rhetoric's more-traditional subject matter eventually into > methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative rhetoric)). > > I'd leave the presuppositions of logic where Peirce seems to put them, > first in logic and before logic's three divisions. Either that, or expand > stechiology to include the material on presuppositions and call it > "analytic" as Peirce seemed to do in the 1911 letter (the June 22, 1911 > draft letter, quoth the Robin Catalog) to Kehler. Note the logic portion of > the table of contents (table of memoirs) in the Carnegie application of > 1902 (to which editor Joe Ransdell added some titles in brackets). > http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/toc.htm . > > *[Logic in the Broad Sense (Semeiotic)]* > 10. On the Presuppositions of Logic > 11. On the Logical Conception of Mind > 12. On the Definition of Logic > 13. On the Division of Logic > 14. On the Method of Discovering & Establishing the Truths of Logic > *[Stechiologic or Universal Grammar]* > 15. Of the Nature of Stechiologic > 16. A General Outline of Stechiologic > 17. On Terms > 18. On Propositions > 19. On Arguments > *[Critical Logic, Logic in the "Narrow" Sense]* > 20. Of Critical Logic in General > 21. Of First Premises > 22. The Logic of Chance > 23. On the Validity of Induction > 24. On the Justification of Abduction > 25. Of Mixed Arguments > 26. On Fallacies > *[Methodeutic or Universal Rhetoric]* > 27. Of Methodeutic > 28. On the Economics of Research > 29. On the Course of Research > 30. On Systems of Doctrine > 31. On Classification > 32. On Definition and the Clearness of Ideas > 33. On Objective Logic > > Best, Ben > > On 4/29/2014 12:19 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Ben, > > Thanks for the clarification. One question: where in the Classification of > the Sciences, then, would you put the presuppositions of logic? Or, is that > the wrong question given that, for example, the 3 ways of fixing belief > other than the method of science don't seem to belong in the the > Classification, at least not among the Sciences of Discovery. Maybe, in the > Sciences of Review (which for Peirce includes some of philosophy of > science)? > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Gary R., Jeffrey D., Michael S., list, > > Very nicely put together, Gary. Just one thing, sorry I wasn't clear > enough, I didn't mean that the presuppositions of logic may belong in > methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative rhetoric), I meant just that the First Rule > of Logic (or of Reason) may belong in methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative > rhetoric). > > Now, when it comes to forming an argument, the difference is important > between what is granted (the premisses) and what remains to be granted (the > thesis). This raises a question of ordering. For example, Peirce said that > logic is rooted in the social principle and, at another time, said that the > social principle is rooted in logic. The first rootedness might be taken as > being in the _*ordo cognoscendi* _, and the second as being in the _*ordo > essendi* _. However, if the First Rule of Logic is first in the _*ordo > cognoscendi* _ in logic, then that would suggest it to be last in the _*ordo > essendi* _ in logic. I suppose that one could split the difference: see > it as first in the _*ordo essendi* _ in methodeutic, and see methodeutic > as the first in the _*ordo cognoscendi* _ in logic. > > This kind futzing around that I'm doing makes me want to throw my hands up > and go back to the view that the First Rule is simply in the > presuppositions of logic, and consists in fallibilism conjoined with > cognizabilism about the real, stated with particularly normative and > assertoric force, from within those isms so to speak (whereas on the other > hand in "Fixation" the idea for example that there are reals is treated as > a hypothesis), and sometimes in methodological terms. At any rate, that it > requires the idea of inquiry doesn't automatically entail that it belongs > in methodeutic, which is about inquiry, yes, but inquiry conceived in more > detail, in its rivalry of methods (including the three unscientific methods > in "Fixation") and in the cyclical but recursive interplay of modes of > argument in scientific method. > > Best, Ben > On 4/28/2014 9:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Jeffrey, Ben, Michael, List, > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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