Gary, list,
I'd say that Peirce wrote the Carnegie application largely in the order
of his classifications of sciences, to the extent that he discusses his
work in them in the application.
The application's Memoir 1 is on the classification of theoretical
sciences - which is not in keeping with his usual classifications, which
put the topic of such classification itself in science of review - but I
think that it was, among other things, a way to prepare his audience for
the order into which he placed the succeeding memoirs.
Subsequently we find mathematics and (cenoscopic) philosophy, covered in
that order, his classificatory order, in the application's constituent
memoirs. (The Carnegie application does not ask for funding for work in
idioscopy or in science of review).
In the philosophical memoirs, we find phenomenology (phaneroscopy),
normative sciences, and metaphysics, in accordance with his
classificatory order.
In the memoirs on logic, we find memoirs on stechiology, critic, and
methodeutic, in accordance with his classificatory order.
In the section on the division of logic, he argues that icons, indices,
and symbols are to be studied together, but on the other hand that
names/terms, propositions, and arguments (which he therein defines as
broadly as his later 'rhemes, dicisigns, arguments') each deserve their
own department in stechiology; and indeed within the stechiological
group of memoirs he has memoirs on terms, on propositions, and on
arguments, in that order.
Within critic, we find deduction, induction, and abduction in his usual
critical-logic ordering of them (decreasing security, order/vector of
involution). Questions of how to conduct abductive inference carry over
from its memoir in critic into one or more memoirs afterward in
methodeutic - as per his usual later-years accounts of abduction's
study's classificatory placements. The classificatory ordering of
critic, then methodeutic, rather than the idea per se of theory of
abduction, governs the ordering of the memoirs involving theory of
abduction.
Sometimes in a memoir he anticipates what is to come in later memoirs,
but it's usually pretty clear when that's what he's doing. I've argued
in the past that the Carnegie application's ordering confirms that he
had not changed his mind about the place of probability theory (as
philosophically applied mathematics) as it appears in the Century
Dictionary definition of science which he had written/approved years
earlier. The discussion of principles of statistics appears in the
critical-logic section on induction.
As to the four inquiry methods: I've never found Peirce saying that the
discussion of the four inquiry methods and their competition or rivalry
belongs in methodeutic. Maybe the basic outline belongs in
presuppositions, insofar as the methods can be generated from general
considerations of the normal, but detailed study of seems to me to
belong in the study of methods of inquiry, perhaps some of it under the
sub-heading of "course of research." What I did say was that I seemed to
remember Peirce saying somewhere that at some point the more-traditional
subject matter of philosophical rhetoric could be incorporated into his
speculative rhetoric. Maybe I was thinking of this:
In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions
of logic have been well settled, there can be no serious objection
to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological
matter, observations of how we think, and the like. The regulation
has served its end; why should it be allowed now to hamper our
endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful? But while the
justice of this must be admitted, it is also to be borne in mind
that there is a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must take
place, which, however great or little is its importance, it is my
plain task and duty here to explore." ('Minute Logic', CP 2.105-109,
c. 1902) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/rhetoricspec.html
Best, Ben
On 4/29/2014 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben,
Thanks. I'm not quite as convinced as you appear to be about the
placement of these items in a classification of the sciences (which
the Carnegie application surely wasn't intended to be as such).
Also, if you can locate the passage where Peirce places the three
non-scientific methods of fixing belief in methodeutic, that would be
especially helpful. Meanwhile, I'll continue reflect on what you just
wrote.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 1:02 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., list,
I'd put the three non-scientific ways of fixing belief in
methodeutic, since methodeutic is not defined as being about
scientific inquiry only (I seem to remember also that somewhere
Peirce talks about bringing philosophical rhetoric's more-traditional
subject matter eventually into methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative
rhetoric)).
I'd leave the presuppositions of logic where Peirce seems to put
them, first in logic and before logic's three divisions. Either that,
or expand stechiology to include the material on presuppositions and
call it "analytic" as Peirce seemed to do in the 1911 letter (the
June 22, 1911 draft letter, quoth the Robin Catalog) to Kehler. Note
the logic portion of the table of contents (table of memoirs) in the
Carnegie application of 1902 (to which editor Joe Ransdell added some
titles in brackets).
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/toc.htm .
*[Logic in the Broad Sense (Semeiotic)]* **
10. On the Presuppositions of Logic
11. On the Logical Conception of Mind
12. On the Definition of Logic
13. On the Division of Logic
14. On the Method of Discovering & Establishing the Truths of Logic
*[Stechiologic or Universal Grammar]* **
15. Of the Nature of Stechiologic
16. A General Outline of Stechiologic
17. On Terms
18. On Propositions
19. On Arguments
*[Critical Logic, Logic in the "Narrow" Sense]*
20. Of Critical Logic in General
21. Of First Premises
22. The Logic of Chance
23. On the Validity of Induction
24. On the Justification of Abduction
25. Of Mixed Arguments
26. On Fallacies
*[Methodeutic or Universal Rhetoric]*
27. Of Methodeutic
28. On the Economics of Research
29. On the Course of Research
30. On Systems of Doctrine
31. On Classification
32. On Definition and the Clearness of Ideas**
33. On Objective Logic
Best, Ben
On 4/29/2014 12:19 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben,
Thanks for the clarification. One question: where in the
Classification of the Sciences, then, would you put the
presuppositions of logic? Or, is that the wrong question given that,
for example, the 3 ways of fixing belief other than the method of
science don't seem to belong in the the Classification, at least not
among the Sciences of Discovery. Maybe, in the Sciences of Review
(which for Peirce includes some of philosophy of science)?
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., Jeffrey D., Michael S., list,
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