Gary R., Jeffrey D., Michael S., list,
Very nicely put together, Gary. Just one thing, sorry I wasn't clear
enough, I didn't mean that the presuppositions of logic may belong in
methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative rhetoric), I meant just that the First
Rule of Logic (or of Reason) may belong in methodeutic (a.k.a.
speculative rhetoric).
Now, when it comes to forming an argument, the difference is important
between what is granted (the premisses) and what remains to be granted
(the thesis). This raises a question of ordering. For example, Peirce
said that logic is rooted in the social principle and, at another time,
said that the social principle is rooted in logic. The first rootedness
might be taken as being in the _/ordo cognoscendi/_, and the second as
being in the _/ordo essendi/_. However, if the First Rule of Logic is
first in the _/ordo cognoscendi/_ in logic, then that would suggest it
to be last in the _/ordo essendi/_ in logic. I suppose that one could
split the difference: see it as first in the _/ordo essendi/_ in
methodeutic, and see methodeutic as the first in the _/ordo
cognoscendi/_ in logic.
This kind futzing around that I'm doing makes me want to throw my hands
up and go back to the view that the First Rule is simply in the
presuppositions of logic, and consists in fallibilism conjoined with
cognizabilism about the real, stated with particularly normative and
assertoric force, from within those isms so to speak (whereas on the
other hand in "Fixation" the idea for example that there are reals is
treated as a hypothesis), and sometimes in methodological terms. At any
rate, that it requires the idea of inquiry doesn't automatically entail
that it belongs in methodeutic, which is about inquiry, yes, but inquiry
conceived in more detail, in its rivalry of methods (including the three
unscientific methods in "Fixation") and in the cyclical but recursive
interplay of modes of argument in scientific method.
Best, Ben
On 4/28/2014 9:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jeffrey, Ben, Michael, List,
Jeff asks if the PM, the first rule of logic, and the principle of
continuity are ordered within Peirce's methodeutic in some way and, if
so, how they fit together. Good question.
My first thought is that these three may not even exhaust Peirce's
speculative rhetoric (== methodeutic). So, the first matter to get
clear on is, I believe, how exactly does Peirce conceive of
/speculative rhetoric/ (and I think that that very term juxtaposed
with what is intended to be its equivalent, viz., /methodeutic/ ,
needs to be at least a bit more fully analyzed)?
As early as The New List Peirce gives this description of what will
later come to be seen by him as the third branch of logic as semeiotic.
[T]he third [branch] would treat of the formal conditions of the
force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is,
of their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be
called formal rhetoric.
Much later, in 1902, Peirce introduces a new term for this third
branch, Transuasional logic, which he makes equivalent to Speculative
Rhetoric, which he says is "substantially" the same as methodology
(or, methodeutic).
Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, is
substantially what goes by the name of methodology, or better, of
methodeutic. It is the doctrine of the general conditions of the
reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which
they aim to determine.
So, over the many years separating those two descriptions, what
remained the same was the reference of symbols and other signs to
their interpretants, the rhetorical aspect, and this would appear to
be the uniquely Peircean way of conceiving methodology.
Still, it is clear from a number of other statements that a theory of
inquiry (or, as Phyllis recently put it, a theory of learning) is
meant to be the crowning jewel of logic, and that, perhaps is the
methodeutical aspect of the third branch. But the two are one for Peirce.
As for the ordering of the principles, as Ben has recently suggested,
the first rule of logic--the desire to learn the truth--should most
probably be placed first. Apparently he originally thought, at the
head of or even preceding the first branch of logic as one of the
presuppositions of it. As he wrote:
BU: In the Carnegie application (1902), the presuppositions of
logic [such as fallibilism]
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm
precede even the definition and division of logic.
But Ben seems to be moving in the direction of thinking that, while
these presuppositions perhaps should be /learned/ before one plunges
into even the first branch of logic, that it yet has a "distinctly
methodeutical flavor," in which case it should be probably be placed
first in the ordering of the content of the third branch of logic,
speculative rhetoric. In this understanding, one /discovers/ these
presuppositions in methodeutic and then /uses/ them everywhere.
Michael has argued for continuity as being essential to pragmatism and
structuralism, and I agree, a least as to pragmatism. However, I do
not think that his recent excellent exegesis of Peirce's understanding
of continuity as offered in the 1898 Cambridge Conference Lectures
demonstrates that (and I have one important bone to pick with his
analysis which I'll leaver that to a future post). Perhaps Michael
intends to make those connections of continuity to pragmatism and
structuralism more explicit in a future message.
Meanwhile, I would for now add only that Peirce makes of continuity in
the logical sphere a social matter ("Logic is grounded in the social
principle").
CP 5.402 When we come to study the great principle of continuity
and see how all is fluid and every point directly partakes the
being of every other, it will appear that individualism and
falsity are one and the same. Meantime, we know that man is not
whole as long as he is single, that he is essentially a possible
member of society. Especially, one man's experience is nothing, if
it stands alone. If he sees what others cannot, we call it
hallucination. It is not "my" experience, but "our" experience
that has to be thought of; and this "us" has indefinite possibilities.
Matters relating to continuity seen in this way--inquiry as a social
matter--might find a place somewhere near the middle of methodeutic,
but this is just a guess. It could be earlier on, say, in the
presuppositions of logic. On the other hand, it may need its own
separate treatment. For example, consider this remark from "What
Pragmatism Is":
[I hold a theory] that continuity is an indispensable element of
reality, and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in
the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality, and more than
generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought.
Since this message is getting a little long, I will only say for now,
and without argumentation, that I think the pragmatic maxim ought to
be placed at the penultimate moment in speculative rhetoric, helping
to prepare the way for a clarified, purified, and strictly scientific
approach to metaphysical analysis following upon an adequate method of
inquiry.
So, since Peirce says in several places that the PM can be seen as a
summary statement of experimental design, there is, in my opinion, a
necessary place for the analysis of "a complete inquiry" in
methodeutic, one involving the three relations of hypothesis
generation, deductions following from a given hypothesis, and the
inductive testing of the hypothesis based on the construction of an
experiment based on what can be deduced from that hypothesis (note how
different this is from the analysis of the three distinct inferences
patterns in critical logic; there they are taken up individually, not
yet considered in their relational roles in inquiry). So, while I'm
not fully clear on this yet, it seems to me that the question of what
goes into a complete inquiry ought to close the third branch of logic
as semeiotic.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 1:12 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jeffrey D., list,
I've wanted to take Peirce literally about the FIRST rule of logic or
reasoning, but the CP editors seem to treat it as methodeutical
(i.e., belonging in logic's third department). In Volume 5
"Pragmatism and Pragmaticism," Book 3 "Unpublished Papers", one finds
Chapter 6: Methods for Attaining Truth
§1. The First Rule of Logic [5.574-589 - this is not "F.R.L.',
titled "First Rule of Reasoning" by eds., 1.135-140]
§2. On Selecting Hypotheses
The First Rule of Logic, in its "F.R.L." version
(http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ebatke/peirce/frl_99.htm>
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/%7Ebatke/peirce/frl_99.htm
>) pertains to the presuppositions of logic, involving the embrace of
fallibilism and discoverability. In the Carnegie application (1902),
the presuppositions of logic
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm
precede even the definition and division of logic. (See the Table of
Contents http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/toc.htm ).
But I have to admit that the First Rule has a distinctly
methodeutical flavor. Skimming around, I don't at the moment find a
discussion along the lines of "F.R.L." in the Carnegie application.
Best, Ben
On 4/28/2014 11:45 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Gary R., List,
The pragmatic maxim is part of Peirce's speculative rhetoric. How
does this rule of reasoning relate to the other principles that are
also part of the speculative rhetoric? For example, in the
Cambridge Lectures of 1898, he articulates two additional
principles. I assume that both are part of his methodeutic. One is
the first rule of logic. The other is the principle of continuity.
Are these three principles ordered in some fashion? I assume that,
given its name, the first rule of logic has priority over the
others. How do three rules fit together?
Given the ordering and relations between the principles, how should
the first rule of logic and the principle of continuity shape the
proper use of the pragmatic maxim?
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> ]
Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 5:54 PM
To: Stephen C. Rose
Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8
Stephen, Michael, Gene, List,
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