Gary R., list,
I'd put the three non-scientific ways of fixing belief in methodeutic,
since methodeutic is not defined as being about scientific inquiry only
(I seem to remember also that somewhere Peirce talks about bringing
philosophical rhetoric's more-traditional subject matter eventually into
methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative rhetoric)).
I'd leave the presuppositions of logic where Peirce seems to put them,
first in logic and before logic's three divisions. Either that, or
expand stechiology to include the material on presuppositions and call
it "analytic" as Peirce seemed to do in the 1911 letter (the June 22,
1911 draft letter, quoth the Robin Catalog) to Kehler. Note the logic
portion of the table of contents (table of memoirs) in the Carnegie
application of 1902 (to which editor Joe Ransdell added some titles in
brackets). http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/toc.htm .
*[Logic in the Broad Sense (Semeiotic)]***
10. On the Presuppositions of Logic
11. On the Logical Conception of Mind
12. On the Definition of Logic
13. On the Division of Logic
14. On the Method of Discovering & Establishing the Truths of Logic
*[Stechiologic or Universal Grammar]***
15. Of the Nature of Stechiologic
16. A General Outline of Stechiologic
17. On Terms
18. On Propositions
19. On Arguments
*[Critical Logic, Logic in the "Narrow" Sense]*
20. Of Critical Logic in General
21. Of First Premises
22. The Logic of Chance
23. On the Validity of Induction
24. On the Justification of Abduction
25. Of Mixed Arguments
26. On Fallacies
*[Methodeutic or Universal Rhetoric]*
27. Of Methodeutic
28. On the Economics of Research
29. On the Course of Research
30. On Systems of Doctrine
31. On Classification
32. On Definition and the Clearness of Ideas****
33. On Objective Logic
Best, Ben
On 4/29/2014 12:19 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben,
Thanks for the clarification. One question: where in the
Classification of the Sciences, then, would you put the
presuppositions of logic? Or, is that the wrong question given that,
for example, the 3 ways of fixing belief other than the method of
science don't seem to belong in the the Classification, at least not
among the Sciences of Discovery. Maybe, in the Sciences of Review
(which for Peirce includes some of philosophy of science)?
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., Jeffrey D., Michael S., list,
Very nicely put together, Gary. Just one thing, sorry I wasn't clear
enough, I didn't mean that the presuppositions of logic may belong in
methodeutic (a.k.a. speculative rhetoric), I meant just that the
First Rule of Logic (or of Reason) may belong in methodeutic (a.k.a.
speculative rhetoric).
Now, when it comes to forming an argument, the difference is
important between what is granted (the premisses) and what remains to
be granted (the thesis). This raises a question of ordering. For
example, Peirce said that logic is rooted in the social principle
and, at another time, said that the social principle is rooted in
logic. The first rootedness might be taken as being in the _/ordo
cognoscendi/ _, and the second as being in the _/ordo essendi/ _.
However, if the First Rule of Logic is first in the _/ordo
cognoscendi/ _ in logic, then that would suggest it to be last in the
_/ordo essendi/ _ in logic. I suppose that one could split the
difference: see it as first in the _/ordo essendi/ _ in methodeutic,
and see methodeutic as the first in the _/ordo cognoscendi/ _ in logic.
This kind futzing around that I'm doing makes me want to throw my
hands up and go back to the view that the First Rule is simply in the
presuppositions of logic, and consists in fallibilism conjoined with
cognizabilism about the real, stated with particularly normative and
assertoric force, from within those isms so to speak (whereas on the
other hand in "Fixation" the idea for example that there are reals is
treated as a hypothesis), and sometimes in methodological terms. At
any rate, that it requires the idea of inquiry doesn't automatically
entail that it belongs in methodeutic, which is about inquiry, yes,
but inquiry conceived in more detail, in its rivalry of methods
(including the three unscientific methods in "Fixation") and in the
cyclical but recursive interplay of modes of argument in scientific
method.
Best, Ben
On 4/28/2014 9:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jeffrey, Ben, Michael, List,
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