Gary. R., List, How about if we ask a different kind of question. Given the descriptions of the other methods for fixing belief, is there any real difference between theory and practice? That is, if we consider the arguments Peirce makes in the first lecture collected in RLT, is it possible to characterize pure theoretical inquiry in terms of any of those other methods? Or, is all inquiry that is guided by those methods practically oriented in the sense that the ends governing the inquiry have a finite time horizon?
On the basis of Peirce's account of induction, the validity of particular acts of inductive inference requires of us we identify our interests with the larger community of inquiry because only the community is capable of continuing the tests needed to eliminate possible sources of error. Only on the basis of such an identification will have have reason to think that our answers will tend to converge on the truth. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2014 10:40 AM To: Benjamin Udell Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science Ben, Frank, Gary F., List, I can't say that I see the 4 methods of fixing belief closely linked to the 3 patterns of inference nor the 3 categories. Best, Gary R. Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 1:18 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Frank, Gary F., Gary R., list, When I said that the method of opinion came to seem to me to consist in authority trying to operate in a situation of the method of development of opinion (the _a priori_), I meant that it came to seem to be a composite method, a view that you suggest at one point in your post. At some point I was thinking of associating inference modes with the method, only I did it a little differently. But unlike with other things that I say below, I kept quiet at the time, because I had already discussed the three unscientific methods of inquiry at length. You associated abductive inference with tenacity; inductive inference with authority; and deductive inference with the _a priori_. I 'switched' the partners of the first two. *Inductive inference and the method of tenacity.* I saw the method of tenacity as involving a kind of misapplication of the method of learning (not necessarily cognitive inquiry) by practice and repetition, which is first of all a method of learning how to do things skillfully (practice makes perfect). One keeps repeating one's opinion, as if to do so were a gradual induction in support of it. But it's a willful induction indeed. The opinion itself may be generated by any means, as long as it is one's first opinion on the given subject, since to the extent that the opinion is not initial, the method is not a method of persistence, repetition, willful inertia. *Abductive inference and the method of authority/contest.* I had seen method of authority as a species or phase of a method of struggle or contest or vying, a phase such that one side becomes dominant. The method of contest involves a kind of misapplication of the learning method of trial and error (and variation), which is first of all a method of learning how to struggle and develop character. In this mis-application, one tries to impose one's opinion, as if to do so were an abductive inference producing it ("I'm right because I'm gonna win!") - an abductive inference is, after all, itself a kind of experimental trial, testing a presupposition of one's capacity to guess; in the method of contest, the test really is of one's capacity to win, but the winner's opinion wins too on the view that _might makes right_. In the authoritarian phase, most have joined, or acquiesced to, the winning side. But the winner's might, even when not kinetically active, remains in place, holding others down. The 'might' may be any kind of what the anthropologists have called 'mana' - political and martial strength, wealth (funding etc.), glory and charisma, and status. The opinion itself may have originally been reached by whatever means. *Deductive inference and the method of _a priori_.* Before this thread, I thought of the method of _a priori_ as the method of contest/authority of glamour, charisma, etc., but now I think that at most they intersect. In the method of a priori, an opinion is adopted, not because it is the most popular or glamorous or hip opinion, but because it is indeed to one's taste. It is a kind of mis-application of the learning method of appreciation and emulation, better known as 'identification and imitation', which is first of all a method of learning to value and developing sensibiity. The opinion represents some values that one likes or admires, or is the opinion of some figure whose values one likes or admires, and adopts. It's not necessarily one's first opinion, instead it is, if anything, one's latest opinion (not necessrily one's last and final opinion), one's personal fad; this is the most hedonistic method, in which opinion is not a weapon or a means, but a culminal pleasure itself, in virtue of its content. That is, the method focuses on _telos_ as culmination and ignores entelechy. Still, the shift of the apriori-arrived opinion may be slow in time; and while it is personal, it is also social, insofar as it involves freely chosen self-herding and emulation not only of idealized models but of actual people. Peirce does discuss it in terms of the development of intellectual fashion and taste of the public, not just of the individual; and there may be fashion leaders and fashion followers. One selects the opinion from among the various opinions on offer at the buffet of the currents of thought. From its pleasantness and agreeability, one infers as if by deduction its truth; or more precisely one likes and expresses it as if the liking and expressing were a deduction, a necessary inference, compelled not by authority or tenacity but by the current of one's thought. It fits with one's other likings and is 'agreeable to reason.' Well, I gave it a try. Best, Ben On 5/7/2014 1:01 AM, Frank Ransom wrote: Gary F., Gary R., Ben, List, Gary F, I'm basically leaning on Liszka's scholarship. In his book, he identifies the method of public opinion as a fifth method, positioned between the method of authority and the method of the a priori (which positioning Ben suggests as well). Having seen what you and Ben reference, I suppose Liszka might have been mistaken. Then again, I find myself agreeing with Ben that there seems to be something distinct about the method of public opinion. As Ben also supposes, the method of consensus might be a species of the method of the a priori. If the method of public opinion is really about consensus, as it seems to me to be, then perhaps Peirce replaced the method of public opinion or consensus with the method of the a priori because the method of the a priori incorporates public opinion or consensus while also covering other cases pertinent to the fermentation of ideas. Personally, I suppose I would consider the method of public opinion, or consensus, distinct from the method of the a priori, due mostly to the fact that I have always considered the method of the a priori to be characteristically a method pursued by a single mind like Plato, Descartes, or Kant, sifting through ideas and ending with what they are inclined to think must be the best answer to a given question or problem; while the method of public opinion strikes me as more a matter of coherence, not so much between ideas, but between the beliefs of the members of a community. Thinking on it like this, I'm inclined to view the method of public opinion as after, not before, the method of the a priori, since the method of science will, in facing reality, inevitably lead to a consensus in the community--the key difference between the method of public opinion and the method of science consisting in the difference between what the community is led to believe today versus what the community is destined to believe. But perhaps this makes the method of public opinion unduly overlap with the method of authority. I have to admit that placing the method of public opinion between the method of authority and the method of the a priori appears more reasonable in light of this, since it shares in both the community-orientation of the method of authority and the free play of ideas in the method of the a priori. I think Peirce is himself not altogether clear about how to properly characterize the method of public opinion, whether it is a sort of softer approach to the method of authority, or whether it is a kind of community approach to the comparing of ideas found in the method of the a priori. Then again, I have wondered about what makes the three non-scientific methods what they are, and I have something of an idea about them that I offer for consideration. If considered from the standpoint of inference and taking a hint from the division of the kinds of inference (which partially makes sense, since methodeutic follows upon the work of critical logic), the method of tenacity might be a strict adherence to one's abductions, the method of authority might rely on enforced inductions (that is, involving some rather brutal facts, pardon the wordplay), and the method of the a priori might rely mostly on deduction, a comparing of ideas with one another and their consistency or inconsistency with one another. This last would certainly engender the coherence theory of truth, as Gary F suggests the method of the a priori, considered as the method of consensus, would. As for the method of public opinion, and its gradual metamorphosis into the method of the a priori, I wonder whether it might originally have involved some combination of two of the kinds of inference without the third, but over time Peirce (probably not consciously) came to want to make each of the three non-scientific methods as distinct from one another as possible, leading to each one signifying a method primarily committed to one kind of inference over the other two; whereas the method of science will involve all three kinds working together. If my hypothesis has some truth to it, then it should be possible to consider three methods, distinct from the four identified in "The Fixation of Belief," that involve combinations of two kinds of inference while minimizing the third. But this would probably get a bit messy, as one would likely be inclined to see similarities between examples of these hybrid methods with the other, simpler methods and look to categorizing any given example of the hybrid methods as more or less falling into one of the simpler methods (tenacity, authority, a priori), or perhaps as a part of a larger example of the method of science. Whether this idea regarding the methods can be reconciled with Peirce's discussion of just what makes the method of science what it is--direct engagement with, and testing of, reality--I don't know. I suppose it can be objected that the fact that the method of science deals with reality and the idea that the method of science needs all three kinds of inference do not have a clear connection with another. Also, it can be argued that the other three methods really do use all three kinds of inference, or perhaps at least two (as one might imagine that the a priori method involves not only deduction but also abduction). Well, I admit that both objections are reasonable. But the latter objection is a little weak, as it involves a point about how to properly classify the methods, and I find that the proper classification is the one that would lead to more fruitful results, which I would maintain is associated more with my proposed approach (though admittedly further inquiry is needed to prove it so). As to the former objection, I have no way to meet it as of yet, but can only say that because no connection is immediately apparent is no real argument against there being such connection. So, I guess I'm just saying that there's room for further reflection on the suggestion of associating the most basic division of kinds of method with the reliance of a given kind of method upon one or more of the modes or kinds of inference. --Franklin ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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