Gary F., Gary R., Ben, List, Gary F, I'm basically leaning on Liszka's scholarship. In his book, he identifies the method of public opinion as a fifth method, positioned between the method of authority and the method of the a priori (which positioning Ben suggests as well). Having seen what you and Ben reference, I suppose Liszka might have been mistaken. Then again, I find myself agreeing with Ben that there seems to be something distinct about the method of public opinion. As Ben also supposes, the method of consensus might be a species of the method of the a priori. If the method of public opinion is really about consensus, as it seems to me to be, then perhaps Peirce replaced the method of public opinion or consensus with the method of the a priori because the method of the a priori incorporates public opinion or consensus while also covering other cases pertinent to the fermentation of ideas.
Personally, I suppose I would consider the method of public opinion, or consensus, distinct from the method of the a priori, due mostly to the fact that I have always considered the method of the a priori to be characteristically a method pursued by a single mind like Plato, Descartes, or Kant, sifting through ideas and ending with what they are inclined to think must be the best answer to a given question or problem; while the method of public opinion strikes me as more a matter of coherence, not so much between ideas, but between the beliefs of the members of a community. Thinking on it like this, I'm inclined to view the method of public opinion as after, not before, the method of the a priori, since the method of science will, in facing reality, inevitably lead to a consensus in the community--the key difference between the method of public opinion and the method of science consisting in the difference between what the community is led to believe today versus what the community is destined to believe. But perhaps this makes the method of public opinion unduly overlap with the method of authority. I have to admit that placing the method of public opinion between the method of authority and the method of the a priori appears more reasonable in light of this, since it shares in both the community-orientation of the method of authority and the free play of ideas in the method of the a priori. I think Peirce is himself not altogether clear about how to properly characterize the method of public opinion, whether it is a sort of softer approach to the method of authority, or whether it is a kind of community approach to the comparing of ideas found in the method of the a priori. Then again, I have wondered about what makes the three non-scientific methods what they are, and I have something of an idea about them that I offer for consideration. If considered from the standpoint of inference and taking a hint from the division of the kinds of inference (which partially makes sense, since methodeutic follows upon the work of critical logic), the method of tenacity might be a strict adherence to one's abductions, the method of authority might rely on enforced inductions (that is, involving some rather brutal facts, pardon the wordplay), and the method of the a priori might rely mostly on deduction, a comparing of ideas with one another and their consistency or inconsistency with one another. This last would certainly engender the coherence theory of truth, as Gary F suggests the method of the a priori, considered as the method of consensus, would. As for the method of public opinion, and its gradual metamorphosis into the method of the a priori, I wonder whether it might originally have involved some combination of two of the kinds of inference without the third, but over time Peirce (probably not consciously) came to want to make each of the three non-scientific methods as distinct from one another as possible, leading to each one signifying a method primarily committed to one kind of inference over the other two; whereas the method of science will involve all three kinds working together. If my hypothesis has some truth to it, then it should be possible to consider three methods, distinct from the four identified in "The Fixation of Belief," that involve combinations of two kinds of inference while minimizing the third. But this would probably get a bit messy, as one would likely be inclined to see similarities between examples of these hybrid methods with the other, simpler methods and look to categorizing any given example of the hybrid methods as more or less falling into one of the simpler methods (tenacity, authority, a priori), or perhaps as a part of a larger example of the method of science. Whether this idea regarding the methods can be reconciled with Peirce's discussion of just what makes the method of science what it is--direct engagement with, and testing of, reality--I don't know. I suppose it can be objected that the fact that the method of science deals with reality and the idea that the method of science needs all three kinds of inference do not have a clear connection with another. Also, it can be argued that the other three methods really do use all three kinds of inference, or perhaps at least two (as one might imagine that the a priori method involves not only deduction but also abduction). Well, I admit that both objections are reasonable. But the latter objection is a little weak, as it involves a point about how to properly classify the methods, and I find that the proper classification is the one that would lead to more fruitful results, which I would maintain is associated more with my proposed approach (though admittedly further inquiry is needed to prove it so). As to the former objection, I have no way to meet it as of yet, but can only say that because no connection is immediately apparent is no real argument against there being such connection. So, I guess I'm just saying that there's room for further reflection on the suggestion of associating the most basic division of kinds of method with the reliance of a given kind of method upon one or more of the modes or kinds of inference. --Franklin On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 4:33 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Franklin, > > > > Why do you see a fifth method here? I don’t see any significant difference > between the method of “public opinion” and the “a priori” or “consensus” > method (as I proposed to call it). And in his preface to the draft that you > (or Liszka) refer to, CP 7.313 ff., he refers to “four methods.” > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* Frank Ransom [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 4-May-14 3:42 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* Frank Ransom > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of > Science > > > > List, > > > > Reading through the posts, I've noticed that no one has mentioned the > fifth method Peirce identified. Quoting from Liszka's *A General > Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce*: > > > > "In this last case, authority must give way to the method of public > opinion. In this method, the fixing of belief is established not by > imposing a set of beliefs on members of a community but by getting them to > enthusiastically adopt a set of beliefs of their own accord. Under this > method it is still possible to control the community's beliefs, but it must > be done in a way that appeals to the population other than through force or > intimidation, that is, out of self-interest or commonly held sentiments, > fears, or hatreds (cf. CP 7.325). But this turns out to be a rather > unstable basis of establishing belief, precisely because the appeal is to > sentiments, appearances, and opinions that are not firmly established. This > method has a tendency to create sweeping and rapid changes but ones that do > not persist as circumstances or public mood changes (cf. CP 7.318). > > > > Since some list members have been making much of the four methods and how > to properly justify the distinction of the four from each other, I felt it > would be well to mention this other method. In general, it is probably best > to think of method in the more general sense in which Peirce uses that > term, as having to do with a procedure for knowing a thing, and that the > notion of method used in "Fixation of Belief" and identification of four > such methods is aimed at the specific purpose of identifying in general, > not methods, but the kinds of methods by which belief might become fixed. > Peirce's list of five kinds of method strikes me as somewhat arbitrary and > more a matter of Peirce's observations than a thorough-going systematic > approach. I do believe that a systematic approach should be possible for > distinguishing the kinds, that there are likley more kinds, and the > categories might prove helpful in such an approach. It's just not clear at > all to me yet how it should be accomplished, and I am reticent to turn to > Kant for suggestions. > > > > -- Franklin > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
