Ben, Frank, Gary F., List, I can't say that I see the 4 methods of fixing belief closely linked to the 3 patterns of inference nor the 3 categories.
Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 1:18 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Frank, Gary F., Gary R., list, > > When I said that the method of opinion came to seem to me to consist in > authority trying to operate in a situation of the method of development of > opinion (the _*a priori*_), I meant that it came to seem to be a > composite method, a view that you suggest at one point in your post. > > At some point I was thinking of associating inference modes with the > method, only I did it a little differently. But unlike with other things > that I say below, I kept quiet at the time, because I had already discussed > the three unscientific methods of inquiry at length. > > You associated abductive inference with tenacity; inductive inference with > authority; and deductive inference with the _*a priori*_. I 'switched' > the partners of the first two. > > **Inductive inference and the method of tenacity.** I saw the method of > tenacity as involving a kind of misapplication of the method of learning > (not necessarily cognitive inquiry) by practice and repetition, which is > first of all a method of learning how to do things skillfully (practice > makes perfect). One keeps repeating one's opinion, as if to do so were a > gradual induction in support of it. But it's a willful induction indeed. > The opinion itself may be generated by any means, as long as it is one's > first opinion on the given subject, since to the extent that the opinion is > not initial, the method is not a method of persistence, repetition, willful > inertia. > > **Abductive inference and the method of authority/contest.** I had seen > method of authority as a species or phase of a method of struggle or > contest or vying, a phase such that one side becomes dominant. The method > of contest involves a kind of misapplication of the learning method of > trial and error (and variation), which is first of all a method of learning > how to struggle and develop character. In this mis-application, one tries > to impose one's opinion, as if to do so were an abductive inference > producing it ("I'm right because I'm gonna win!") - an abductive inference > is, after all, itself a kind of experimental trial, testing a > presupposition of one's capacity to guess; in the method of contest, the > test really is of one's capacity to win, but the winner's opinion wins too > on the view that _*might makes right*_. In the authoritarian phase, most > have joined, or acquiesced to, the winning side. But the winner's might, > even when not kinetically active, remains in place, holding others down. > The 'might' may be any kind of what the anthropologists have called 'mana' > - political and martial strength, wealth (funding etc.), glory and > charisma, and status. The opinion itself may have originally been reached > by whatever means. > > **Deductive inference and the method of _**a priori**_.** Before this > thread, I thought of the method of _*a priori*_ as the method of > contest/authority of glamour, charisma, etc., but now I think that at most > they intersect. In the method of a priori, an opinion is adopted, not > because it is the most popular or glamorous or hip opinion, but because it > is indeed to one's taste. It is a kind of mis-application of the learning > method of appreciation and emulation, better known as 'identification and > imitation', which is first of all a method of learning to value and > developing sensibiity. The opinion represents some values that one likes or > admires, or is the opinion of some figure whose values one likes or > admires, and adopts. It's not necessarily one's first opinion, instead it > is, if anything, one's latest opinion (not necessrily one's last and final > opinion), one's personal fad; this is the most hedonistic method, in which > opinion is not a weapon or a means, but a culminal pleasure itself, in > virtue of its content. That is, the method focuses on _*telos*_ as > culmination and ignores entelechy. Still, the shift of the apriori-arrived > opinion may be slow in time; and while it is personal, it is also social, > insofar as it involves freely chosen self-herding and emulation not only of > idealized models but of actual people. Peirce does discuss it in terms of > the development of intellectual fashion and taste of the public, not just > of the individual; and there may be fashion leaders and fashion followers. > One selects the opinion from among the various opinions on offer at the > buffet of the currents of thought. From its pleasantness and agreeability, > one infers as if by deduction its truth; or more precisely one likes and > expresses it as if the liking and expressing were a deduction, a necessary > inference, compelled not by authority or tenacity but by the current of > one's thought. It fits with one's other likings and is 'agreeable to > reason.' > > Well, I gave it a try. > > Best, Ben > On 5/7/2014 1:01 AM, Frank Ransom wrote: > > Gary F., Gary R., Ben, List, > > Gary F, I'm basically leaning on Liszka's scholarship. In his book, he > identifies the method of public opinion as a fifth method, positioned > between the method of authority and the method of the a priori (which > positioning Ben suggests as well). Having seen what you and Ben reference, > I suppose Liszka might have been mistaken. Then again, I find myself > agreeing with Ben that there seems to be something distinct about the > method of public opinion. As Ben also supposes, the method of consensus > might be a species of the method of the a priori. If the method of public > opinion is really about consensus, as it seems to me to be, then perhaps > Peirce replaced the method of public opinion or consensus with the method > of the a priori because the method of the a priori incorporates public > opinion or consensus while also covering other cases pertinent to the > fermentation of ideas. > > Personally, I suppose I would consider the method of public opinion, or > consensus, distinct from the method of the a priori, due mostly to the fact > that I have always considered the method of the a priori to be > characteristically a method pursued by a single mind like Plato, Descartes, > or Kant, sifting through ideas and ending with what they are inclined to > think must be the best answer to a given question or problem; while the > method of public opinion strikes me as more a matter of coherence, not so > much between ideas, but between the beliefs of the members of a community. > Thinking on it like this, I'm inclined to view the method of public opinion > as after, not before, the method of the a priori, since the method of > science will, in facing reality, inevitably lead to a consensus in the > community--the key difference between the method of public opinion and the > method of science consisting in the difference between what the community > is led to believe today versus what the community is destined to believe. > > But perhaps this makes the method of public opinion unduly overlap with > the method of authority. I have to admit that placing the method of public > opinion between the method of authority and the method of the a priori > appears more reasonable in light of this, since it shares in both the > community-orientation of the method of authority and the free play of ideas > in the method of the a priori. I think Peirce is himself not altogether > clear about how to properly characterize the method of public opinion, > whether it is a sort of softer approach to the method of authority, or > whether it is a kind of community approach to the comparing of ideas found > in the method of the a priori. > > Then again, I have wondered about what makes the three non-scientific > methods what they are, and I have something of an idea about them that I > offer for consideration. If considered from the standpoint of inference and > taking a hint from the division of the kinds of inference (which partially > makes sense, since methodeutic follows upon the work of critical logic), > the method of tenacity might be a strict adherence to one's abductions, the > method of authority might rely on enforced inductions (that is, involving > some rather brutal facts, pardon the wordplay), and the method of the a > priori might rely mostly on deduction, a comparing of ideas with one > another and their consistency or inconsistency with one another. This last > would certainly engender the coherence theory of truth, as Gary F suggests > the method of the a priori, considered as the method of consensus, would. > As for the method of public opinion, and its gradual metamorphosis into the > method of the a priori, I wonder whether it might originally have involved > some combination of two of the kinds of inference without the third, but > over time Peirce (probably not consciously) came to want to make each of > the three non-scientific methods as distinct from one another as possible, > leading to each one signifying a method primarily committed to one kind of > inference over the other two; whereas the method of science will involve > all three kinds working together. If my hypothesis has some truth to it, > then it should be possible to consider three methods, distinct from the > four identified in "The Fixation of Belief," that involve combinations of > two kinds of inference while minimizing the third. But this would probably > get a bit messy, as one would likely be inclined to see similarities > between examples of these hybrid methods with the other, simpler methods > and look to categorizing any given example of the hybrid methods as more or > less falling into one of the simpler methods (tenacity, authority, a > priori), or perhaps as a part of a larger example of the method of science. > > Whether this idea regarding the methods can be reconciled with Peirce's > discussion of just what makes the method of science what it is--direct > engagement with, and testing of, reality--I don't know. I suppose it can be > objected that the fact that the method of science deals with reality and > the idea that the method of science needs all three kinds of inference do > not have a clear connection with another. Also, it can be argued that the > other three methods really do use all three kinds of inference, or perhaps > at least two (as one might imagine that the a priori method involves not > only deduction but also abduction). Well, I admit that both objections are > reasonable. But the latter objection is a little weak, as it involves a > point about how to properly classify the methods, and I find that the > proper classification is the one that would lead to more fruitful results, > which I would maintain is associated more with my proposed approach (though > admittedly further inquiry is needed to prove it so). As to the former > objection, I have no way to meet it as of yet, but can only say that > because no connection is immediately apparent is no real argument against > there being such connection. So, I guess I'm just saying that there's room > for further reflection on the suggestion of associating the most basic > division of kinds of method with the reliance of a given kind of method > upon one or more of the modes or kinds of inference. > > --Franklin > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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