Hi Jeff, This sounds right to me, except that we still have the problem of justifying our belief that an infinite time-period will bring us infinitely closer to the truth rather than rendering us infinitely confused. Don't we?
Cheers, Cathy On Fri, May 9, 2014 at 6:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary. R., List, > > How about if we ask a different kind of question. Given the > descriptions of the other methods for fixing belief, is there any real > difference between theory and practice? That is, if we consider the > arguments Peirce makes in the first lecture collected in RLT, is it > possible to characterize pure theoretical inquiry in terms of any of those > other methods? Or, is all inquiry that is guided by those methods > practically oriented in the sense that the ends governing the inquiry have > a finite time horizon? > > On the basis of Peirce's account of induction, the validity of > particular acts of inductive inference requires of us we identify our > interests with the larger community of inquiry because only the community > is capable of continuing the tests needed to eliminate possible sources of > error. Only on the basis of such an identification will have have reason > to think that our answers will tend to converge on the truth. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ------------------------------ > *From:* Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > *Sent:* Thursday, May 08, 2014 10:40 AM > *To:* Benjamin Udell > *Cc:* Peirce-L > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of > Science > > Ben, Frank, Gary F., List, > > I can't say that I see the 4 methods of fixing belief closely linked to > the 3 patterns of inference nor the 3 categories. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 1:18 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Frank, Gary F., Gary R., list, >> >> When I said that the method of opinion came to seem to me to consist in >> authority trying to operate in a situation of the method of development of >> opinion (the _*a priori*_), I meant that it came to seem to be a >> composite method, a view that you suggest at one point in your post. >> >> At some point I was thinking of associating inference modes with the >> method, only I did it a little differently. But unlike with other things >> that I say below, I kept quiet at the time, because I had already discussed >> the three unscientific methods of inquiry at length. >> >> You associated abductive inference with tenacity; inductive inference >> with authority; and deductive inference with the _*a priori*_. I >> 'switched' the partners of the first two. >> >> **Inductive inference and the method of tenacity.** I saw the method of >> tenacity as involving a kind of misapplication of the method of learning >> (not necessarily cognitive inquiry) by practice and repetition, which is >> first of all a method of learning how to do things skillfully (practice >> makes perfect). One keeps repeating one's opinion, as if to do so were a >> gradual induction in support of it. But it's a willful induction indeed. >> The opinion itself may be generated by any means, as long as it is one's >> first opinion on the given subject, since to the extent that the opinion is >> not initial, the method is not a method of persistence, repetition, willful >> inertia. >> >> **Abductive inference and the method of authority/contest.** I had seen >> method of authority as a species or phase of a method of struggle or >> contest or vying, a phase such that one side becomes dominant. The method >> of contest involves a kind of misapplication of the learning method of >> trial and error (and variation), which is first of all a method of learning >> how to struggle and develop character. In this mis-application, one tries >> to impose one's opinion, as if to do so were an abductive inference >> producing it ("I'm right because I'm gonna win!") - an abductive inference >> is, after all, itself a kind of experimental trial, testing a >> presupposition of one's capacity to guess; in the method of contest, the >> test really is of one's capacity to win, but the winner's opinion wins too >> on the view that _*might makes right*_. In the authoritarian phase, most >> have joined, or acquiesced to, the winning side. But the winner's might, >> even when not kinetically active, remains in place, holding others down. >> The 'might' may be any kind of what the anthropologists have called 'mana' >> - political and martial strength, wealth (funding etc.), glory and >> charisma, and status. The opinion itself may have originally been reached >> by whatever means. >> >> **Deductive inference and the method of _**a priori**_.** Before this >> thread, I thought of the method of _*a priori*_ as the method of >> contest/authority of glamour, charisma, etc., but now I think that at most >> they intersect. In the method of a priori, an opinion is adopted, not >> because it is the most popular or glamorous or hip opinion, but because it >> is indeed to one's taste. It is a kind of mis-application of the learning >> method of appreciation and emulation, better known as 'identification and >> imitation', which is first of all a method of learning to value and >> developing sensibiity. The opinion represents some values that one likes or >> admires, or is the opinion of some figure whose values one likes or >> admires, and adopts. It's not necessarily one's first opinion, instead it >> is, if anything, one's latest opinion (not necessrily one's last and final >> opinion), one's personal fad; this is the most hedonistic method, in which >> opinion is not a weapon or a means, but a culminal pleasure itself, in >> virtue of its content. That is, the method focuses on _*telos*_ as >> culmination and ignores entelechy. Still, the shift of the apriori-arrived >> opinion may be slow in time; and while it is personal, it is also social, >> insofar as it involves freely chosen self-herding and emulation not only of >> idealized models but of actual people. Peirce does discuss it in terms of >> the development of intellectual fashion and taste of the public, not just >> of the individual; and there may be fashion leaders and fashion followers. >> One selects the opinion from among the various opinions on offer at the >> buffet of the currents of thought. From its pleasantness and agreeability, >> one infers as if by deduction its truth; or more precisely one likes and >> expresses it as if the liking and expressing were a deduction, a necessary >> inference, compelled not by authority or tenacity but by the current of >> one's thought. It fits with one's other likings and is 'agreeable to >> reason.' >> >> Well, I gave it a try. >> >> Best, Ben >> On 5/7/2014 1:01 AM, Frank Ransom wrote: >> >> Gary F., Gary R., Ben, List, >> >> Gary F, I'm basically leaning on Liszka's scholarship. In his book, he >> identifies the method of public opinion as a fifth method, positioned >> between the method of authority and the method of the a priori (which >> positioning Ben suggests as well). Having seen what you and Ben reference, >> I suppose Liszka might have been mistaken. Then again, I find myself >> agreeing with Ben that there seems to be something distinct about the >> method of public opinion. As Ben also supposes, the method of consensus >> might be a species of the method of the a priori. If the method of public >> opinion is really about consensus, as it seems to me to be, then perhaps >> Peirce replaced the method of public opinion or consensus with the method >> of the a priori because the method of the a priori incorporates public >> opinion or consensus while also covering other cases pertinent to the >> fermentation of ideas. >> >> Personally, I suppose I would consider the method of public opinion, or >> consensus, distinct from the method of the a priori, due mostly to the fact >> that I have always considered the method of the a priori to be >> characteristically a method pursued by a single mind like Plato, Descartes, >> or Kant, sifting through ideas and ending with what they are inclined to >> think must be the best answer to a given question or problem; while the >> method of public opinion strikes me as more a matter of coherence, not so >> much between ideas, but between the beliefs of the members of a community. >> Thinking on it like this, I'm inclined to view the method of public opinion >> as after, not before, the method of the a priori, since the method of >> science will, in facing reality, inevitably lead to a consensus in the >> community--the key difference between the method of public opinion and the >> method of science consisting in the difference between what the community >> is led to believe today versus what the community is destined to believe. >> >> But perhaps this makes the method of public opinion unduly overlap with >> the method of authority. I have to admit that placing the method of public >> opinion between the method of authority and the method of the a priori >> appears more reasonable in light of this, since it shares in both the >> community-orientation of the method of authority and the free play of ideas >> in the method of the a priori. I think Peirce is himself not altogether >> clear about how to properly characterize the method of public opinion, >> whether it is a sort of softer approach to the method of authority, or >> whether it is a kind of community approach to the comparing of ideas found >> in the method of the a priori. >> >> Then again, I have wondered about what makes the three non-scientific >> methods what they are, and I have something of an idea about them that I >> offer for consideration. If considered from the standpoint of inference and >> taking a hint from the division of the kinds of inference (which partially >> makes sense, since methodeutic follows upon the work of critical logic), >> the method of tenacity might be a strict adherence to one's abductions, the >> method of authority might rely on enforced inductions (that is, involving >> some rather brutal facts, pardon the wordplay), and the method of the a >> priori might rely mostly on deduction, a comparing of ideas with one >> another and their consistency or inconsistency with one another. This last >> would certainly engender the coherence theory of truth, as Gary F suggests >> the method of the a priori, considered as the method of consensus, would. >> As for the method of public opinion, and its gradual metamorphosis into the >> method of the a priori, I wonder whether it might originally have involved >> some combination of two of the kinds of inference without the third, but >> over time Peirce (probably not consciously) came to want to make each of >> the three non-scientific methods as distinct from one another as possible, >> leading to each one signifying a method primarily committed to one kind of >> inference over the other two; whereas the method of science will involve >> all three kinds working together. If my hypothesis has some truth to it, >> then it should be possible to consider three methods, distinct from the >> four identified in "The Fixation of Belief," that involve combinations of >> two kinds of inference while minimizing the third. But this would probably >> get a bit messy, as one would likely be inclined to see similarities >> between examples of these hybrid methods with the other, simpler methods >> and look to categorizing any given example of the hybrid methods as more or >> less falling into one of the simpler methods (tenacity, authority, a >> priori), or perhaps as a part of a larger example of the method of science. >> >> Whether this idea regarding the methods can be reconciled with Peirce's >> discussion of just what makes the method of science what it is--direct >> engagement with, and testing of, reality--I don't know. I suppose it can be >> objected that the fact that the method of science deals with reality and >> the idea that the method of science needs all three kinds of inference do >> not have a clear connection with another. Also, it can be argued that the >> other three methods really do use all three kinds of inference, or perhaps >> at least two (as one might imagine that the a priori method involves not >> only deduction but also abduction). Well, I admit that both objections are >> reasonable. But the latter objection is a little weak, as it involves a >> point about how to properly classify the methods, and I find that the >> proper classification is the one that would lead to more fruitful results, >> which I would maintain is associated more with my proposed approach (though >> admittedly further inquiry is needed to prove it so). As to the former >> objection, I have no way to meet it as of yet, but can only say that >> because no connection is immediately apparent is no real argument against >> there being such connection. So, I guess I'm just saying that there's room >> for further reflection on the suggestion of associating the most basic >> division of kinds of method with the reliance of a given kind of method >> upon one or more of the modes or kinds of inference. >> >> --Franklin >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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