Howard, lists,

Howard, you wrote,

    > In any case, if you are hoping that Peirce's type of realism will
   resolve the mysteries of quantum theory, I am afraid you will be
   disappointed. He could not have understood the problem. In
   particular, the discovery of the irreducuble quantum discreteness
   would have been a total surprise to him, as it was to everyone else.
   Perhaps even more so since it is contrary to his /synechism/.
   [End quote]

Peirce was not a synechist about matter (I don't know what he thought about light):

   The things of this world, that seem so transitory to philosophers,
   are not continuous. They are composed of discrete atoms, no doubt
   Boscovichian points. The really continuous things, Space, and Time,
   and Law, are eternal.
   [End quote, fromEP 2:35, likewise from page 115 in Reasoning and the
   Logic of Things, Peirce's 1898 lectures]

Space, time, and law, as embodied in our Big-Bang universe, may or may not be eternal. But, as to continuity, continuity of spacetime is the simplest way to have quantum mechanics, relativity, and Lorentz symmetry. A granular or pixelated spacetime would introduce big complications for Lorentz symmetry (or so I've read). If there is a Lorentz violation, its maximum size appears, as of a few weeks ago, to be ten million times smaller than previous observations allowed: "Test of Lorentz Invariance with Atmospheric Neutrinos" http://arxiv.org/abs/1410.4267 . (I think that the previous limit was set in 2009, see "7.3 Billion Years Later, Einstein’s Theory Prevails" http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/science/space/29light.html?_r=1 , on work that ruled out Lorentz violations larger than 8/10 of the Planck length) . So, quantum mechanics never abolished all forms of synechism, and Peirce is holding up pretty well.

I don't know whether Peirce can help resolve the mysteries of quantum theory, but his view that that which in principle cannot be discovered is not real is quite in line with QM or the "Copenhagen" version anyway, likewise as you point out he would have agreed with Bohr. Some aspects of quantum discreteness might have surprised him, but I see no reason why he could not have come to understand it. In addition to being a mathematician and a physicist, Peirce was pretty systematic about trying to assemble partial or 'complementary' perspectives into comprehensive wholes (e.g., "The Seven Systems of Metaphysics" from the 1903 Harvard Lectures in EP 2).

You wrote,

   HP: Well, I've never heard that interpretation of QM before. I have
   to agree with Bohr that if you don't think QM is a problem, then I'm
   afraid you don't understand QM.

I said that it seems more solution than problem in a certain light, not that there's no problem for a person's understanding it. I don't claim to flat-out understand QM, I'm not a physicist and, in particular, I don't know the math. But the hardest thing for the average person seems to be that it defies classical realism in physics, the idea that there is no vagueness or indeterminateness in nature itself.

What I'm pointing out is that such classical realism also is not particularly hospitable to the ancient notion (as in Aristotle) that the future really, even in principle, is more or less indeterminate.

If, for whatever reasons, one thinks that the future is intrinsically indeterminate, one naturally wonders, how do things become determinate, is something determinate simply by being located in one's past light cone? That seems a bit mysterious too and, for QM, even it has a bit too much classical realism. What's required is not merely being in the past, so that information could have spread by now, even if it didn't, but instead information's actual spreading or having spread. It's reaction, resistance, interaction, that do this, so light's choice of paths through two slits, without interacting with the environment at that stage, remains indeterminate even as the event recedes into the past, leaving a wave pattern of "futurish" feasible and extremal probabilities recorded on a photographic screen.

Best, Ben

On 11/8/2014 4:56 PM, Howard Pattee wrote:

At 11:40 AM 11/8/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:

Howard, you wrote:

    there is general agreement that QM cannot be interpreted by
    Peircean Realism. In fact, most teachers of QMÂ  struggle with
    the intuitively realist perspectives of introductory students. In
teaching QM, Realism blocks the path of inquiry. [End quote] It's hard to see how there can be general agreement, at least among physicists, about QM's being uninterpretable by Peircean Realism when most physicists are not well acquainted with Peircean Realism.

HP: You are right. I should not have modified Realism with Peirce's name. But many physicist were aware of Peirce. Wigner quotes Peirce but only in the context of the mystery of how "unreasonably effective" abstract mathematical symbols are for modeling Nature, because Peirce also saw the symbol-matter relation as "occult and mysterious."

In any case, if you are hoping that Peirce's type of realism will resolve the mysteries of quantum theory, I am afraid you will be disappointed. He could not have understood the problem. In particular, the discovery of the irreducuble quantum discreteness would have been a total surprise to him, as it was to everyone else. Perhaps even more so since it is contrary to his /synechism/.

BU: Peircean realism favors real, in-principle uncertainty and vagueness in nature itself, by reason of the imperfectibility of measurement, I.e., that which, even _in principle_, inquirers could never find, nature itself cannot find.

HP: Here, Peirce would completely agree with Max Born's argument <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/235987/filename/ajp-jphysrad_1959_20_1_43_0.pdf>, except Born was not a realist.

BU: Moreover, Peirce's realism includes the idea that there are real individuals, real existences. (So the 'complementarity' of generalism versus individualism is already encompassed in Peirce's brand of realism.) In particular, Peirce regards individual existence as a matter not merely of location or proximity in space and time, but of reaction, resistance, interaction, like so many natural measurements. This is congenial to the QM view of things as becoming determinate through interaction with the environment, the 'observer', the 'measurer', etc. If one holds with basicness of reaction/resistance for individual existence, and with the indeterminacy of the future, and takes into account similar considerations involving a signal speed limit (the light cone etc.), then QM starts to seem more a solution than a problem.

HP: Well, I've never heard that interpretation of QM before. I have to agree with Bohr that if you don't think QM is a problem, then I'm afraid you don't understand QM.

Howard
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