Thanks for your comments, Ben. I'll add a few. 1) BEN: How something stands as a sign (for an object to an interpretant): qualisign, sinsign, legisign. How (something as) a sign stands for an object (to an interpretant): icon, index, symbol. How (something as) a sign (for an object) stands to an interpretant: rheme, dicisign, index.
EDWINA: I'd define the first set as Mediation - a term Peirce uses frequently. And the second set as the "relations to their dynamic objects" 8.335. And the third set as "its relation to its signified interpretant" 8.337. That is, I'm using Peirce's terms of 'relation', not 'stands as/stands for/stands to'. I prefer the term 'relation' because it implies (at least to me) the idea of active interaction, while the 'stands as/for/to' implies (at least to me) the idea of static, mechanical cut-and-paste. 2) You wrote: BEN: E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant represents it as (or as if it were) a character attributed or imputed to an object. EDWINA: What bothers me about the above is that it implies (to me) the need for an agent who does the 'attribution' or 'imputation'. I prefer Peirce's description of the rheme as "a Sign of qualitative Possibility.....any Rheme...will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so" 2.250. That is, your description includes some 'attribution' of information, but I don't think a rheme does that. 3) You wrote: BEN:On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the relations that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just discussed, are considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation for the sake of focus. EDWINA: As Peirce said, "signs are divisible by three trichotomies' 2.243 - and he outlines them, within the three categories, and, within the relations to the object and the interpretant: 'the relation of the sign to its object...; according as its Interpretant represents it... That is, at least to me, what I do when I refer to the same three trichotomies and I use the same term as Peirce 'relation'. They are indeed, analytic abstractions from the full triadic Sign. As I've said numerous times - these 'relations' can't exist per se on their own. But they certainly do 'exist' in analysis - otherwise - we wouldn't be able to analyze the ten classes of Signs! 4) You wrote: BEN: Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say. EDWINA: I'm using Peirce's terms. 5) You wrote: BEN: Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the relations. Is Jack the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still exist EDWINA: Jack, who is not the father of Jackson, does not exist within the Relation of Being The Father of Jackson. But Jack exists only within some other Relation - even if it is just air and water. 6) The reason I prefer to use the capital 'S' when referring to the triad, is to differentiate it from the many times when Peirce refers to the Representamen as the 'sign' (lower case). And often, he'll refer to the whole triad as lower case 'sign' (see 2.243)! Many thanks for your triadic three cents worth. Much appreciated. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Benjamin Udell Cc: [email protected] ; 'Peirce-L' Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 2:31 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations Edwina, lists, I haven't read the whole thread, but... I think that it's true that many of us have discussed the sign relations quasi- or pseudo-dyadically for convenience, for example, in the _trikonic_ (2004) PowerPoint presentation, slide 42, discussing the 9-adic Sign Relations: as to the sign itself: qualisign (tone) ▷ legisign (type) sinsign (token) as to the interpretant: rheme ([e.g.,] propositional function) ▷ ▷ argument dicisign ([e.g.,] proposition) as to the object: icon ▷ symbol index In each case one is really discussing a triad with something as a sign for something as an object to something as an interpretant, but there are three places in there where we trichotomize, playing down some aspects of the triadic relation in order to focus on others: How something stands as a sign (for an object to an interpretant): qualisign, sinsign, legisign. How (something as) a sign stands for an object (to an interpretant): icon, index, symbol. How (something as) a sign (for an object) stands to an interpretant: rheme, dicisign, index. This playing down has its limits. In particular, the third trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument) depends on how the sign is represented, in its signified interpretant, as, or as if, character, indexical, or sign of intepretant) of the object. E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified interpretant represents it as (or as if it were) a character attributed or imputed to an object. So, one could as well say that, among the trichotomies: The first trichotomy (qualisign, sinsign, legisign) depends on how a sign stands (or how something stands as a sign). The second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol) depends on how a sign stands for an object. The third trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument) depends on how a sign stands for an object to an interpretant. But we wouldn't actually think that the first trichotomy involves a trio of monadic characters, the second involves a trio of two-correlate relations, and the third a trio of three-correlate relations. On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the relations that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just discussed, are considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation for the sake of focus. Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations", on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I sometimes have trouble following what you say. You object that to speak of the correlates as correlated things rather than as relations implies that they would exist without the relations. Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the relations. Is Jack the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still exist. Then Jackson may not be an index of Jack at all, yet still exist. Jackson will surely be an index of other people and things, of course. Generally of course it is hard to conceive of things in general without conceiving of representational relation in general. The distinction between correlates and relations helps us focus flexibly on various aspects of the phenomenon, including when the correlates are real but not individually existent, and even when a correlate is a figment. Now, flexibility of focus thanks to potential precision justifies speaking of the 'relations' and the 'relation', which you like to be able to do. It also justifies and, I'd say, requires, distinguishing relative (or correlate) from relation, even if the relative were called into being entirely by the relation. As regards speaking of the semiotic triad as the capital-S 'Sign', I seem to disagree with an increasing number of people about this. Not only do I see nowhere Peirce doing this, it seems like a bad move terminologically - it is at odds with everyday-English word 'sign'; I think that such an everyday-English word should not be pressed into service as term of art for a technical conception that has no everyday-English word approximating to it. I would suggest that the semiotic triad, a.k.a. genuine triad, be called a 'eutriad.' The eutriad would 'consist' or however one wants to put it, of the three correlates, their triadic relation, and the relations abstracted from the triadic relation. The genuine triadic relation itself could be called a 'trilation', and the 'members' or relatives having the trilation could be called the 'trilates' or 'trilatives'. On the other hand, I'm not sure how this would gibe with finer-grained classifications in which a sign could be classified by relations to dynamic object, immediate object, etc. And that's my three cents worth. Best, Ben On 12/17/2014 8:20 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: I think that bringing in other words in place of other words...doesn't change the analysis. Jon wrote, of his diagramme, which is quite clear, The "R" brings to mind a triadic relation R, which collateral knowledge tells me is a set of 3-tuples. BUT - calling the triad Sign (capital S) as an 'R' (Representamen) doesn't change the format. And calling the three Relations within that triad as '3-tuples' doesn't change the format. We agree (I think) that the semiosic sign is irreducibly triadic. The quibble seems to be, in my view, trivial, over whether to consider this irreducible triad as A Relation or, as I do, as an irreducible set of 3 Relations. And I consider that my conclusion is readily supported within the Peircean analysis - as I've provided quotations from his own analysis of each one of these 3 Relations, (and he uses the term 'relation' in his discussion, not 'interaction' as does John D) and his pointing out how they function differently. It is the FACT of their different function that leads me to use the plural of the noun 'Relations'. Yet again, no-one is arguing that any one of these 3 can function alone; they exist only within that 'irreducible triad'. But, so far, no-one seems to be focusing on the differences within these three - and why one must acknowledge their differences; the focus seems only to be one whether to call them: a Relation or an irreducible set of 3 Relations. And moving into the fallacies of ad hominem (you are unable or unwilling to..) or ad populum (everyone else thinks like me...) doesn't deal with this issue. The question, I think, isn't so much on Relation vs Relations, but on the nature of the Relation. And I'll continue to use this term as used by Peirce, rather than 'tuple'. Is it a dyad? I'm saying' no', first, because the perimeters of the interaction are not between existential individual entities and second, because the semiosic process is triadic and the single Relations do not exist on their own. Is a single Relation a dyad? No, again, because the perimeters of each Relation are part of the whole triadic interaction. Certainly, semiosis takes place, as a triadic whole, between two existential units - whether it be one cell and another cell. What makes this interaction between, eg, an external Dynamic Object or even an Internal Object ..and the habits of the Representamen...a Relation? The fact that it can be in any of the three categorical modes; that moves it from a mere mechanical interaction to a Relation. Same with the other two processes of the semiosic triad. 'Something' is going on - and that something is the transformative action of the categories. Now, of course, some of you may disagree. But that's how I 'imagize' the semiosic process and I don't see how my use of the plural of Relations or my focus on the individual nature of each ofo the three Relations (and I recall Peirce's focus on their individual nature) is 'offensive' to some. Edwina ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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